

Vladilen
Vorontsov

FROM THE MISSIONARY DAYS TO REFORM

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**FROM
THE
MISSIONARY
DAYS
TO
REAGAN**

US China Policy



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ОТ МИССИОНЕРОВ ДО РЕЙГАНА
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Many alumni of the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies of the mid-1950s had the good fortune to study under such prominent academics as, for instance, professor G.N. Voitinsky, who left a deep imprint in my memory. In the 1920s Voitinsky had written of his meetings with the great son of the Chinese people, Dr. Sun Yatsen. At the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies Voitinsky endeavoured to convey to students his inherent optimism, his hope that socialism would be established in China.

S.L. Tikhvinsky and G.V. Yefimov, among others, soon won renown as Orientalists. Taking over from G.N. Voitinsky, they closely studied the heritage of Dr. Sun Yatsen and showed how significant this heritage was for the development of friendly relations between the Soviet and Chinese peoples. In those years we saw the events in the Far East basically as an unhindered process of the spread and triumph of socialist ideas.

But already then among Soviet Orientalists there were various opinions about the development of the revolutionary process in China. Some called this a people's democratic revolution, others believed that it was an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal revolution, and still others were convinced that Chinese society was undergoing a socialist restructuring. However that may be, our perception of the political events in China, of the development of Soviet-Chinese relations depended chiefly on the prevailing atmosphere.

We rejoiced over the proclamation of the People's Republic of China, knew of the immense assistance our country was extending to China in building the foundations of socialism, and

many of our alumni had grounds for regarding themselves involved in this construction. As members of the Moscow YCL organisation of those years, we felt it was our duty to contribute to the success of the visits of Chinese youth delegates to our country. We were familiar with the name of Hu Yaobang, then First Secretary of the New Democratic Youth League of China CC, and heard his speeches, in which time and again he urged closer friendship between the young people of the USSR and China.

Those who continued working as Orientalists often recalled the years when the foundation of friendly relations between the Soviet Union and China was built. There was a big demand for books on Soviet-Chinese relations that came out in the 1950s. "The friendship between the Soviet and Chinese peoples, which has deep roots and long-standing traditions," Kapitsa noted, "withstood stern tests and no force could prevent its growth. Both peoples will go on strengthening their friendship and cooperation." Of course, even as early as the 1950s people in the Soviet Union knew that there were other sentiments among part of the Chinese leadership. But our comrades saw their duty in mustering every effort to foster the internationalist tendencies in the development of Soviet-Chinese relations. The Orientalists who began their career in the 1950s saw these relations as a reflection of the revolutionary, genuinely internationalist currents in the history of the USSR and China.

In those years, at the height of the cold war, of the American witch-hunt, people in the USA avidly read the works of Owen Lattimore, who was one of the first victims of McCarthyism. It was precisely then that in the USA much was said about the "loss" of China to the USA and a feverish search was instituted to find those responsible for this "loss". Those who were charged with betraying US interests clearly stated their stand: Can one lose something that one does not have? In 1958 John K. Fairbank's *The United States and China* was published in the USA. Recognised as the leading US Sinologist, Fairbank urged his countrymen to accept the political realities of China without embellishment, to avoid subjectivist assessments of these realities, to desist from wishful thinking, and try to acquire a clear understanding of the fundamental distinctions between the Chinese and American societies.

Fairbank's conclusion was that Americans could not remake Chinese society along the pattern of their own society but should help to draw the West and China closer together.

Ever since the initial US penetration into China, the US attitude to China has undergone many changes. America's rulers looked on the revolution in China with horror, American liberals saw it as bringing the Chinese people deliverance from the detested Chiang Kai-shek regime, while American progressives welcomed the triumph of the Communist Party of China.

The political developments in China were ideologically unacceptable to the conservative Republican right wing, from John Foster Dulles and Douglas MacArthur to Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan. But in the 1970s and 1980s they reconsidered the basic guidelines of their policy towards China. This evolution inevitably took into consideration the changes in China itself and in the posture of China's leaders towards the USSR.

In the USA, as in the entire capitalist world, considerable optimism was generated when China embarked upon an Open Door policy in the 1980s. But the question of how useful this policy would be in terms of Western interests has never lost its significance, especially to Washington. Of course, in the USA they are hoping that the internal changes in China will open the door to capitalist development in that country. US protagonists of closer relations with China have their sights on both current and long-term foreign policy aims. They are encouraged by, in particular, the circumstance that individual ranking government officials in China are amassing wealth and degenerating. In China the objective conditions have indeed taken shape for this. Deng Xiaoping's words about there being "two systems in one state" are not simply a slogan; they reflect the fact that elements of capitalism are developing in China. Capitalism's essence does not change, of course. The market economy fosters consumer sentiments among different sections of the Chinese people and inflames the passion for gain. Concerned over capitalism's destinies in the world, American politicians are using all the means at their disposal to promote the development of bureaucratic-capitalist tendencies in China.

To what extent is the experience of US-Chinese relations consistent with the intentions of the West, of the USA in the

first place, to stimulate the development of capitalist tendencies in China? Can the revolutionary, progressive traditions of the Chinese people's historical past exercise a restraining influence on such tendencies in that country? What are the potentialities and limits for the development of relations between the USA and China? In this book, the author endeavours to answer these and related questions.

The author has attempted to analyse Sino-American relations from the angle of history, ideology, and politics. Naturally, he examines subjects that he feels are of the greatest import and interest. This is a vast theme and many of its aspects, dealt with only in outline or omitted in this book, will unquestionably be researched by other scholars.

Vladilen Vorontsov

INTRODUCTION

A major factor shaping China's present foreign policy and substantiating and justifying the changes that have taken place in China's relations with the West has been the relevant interpretation of historical experience, primarily the experience of US-Chinese relations. In 1972, when President Richard Nixon visited Beijing, the mass media both in the USA and in China hailed the idea that friendship between the Chinese and American peoples was traditional.

What Richard Nixon started was continued in the 1980s by his party associate Ronald Reagan. On April 27, 1984, during his visit to China, President Ronald Reagan addressed community leaders in the Great Hall of the People. He reminded his listeners that Richard Nixon, who had visited China 12 years before him, "turned a new page" in the history of the USA and China. Reagan evidently realised that having mentioned the "new page", no American political leader could afford to forget the pages preceding it. He spoke of America's long interest in China, which, he said, dated back to the beginning of the USA's history. In support of this interest he referred to the Founding Fathers of the USA—George Washington, John Adams, and Thomas Jefferson—whose personal dinner settings were of Chinese origin. He spoke in glowing terms of the first American acquaintance-ship with China. "Back in 1784, when the first American trading ship, the *Empress of China*, entered your waters," Reagan told his hosts, "my country was unknown to you. We were a new republic, eager to win a place in international commerce."

Much of the freight aboard the first United States ship to China was owned by Robert Morris. He was not mentioned by

Reagan, although researchers into the history of US expansion note that to the period of primary accumulation of US capital of the eighteenth century Robert Morris was approximately what Rockefeller was to industrial capitalism of the nineteenth. The President's drilled assistants inserted into his speech an excerpt from a letter written home by an American seaman, who described his visit to China, writing that the Americans managed to persuade the Chinese of the importance of trade. Some American political personalities and academics are more restrained in their assessments of the history of US-Chinese relations. In many of their writings they note that the ships that returned from China to America (some did not return) brought enormous wealth, rare spices, and the hope of more riches. The flags flown by these ships might well have borne the words: "For God, gold, and glory!" It was not the desire to promote trade for the good of the two countries but the ambitions of the capitalists that motivated US expansion in the East.

In the Great Hall of the People President Reagan said that since the close of the eighteenth century the USA and China had both profited from the exchange of people and that "Chinese settlers helped tame" the American continent. It evidently escaped his mind that American businessmen used cheap Chinese labour to drain marshes and grow rice, fruit, tea, tobacco, cotton, etc. Chinese began crowding out American workers, particularly in industries that employed mainly manual labour, competing "in the labour market with American workers on the basis of the Chinese living standard, which was the lowest of all".¹ The gold rush in California and then the railway construction boom stimulated the employment of cheap imported labour. In league with Chinese suppliers of labour, Chinese businessmen redoubled their efforts to recruit workers. In 1850 there were 600 Chinese working in California's goldfields; within ten years their number rose to 30,000. The interests of American and Chinese businessmen intertwined in the employment of cheap Chinese labour. Both the former and the latter were in the grip of an elementary drive for profit. But as the Chinese population in the USA grew and the positions of the Chinese suppliers of la-

¹ "Engels an Nikolai Franzewitsch Danielson in Petersburg. London, 22 September 1892", in Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 38, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1968, p. 470.

bour gained strength, anti-Chinese feeling increased in various segments of American society. Some states passed laws that were undisguisedly racist and struck at Chinese immigrants. The Chinese worker was duped by Chinese businessmen and made the victim of political gambles by American businessmen, who went to all lengths to blunt the social thrust of the growing working-class movement.

Chinese historians will hardly forget that the foundation of the mammoth fortunes of American's wealthiest families was built by cheap Chinese labour.

American academics could not, of course, refrain from attempts at taking a new look at the past experience of relations with China. For instance, in seeking the roots of the USA's China policy of the 1970s in events of the distant past, Marvin Kalb and Elie Abel offer the conclusion that US foreign policy in Asia has been more or less stable during the last 200 years. Judging by their studies, there is absolutely no evidence in history that the USA was guided by imperialist motives, that the only proof obtainable is that the USA had been magnanimous and that it had inaccurately assessed its potentialities for attaining its "lofty" aims in Asia. These theories are hardly new. The spokesmen of US anti-colonialism have always counterposed the "exclusiveness" of American experience in Asian affairs to West European colonialism. In the 1840s Caleb Cushing, who led a military and diplomatic mission to China, publicly stigmatised the actions of the British in China. But in conversations with his countrymen he spoke favourably of British policy in China. During the Opium Wars in China (1840-1842), when the British fought and the Americans remained neutral, Britain benefited enormously from US neutrality. As neutrals, the Americans in many cases protected British property in and outside China. The first shackling Sino-US treaty was signed in 1844, when the USA took advantage of Britain's victory in China and used the threat of force to achieve objectives that were not lofty in any sense.

Caleb Cushing was one of the first Americans to begin talks with China from positions of strength. He arrived in China at the head of a special mission authorised to conclude a treaty with the Chinese authorities. The guns of three US naval vessels were his strongest arguments to justify the

objectives of his mission. Through a demonstration of naval strength Cushing forced the unequal 1844 treaty upon the Chinese authorities in Wangxia. This treaty exacted larger concessions from the Chinese than they had made in their treaties with Britain (1842-1843). The Americans obtained extra-territorial rights, most-favoured nation status in trade, a clause stipulating that the treaty would be revised in 12 years, and so forth.

In 1856, when the British started hostilities in China, the Chinese coast was shelled heavily by United States warships.

The US Navy was built, writes the American Sinologist John K. Fairbank, chiefly as a defence against pirates from the Moslem states of North Africa. ("The Navy was built to protect this [US] trade by police action.")¹ Many of the naval officers who operated on the Barbary Coast turned up in the Far East twenty or thirty years later. Fairbank cites the example of Commodore Perry, who began his career on the Barbary Coast in the 1820s. According to Fairbank, the US fleet stationed along the Chinese coast operated in the spirit of the "defensive" traditions formed in the clashes with pirates. However, it was none other than Commodore Matthew Galbraith Perry who urged determined action with the objective of establishing an American protectorate over Siam, Cambodia, Borneo, and other territories. It was none other than he, acting contrary to the spirit of "defensive" traditions, who insisted that the US Navy Department turn Formosa into an American base in the Far East.

In the Pacific and, particularly, in China, the Americans acted independently of the European powers, often imitating the worst patterns of behaviour from the history of colonialism. Small wonder that US statesmen and their associates from among the political community of their country called the Pacific a "sphere of traditional US interests". In the nineteenth century unequal treaties were forced upon China and Korea by military strength and by subterfuges.

The Chinese attained an intimate knowledge of Americans when Frederick Townsend Ward, who had by then acquired notoriety as a soldier of fortune, appeared in China in 1860. The colonial powers had sided irrevocably with the imperial govern-

¹ John K. Fairbank, *Chinese-American Interactions: A Historical Summary*, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1975, pp. 12-13.

ment against the Chinese people (Boxer Uprising). The Qing court signed unequal treaties with colonial powers (the USA forced the Tianjin [Tientsin] Treaty of 1858 on China, and the 1901 Protocol was signed under pressure from the USA after the Yihetuan—Boxer—Uprising was crushed). Ward, having struck a deal with the imperial court, decided to muster an army of cutthroats. Spurred by easy gain, riffraff with criminal elements among them responded to his call for recruits. At first only foreigners were admitted to this army of thugs, but later Ward began recruiting Chinese as well. For every town taken from the rebels Ward received payment ranging from the equivalent of 40,000 to 130,000 dollars. The “great American citizen”, as Ward is called by some Western historians, relied on the touching unity among the colonialists. Ward’s mercenaries got their weapons and equipment from the British, and in many of their punitive operations they were supported by marines from British and French frigates. In the nineteenth century the Chinese people thus saw the true face of their foreign friends, and the worth of the assurances dispensed generously by the colonialists. If John K. Fairbank is to be believed, up to the year 1870 the Americans acted as private persons, operating independently of their government and motivated entirely by a thirst for adventure or gain. In this context a rosy picture is given of the activities of Anson Burlingame, who was the American minister in China. Western, particularly US, historiography peddles the legend that in the 1860s Burlingame contributed to building up “friendly” relations between China and the USA. Americans thought highly of the activities of their diplomat, so much so that an American poet, Oliver Holmes, dedicated a poem to him. Holmes wrote with rapture—the topicality of this poem is mentioned by Fairbank—about there being features in common between East and West, between China and the USA.

In his despatches Burlingame wrote bluntly that (“if necessary”) the Western powers could intervene in China’s internal affairs. He justified the operations of the foreign troops aimed at suppressing the Taiping movement, which was a spontaneous protest of the Chinese people against the Qing tyranny. Indeed, Burlingame’s practical actions also show the hollowness of the argument that in US-Chinese relations the miscalculations and “misunderstandings” of the past were accidental. In 1868, in

collaboration with the US Secretary of State William Henry Seward, Anson Burlingame drafted a treaty with China, known as the Burlingame Treaty, that de jure codified new forms of slave-trade. The treaty gave American businessmen the possibility of using cheap Chinese labour shipped to the USA from China. This subsequently led to an uncontrolled growth of Chinese immigration in the USA with the resultant difficult internal problems for the government in Washington. One of the clauses of the Burlingame Treaty envisaged the possibility of giving the USA jurisdiction over part of China's territory and its inhabitants, and although this treaty contained the reservation that special agreement would be needed for this it was evidence of the colonial essence of the USA's China policy.

By the mid-nineteenth century the US political and military machine had acquired vast experience of armed adventure in the Pacific and of the barbarous use of weapons against civilians in China, Korea, Japan, and the Pacific islands. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries US diplomacy still did not feel it was necessary to shift and dodge in order to produce suitable justification for plunder and violence. In complex situations US political leaders used what they saw as the best possible pretexts: "the need to punish natives", "protection of the property and lives of US citizens". History shows that these pretexts were used in China time and again by US diplomacy: the "protection" of the interests of United States citizens in China in 1854 and 1855; the "protection" of US interests in Guangzhou (Canton) in 1866; the "protection" of US interests in Shanghai in 1859; "punishment" for an attack on a US Consul in 1859; the "punishment" of persons suspected of murdering the crew of a United States vessel on Taiwan in 1867; the "protection" of US interests in 1894-1895; the "protection" of the US Mission in Beijing and of the US Consulate in Tianjin in 1898-1899; the "protection" of the interests of foreign powers during the Boxer Uprising in 1900; "protection" of private property in Hangzhou and Shanghai and the landing of troops in Nanking in 1911; the "protection" of US interests in 1912; the "protection" of US property in Beijing and the road to the sea in 1912; "protection" of US property in China in 1920, 1924, and 1925-1927.

The appetites of the young US monopolies grew. They could no longer be satisfied by the domestic market, by internal re-

sources. The American bourgeoisie was increasingly attracted by the idea of extending its influence beyond the frontiers of its own country. The most important factor motivating plans for further expansion was the seizure of the Philippines. US imperialism, to quote Lenin, saw the conquest of the Philippines as "a step towards Asia and *China*".¹ In the US Congress statesmen argued about "protecting American interests", while military leaders and businessmen, driven by a thirst for profit, vainglory, or simply adventure resorted to force, deceit, or cunning to compel Eastern nations to sign unequal treaties, giving the former extraterritorial rights and other benefits in return for promises of "good services" in time of need, and demanded the opening of ports, trade benefits, and so forth. The United States embarked upon the building of an empire. The ideologues of the "American age" dreamed of an empire extending ever farther to the south (Central and South America) and to the west (the Pacific basin). The USA was moving into leading economic and political positions, pushing Britain into the background. The American bourgeoisie followed in the footsteps of the colonialists, complying with the classical canons of colonialism and contributing to capitalist expansion in Asia. In effect, the USA became the spiritual heir to European colonialism in Asia.

Through United States representatives in London, St Petersburg, and Berlin, on September 6, 1899, US Secretary of State John Hay addressed notes to the governments concerned, declaring that the USA wanted freedom of trade in China. Similar notes were later received by the governments of France, Japan, and Italy. This was, in effect, the official birth of the Open Door, or Hay, doctrine.

In many American non-Marxist studies the Open Door doctrine is portrayed as a boon for the Chinese people, as evidence of the USA's lofty intention of "achieving justice". The architects of the Open Door doctrine linked it to, as Fairbank believes, apprehensions about Russian expansion in Manchuria and demonstrated the aspirations of the Americans to achieve what they termed as "political justice". One can hardly dispute the anti-Russian thrust of the doctrine, but its true objectives were

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Notebooks on Imperialism", *Collected Works*, Vol. 39, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p. 210.

much broader. Was it not with this doctrine to fall back upon that the USA paved the way for expansion in China? Was it not this doctrine that was the weapon of US capital against European competition? Although its methods differed from those of European policy, US policy in China was expansionist. N. Gordon Levin, an exponent of Wilsonian "liberal anti-imperialism", saw United States "anti-colonialism", born in the crucible of inter-imperialist contradictions, as the USA's new approach to the world's colonial problems. "New Freedom Foreign Policy in regard to China and Latin America, during Wilson's first term," Levin writes, "exemplified the relation of the President's ideology of moral and material export to his liberal anti-imperialism."¹ What was Wilson's "anti-imperialism" relative to China? In answering this question, Levin obviously had in mind the attitude of many of his fellow-countrymen who charged Wilson with disregarding the USA's national interests. The Wilsonian concern for the "territorial integrity, stability, and political independence of China" was not, according to Levin, "an abstract anti-imperialist position". "Actually," he writes, "Wilson's opposition to the traditional policies of spheres of influence ... was inextricably bound up with his concept of the type of liberal world order of commercial freedom within which the genius of American capitalism could best win its rightful place in the markets of the world."² Levin notes that such a League-supported programme of non-discriminatory trade and the "peaceful" capitalist penetration of the world's underdeveloped areas was to foster the Open Door policy in Asia and Africa.³

Chinese historians of the 1950s wrote much about the Open Door doctrine, exposing it as a cover for United States expansion of China, as the commencement of the struggle between US imperialism and Japan for control over China.⁴ However, an improvement of relations between China and the

¹ N. Gordon Levin, Jr., *Woodrow Wilson and World Politics. America's Response to War and Revolution*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1968, p. 18.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid., p. 237.

⁴ Hu Sheng, *Aggression in China by Imperialist Powers*, Moscow, 1951, translated from the Chinese (in Russian); Liu Danian, *US Aggression in China: a History*, Moscow, 1953, translated from the Chinese (in Russian).

USA and the establishment of diplomatic relations between them induced Beijing to reconsider the assessments of the US Open Door doctrine offered previously by Chinese historians. Indicative in this respect is an article by Wang Xi (in the journal *World History*, No 3, 1979), in which the USA is portrayed as a supporter of China's territorial integrity despite having had the intention of consolidating and extending its own economic and political interests. This Chinese historian reminds the USA of its "miscalculations" in giving effect to the Open Door doctrine; this, he notes, was seen in Washington's "indecision", in its reluctance to take a more energetic stand against its rivals in China, primarily Russia, of course.

The true motivations of the Europeans and Americans in the East have been shown by the Marxists. It was not "moral values", as is claimed by many bourgeois academics, but the interests of capital that formed the locomotive spreading West European and United States influence in Asia. The attempts to justify colonialist outrage in China had been denounced by Karl Marx. "Wherever the real demand for commodities imported into Asiatic countries does not answer the supposed demand—which, in most instances, is calculated on such superficial data as the extent of the new market, the magnitude of the population, and the vent foreign wares used to find at some outstanding sea-ports—commercial men, in their eagerness at securing a larger area of exchange, are too prone to account for their disappointment by the circumstance that artificial arrangements, invented by barbarian Governments, stand in their way, and may, consequently, be cleared away by main force... Thus the artificial obstacles foreign commerce was supposed to encounter on the part of the Chinese authorities, formed, in fact, the great pretext which, in the eyes of the mercantile world, justified every outrage committed on the Celestial Empire."¹

As the turbulent Sino-US dialogue developed in the 1970s, many officials in Washington missed no opportunity to remind the world of the "touching concern" shown by American philanthropists for their "Chinese proteges". Some historians have al-

¹ Karl Marx, "Trade With China", in Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 16, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1980, pp. 536-37.

together written off US expansion in China, flagrant interference of the colonial powers in China's internal affairs, claiming that there only were "mistakes", "misunderstandings", and the like.

Many Americans who wrote books about China in those years deliberately sought to persuade people that the USA had always had the desire to facilitate the creation of a united and independent China, to act exclusively for the good of the Chinese people. Under this same pretext attempts are being made to justify, for instance, US interference in China's internal affairs, its support for the bankrupt Chiang Kai-shek regime, the aggression against the Korean people that was a direct threat to China itself and, lastly, the aggression in Indochina, attributing all this to errors and miscalculations by individual statesmen and political leaders (Patrick J. Hurley, Douglas MacArthur, John Foster Dulles, and others). It cannot be said, of course, that US political leaders and historians had not formerly been in the habit of saying that in relation to China their fellow-countrymen were disinterested and altruistic, of claiming that a "sense of justice" was the principal motivation of the USA's China policy. But in the books about China published in the period of the normalisation of US-Chinese relations, such claims have become very visible indeed.

The years that have passed since the publication of the Shanghai communique (1972) have shown what complications and contradictions the process of Sino-American detente is encountering. Contradictions between Beijing and Washington over Taiwan grew acute in 1982. The compromise achieved did not mean an extinguishing of such contradictions.

The ups and downs in Sino-US relations are due not only to the political situation. These relations are influenced by the impact of historical traditions, by the glaring differences in the economic development of China and the USA, and by distinctions of a social and ideological character.

CHAPTER ONE

MISSIONARIES “DISCOVER” CHINA: HOPES AND DISAPPOINTMENTS

First Steps

American missionaries began their systematic penetration of China early in the nineteenth century. In 1812 the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions consisted of influential members of the Congregational and Presbyterian Churches in the USA. China became one of the Board's main objectives. The Qing Closed Door policy was a serious impediment to the advance of the American missions that the American Board was planning to establish in that country. US religious organisations began spreading their evangelical activities to the countries around China and then, having acquired some experience, they planned a massive expansion in China.

The arrival of the first Protestant missionary in Canton in 1807 was a noteworthy event. As the first British missionary in China, Robert Morrison might have been expected to enjoy the extraordinary patronage of the British Crown. But the facts tell quite a different story. When Morrison landed in China he had in the pocket a letter of recommendation from the US Secretary of State James Madison to the United States Consul in Guangzhou. He arrived in China aboard an American vessel, while American merchants had not only financed his voyage but given him every possible moral and material assistance. Morrison's arrival in China was one of the early testimonies not only of the unity between the American bourgeoisie, which was strengthening its positions, and the British colonialists, but also a striking illustration of the growing interest that American business was showing in missionary activity in China. Ever since the young American bourgeoisie appeared in the arena of world trade, which was growing rapidly, the knowledge that Americans

had of China and the Chinese had of the USA was formed largely under the influence of the adherents of the missionary movement, from the links that were established between the heirs of the Pilgrim Fathers and their pupils in China.

With the laying of a new milestone in the development of relations between Beijing and Washington, a milestone clearly marked out by the visit of US President Richard M. Nixon to the PRC in 1972, Chinese and United States historians had a ponderable reason for looking back over the history of Sino-US relations and over the history of the missionary movement. After the death of Mao Zedong Chinese historians variously assessed the activities of the Christian Church in China. Some—for example, Wang Xi—wrote that the American missionaries played a positive role in China,¹ while Ding Mingnan, Zhang Zhenkun² showed that the American missionaries were nothing less than an instrument of foreign aggression in China. The former viewpoint is very close to that of American pundits, who for their part sought to praise the efforts of their countrymen in spreading Christianity in China and thereby helping to create a more conducive political atmosphere for the promotion of relations between the USA and China.

The exponents of the various viewpoints about the role of the Christian Church in China do not deny that the missionaries left an imprint on the history of US-Chinese relations. Huang Hua, who became Foreign Minister and Deputy Premier of the PRC soon after Mao Zedong's death, was one of the many Chinese who studied at Yanjing University, which was under the control of missionary organisations. The American journalist Edgar P. Snow saw in Huang Hua a "Christian Communist". "Having dropped the supernaturalism of the faith, which is irreconcilable with Chinese rationalism", young people of Huang Hua's stamp were, Snow wrote, "able to synthesize the social teachings of Christianity with their daily political catechism". He assumed that the "elemental and apostolic equalitarianism" of local life fostered the illusion that this was expedient behaviour. In this context he cited the self-sacrifice of Father Vincent Lebbe, a Belgian priest, who took his

¹ *Shijie lishi*, No. 3, 1979, (Beijing), pp. 11-23.

² *Jindai shi yanjiu*, No. 2, 1979, (Beijing), pp. 89-113.

Christian hospital to join the CPC's armed forces and declared that he felt no conflict between his principles and those practised by General Zhu De (Chu Teh)¹.

Confronted by social and political changes in China, the foreign missionaries had to have recourse to more flexible forms of activity, to show tolerance, find a common language with people of a different faith, and take the population's sentiments and thinking into account. Father Vincent Lebbe's deed was a natural one in the light of clerical modernism. The turn by students (such as Huang Hua) from Christian educational institutions to the revolutionary movement was also quite natural. In China the Christian Church was hit by a serious religious crisis, when the upsurge of the anti-imperialist movement was seen clearly in, among other things, intense anti-missionary actions.

In some American propaganda publications the discourses about US "traditional friendship" with China are usually replete with arguments claiming that the missionaries had made a huge "enlightening contribution" not only to Chinese culture but also to the Chinese revolution. It is asserted that the missionaries came to China exclusively for educational purposes, in order to enlighten the "ignorant" Chinese people by bringing the "word of God" to them. In this context propagandists often quote words spoken by John Griffith at a China missionary conference in 1877: "We are here, not to develop the resources of the country, not for the advancement of commerce, not for mere promotion of civilization; but to do battle with the powers of darkness, to save men from sin, and conquer China for Christ."² These propagandists claim that John Griffith and his associates played a "constructive" role, and usually try to show the missionary movement in China as activity that had nothing at all in common with economic and political expansion.

The development of US-Chinese relations in the 1970s required that American historians look for new themes that would reaffirm that the US missionary movement played a creative role, that it had a constructive impact on the destiny of the Chi-

¹ Edgar Snow, *The Battle for Asia*, Random House, New York, 1941, p. 252.

² Jessie Gregory Lutz, *China and the Christian Colleges. 1850-1950*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1971, p. 11.

nese revolution. In line with the euphoria about China in the early 1970s, quite a few books were published in an effort to show how much noble work was done by the American missionaries who set up a network of Christian educational institutions for the alleged purpose of saving "heathen souls from eternal fire". This argument is to be found not only in treatises. In the 1970s it began to appear in newspapers and journals.

However, in China they will hardly consign to oblivion the tragedy that accompanied the first steps made by the capitalist West in its expansion in the Far East. The American missions were a major element of this expansion. New ports were opened for commerce with foreign countries, and the Christian missionaries were given a free hand for their activities. Among them were many, who, without fear of retaliation, approved violence as a major means of spreading foreign influence in China. In May 1840 they gave their blessing to what amounted to British military actions against China and inclined the US government to follow suit. The time had come, wrote a missionary journal published in Guangzhou, when China had to bend or be broken. During the Opium Wars many missionaries supported an enlargement of the foreign expansion in China.

In 1858 the city of Tianjin (Tientsin) was besieged by British and French troops. In the ranks of the allies there were Americans who portrayed themselves as "mediators". The American missionaries W.A. Martin and Samuel Wells Williams persistently conducted negotiations in the Chinese camp. On May 19 a special messenger brought them the news that on the next day the allies would storm the forts protecting the approaches to Tianjin. Despite this foreknowledge, the missionaries went on with the negotiations, hoping in this way to lull the vigilance of the city's defenders. This "mediation" of the missionaries helped the allies take the enemy unawares. Martin, who inspected the battlefield with the eye of a conqueror, noted: "It was a sickening sight. Trails of blood were to be seen in all directions, and in some places it stood in pools, while the corpses of soldiers were roasting in their burning barracks."¹

¹ W.A. Martin, *A Cycle of Cathay or China, South and North. With Personal Reminiscences*, Fleming H. Revell Company, New York, Chicago, Toronto, 1896, p. 163.

It seemed that the conditions most conducive for the activity of the missionaries in China took shape after the British and the French signed treaties with the Chinese (the Tianjin Treaties of 1858). But at the turn of the century a wave of disaffection rolled across China. This was the Yihetuan Uprising during which the missionaries saw how deep-rooted the people's wrath was. Lenin, who was a contemporary of the Yihe-tuan Uprising, wrote in the first issue of *Iskra* in December 1900: "How can the Chinese not hate those who have come to China solely for the sake of gain; who have utilised their vaunted civilisation solely for the purpose of deception, plunder, and violence ... who hypocritically carried their policy of plunder under the guise of spreading Christianity?"¹

The anti-foreign actions under the slogan calling for struggle against the humiliating terms of the unequal treaties forced upon China by the West gained momentum. As a result of an action on May 28, 1895 in Chengdu (Chengtu), Sichuan (Szechwan) Province, three foreign missions, one of which was American, were destroyed. Soon afterwards there was a rising in Gutian (near Fuzhou [Foochow], Fujian [Fukiang] Province). As in most other localities, the rising in Gutian was directed by secret societies. The secret Buddhist Vegetarian Society, which had up to 12,000 members in Fujian Province, consisted chiefly of persons who were, willy-nilly, vegetarians—the rules banned meat, wine, tobacco, and opium; as for the poor their joyless life fitted into these rules. Tang Gue, a scholar who led the rising in Gutian, urged the insurgents to "kill the foreign devils". The tragic events at Lanzhou on October 28, 1905 are widely known. Hundreds of Chinese attacked an American mission. Five missionaries lost their lives. The USA responded with vigorous military and diplomatic efforts: in Washington it was decided to enlarge the US naval squadron in Far Eastern waters.

The complicated dialectics of the missionary movement is self-evident. Those who went to China to spread the Gospel risked their lives time and again amidst hostile surroundings. On the one hand, they sought to save children from cholera,

¹ V.I. Lenin, "The War in China", *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, 1977, p. 373.

thereby endangering their own lives. They sincerely believed that they were making this sacrifice in order to heal misled heathens. But, on the other hand, they approved the perfidy and brutality of the foreign troops on Chinese soil, believing that "heathen" blood was being spilt for a sacred cause. By and large, the impression was given that the missionaries condemned the opium trade—Christian morality officially came into conflict with the evil that addiction to opium was holding out for the Chinese. But missionary publications contended that opium was no more harmful than alcohol, while some zealous and enterprising American missionaries travelled (most often as interpreters) aboard ships trading in opium. The American missionary was a teacher, doctor, and interpreter, and in this sense should have contributed to the enlightenment of the "ignorant" Chinese masses. However, the Americans saw the missionaries as a powerful instrument capable of "rejuvenating" the Chinese spiritually and thereby facilitating China's penetration by capitalist production and capitalist political institutions. Among the missionaries there were, of course, those who were guided entirely by religious motivations, devoting themselves to charitable work in the East. Some sincerely believed that they were contributing to the education and health of the peoples of backward countries. The first echelon in the movement of capitalist America into a backward Asian country had, as had the British in India, in their time, to accomplish a double mission, to quote Marx: "...one destructive, the other regenerating".¹

Many Americans acknowledged, as they still do, that the missionary was the "forerunner of commerce". "Inspired by holy zeal," writes the American envoy Charles Denby, "he goes into the interior where the white man's foot has never trod. He builds a little chapel, a dispensary, a schoolhouse, a workshop. He effects a lodgment in the heart of the country. The drummer follows behind, and foreign commerce begins."² It is admitted in US official quarters that in the twentieth century the Amer-

¹ Karl Marx, "The Future Results of British Rule in India", in Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 12, 1979, p. 217.

² Charles Denby, *China and Her People. Being the Observations, Reminiscences, and Conclusions of an American Diplomat*, in two volumes. Vol. I, L.C. Page & Company, Boston, 1906, p. 220.

ican monopolies Standard Oil Co. and British American Tobacco Co. were, thanks to missionaries, able to function profitably in China.

The “Golden Age”

In the early twentieth century, when Washington was stepping up its activities in the Far East, it nevertheless had to reckon with the ambitions of the Japanese colonialists—this was the result of the USA’s belated appearance in the arena of struggle for the colonial division of the world. In objective terms, this circumstance placed a constraint on the activity of American missionaries in China. Some American authors, missionaries among them, were ready to censure United States ruling circles for “lacking a keen interest” in China’s affairs. The American missionaries were sounding the alarm at the time. Members of the top echelon of Chinese society had begun to turn away from the missionary schools and preferred to send their sons to China’s Eastern neighbour to learn the secrets of Japanese successes. They felt it was incredible that having, seemingly, only recently been in the grip of ignorance, Japan had by force of arms come forth as a powerful nation. The USA had to accept a compromise. For its tacit agreement to the annexation of Korea in 1910 Washington obtained Japan’s recognition of its seizure of the Philippines.

The strengthening of Japan’s positions in the Far East visibly affected the destinies of the missionary movement in China. Anti-American propaganda led to a renunciation of the services of American schoolteachers and of the use of American textbooks. Japan, Germany, and Britain became more attractive to Chinese students than the USA. The struggle for the spiritual leadership of the then existing and future elite of China intensified. American politicians gave strident publicity to a symbolic gesture—in 1908 the US Congress renounced the USA’s share of the indemnity that was imposed on China after the massive rebellion of 1900 was suppressed by the leading imperialist powers. The Americans returned to China a portion of the “Boxer” indemnity and accompanied their seemingly magnanimous gesture with the conditions that this money would be used to promote education in China, naturally, under US supervision.

In 1911 Qinhua University was founded on the basis of this "gift". It was in this educational institution that Chinese students got their training before continuing their studies in the USA. By 1947 Qinhua University alone had sent 2,000 young Chinese to study in the USA.

The USA gave its backing to pro-imperialist elements in China, using levers of economic pressure for this purpose. This was its motivation when it first undertook the central role in the affairs of a consortium of six powers (USA, Britain, France, Russia, Japan, and Germany), which extended a so-called large reorganisation loan to the government of Yuan Shikai, who was proclaimed China's President on June 18, 1912. A precondition for the loan was that the USA would have "equal" opportunities with the other imperialist powers in the Chinese market, in other words, its aim was to consolidate the influence of US capital in China. The latter received only 33 per cent of the initially stipulated loan of 25 million pounds sterling. A large portion of this money was withheld as overdue payments on various indemnities, under the guise of commission, and so on.

The older monopoly associations, such as the Morgan empire, acted in close collaboration with the European colonial powers, vigilantly safeguarding the traditional preserves of colonialism. The Rockefellers, who felt they had been unfairly left out of the old colonial world, were attracted to China by the alluring prospect of using continental territory for further penetration into countries of the Far East and Southeast Asia, into new markets for goods and capital.

Private American foundations, hoping to reinforce the USA's positions, put up money to encourage the activities of American missions in China. The Rockefeller and other foundations contributed millions of dollars for the requirements of the missionaries. In this given case Rockefeller was not a philanthropist.

There was self-seeking motivation for the Rockefellers' concern for missionary schools and hospitals. Many American historians liked to refer to the first decade of the twentieth century as the "golden age" of the missionary movement. There was nothing to indicate that these efforts were in vain. By 1925 there were, in China, 27 missionary-run colleges and universities, of which 21 were opened after the year 1900.

The reminiscences of Americans who looked back with nostalgia to the "good old days" of their residence in China (1920s) in fact reconstructed the system of White domination under which business flourished. Indeed, in those years the foreigners, with many Americans among them, grouped themselves in China not only around missionary societies but, above all, around privileged clubs. They enjoyed every luxury life could offer and every whim was instantly fulfilled by servants. Just as individuals from other capitalist powers, Americans were part of the elite dominating the lives of the ordinary Chinese people. They were not burdened by responsibility for the situation in the country in which they lived or for the destiny of its people. Many Americans argued in all seriousness that the Chinese people were unable to maintain order in and effectively administer their own country.

While the American businessmen were spending their time in cosy entertainment, revelling in the good things of life which they appropriated to themselves with a sense of having every right to do so, the Chinese people on the other side of the social watershed were submerged in tragedy. The missionaries certainly saw a different China. Every morning corpses were found in the streets of Shanghai. In only one year there were 20,000 deaths from hunger, cold, and suffering. The city's streets were filled with beggars, children were employed on backbreaking labour, and the life span of the huge numbers of coolies was unbelievably short.

What political force can govern China? This was a perennial question and it worried the capitalist world. The developments of the latter half of the 1920s carried Chiang Kai-shek to the pinnacles of power. Many people thought at the time that China's new leader would set his country upon the road of Christianity and thereby save it. It were the missionaries who sowed these unjustified illusions. Prominent personalities of the missionary movement besieged the Wilson administration, demanding that, to counter the political force led by the revolutionary-democrat Sun Yatsen, it recognise the dictatorship of the warlords Yuan Shikai and Wu Peifu. In the onslaught against the Chinese revolution of 1925-1927 the USA backed the bourgeoisie to suppress the revolutionary movement of the Chinese people.

During the revolution of 1925-1927 the missionary centres again drew attention to themselves—they personified oppression

by foreign imperialism. Once more thousands of missionaries had to go into hiding, to ask for protection from foreign powers and for more brutal military and political actions against the revolutionary forces. By that time there appeared among American missionaries, some of whom were quite influential, supporters of Chiang Kai-shek. The differences that surfaced in the attitudes of the American missionaries mirrored the contradictory character of US policy in China. In Washington, on the one hand, they pondered ways and means of eroding the Chinese people's unity in their struggle against the colonialists and, on the other, counted on turning the Kuomintang leaders into dependable creatures, especially in view of the growing Japanese intrusion into China.

Unlike the established colonial powers, the USA was, by virtue of the specifics of its own development, not closely associated with the most reactionary, feudal-bureaucratic elements of Chinese society. It therefore endeavoured to portray itself as a champion of "anti-colonialism" and camouflage the true aims of its expansion in the Far East. But this can hardly absolve the USA of responsibility for the tragedy of the Sino-Japanese war. It is common knowledge that the ruling circles in the USA contributed much to extinguish the revolution of 1925-1927 and sought to use the counter-revolution to suppress the liberation movement of the Chinese people. The 6-inch guns of US warships were targeted on the peaceful city of Nanking. Clarence S. Williams, commander of the US naval forces in Shanghai, firmly insisted that the Americans had the prerogative over the British to shell Nanking. On March 27, 1927, the newspaper *Pravda* wrote: "The land of George Washington and the Declaration of Independence is now seen by China in the person of the monster Williams, who is drowning the independence of the Chinese people in torrents of blood." This was precisely the period that saw the birth and consolidation of the traditions of the USA's Far Eastern policy aimed at eroding the united anti-imperialist actions of the Chinese people. Most of the American missionaries did not support the political forces headed by the revolutionary-democrat Sun Yatsen, rejecting his programme for creating an independent, free China after the overthrow of the Qing dynasty.

Chiang Kai-shek flirted with wealthy Chinese families and

with foreign capital. At the same time, the nationalistic platform of China's new leader aroused suspicion among Western businessmen, who saw a threat to themselves in the manoeuvrings of Chiang Kai-shek. When Japan began serious preparations to invade China, the anti-Western sentiments in the Chiang Kai-shek camp were supplanted by anxiety in the face of the threat from China's dangerous neighbour. Chiang Kai-shek began looking to the West with the hope of getting the help needed for resistance. How to allay the suspicions of the business community in the USA and other capitalist countries? The Kuomintang leader decided to demonstrate his spiritual affinity with the American nation. He became a Christian and with this, it seemed, satisfied the hopes of the missionary community, which wanted a Christian to govern the "Middle Kingdom". Chiang Kai-shek married a brilliant member of the Song family, Song Meiling, who was educated in the USA. He became a member of the Methodist Church as was his young wife.

Chiang Kai-shek and his wife were highly respected by missionary circles. The Americans expected that together with Christianity the Chinese leadership would adopt the American experience of state development and the "values" of American democracy. It did not worry them that patriots were dying in the Kuomintang prisons, that disobedience to the dictatorship was cruelly punished, and that corruption was flourishing. What mattered was that Chiang Kai-shek and his wife were Christians and that the Kuomintang leader's entourage consisted chiefly of graduates of missionary-controlled schools and universities. With this were linked the hopes that there would be unbounded official support for missionary activity in China.

Beginning with the early 1930s the missionaries became the medium for influencing American public opinion. As the contradictions between the USA and Japan mounted, this medium acquired growing importance for US-China relations. The then young Edgar Snow, known for his partisanship with liberal American Sinologists, shared and, judging by his early works, propagated the views of the missionaries urging a more active China policy by the USA. One of Snow's earliest books, published in 1933, bore the title *Far Eastern Front*. The young author's first lines in this book were a warning that the USA was apparently heading into war with Japan. China, he wrote, was

of major significance to the USA. A potential market, it was already then absorbing 3.5 per cent of the total American exports. American business, he noted, was supporting in China an American community of some 7,000, including about 4,000 missionaries.¹ At the time, the USA was indeed making all-sided use of its treaties with China: in 1927 a total of 5,670 officers and enlisted men of the US Army were serving in China, and 44 United States warships were in Chinese waters; 3,027 US officers and enlisted men were landed in China in 1933. The interests of Standard Oil of New York, Texas Oil, Ford, General Motors, and other corporations were represented in China.

Japanese aggression in Manchuria in the early 1930s caused considerable anxiety in the USA. Already then US foreign policy was confronted by the rather complex dilemma of how to protect the interests of US capital and sustain its own image as the "friend" of the Chinese people and ally of Japanese militarism against the "communist threat". Clearly, in the USA they took the magnitude of the anti-Japanese movement in China into account. In many of the anti-Japanese demonstrations in China the initiative was taken by students of Christian colleges. The participation of persons professing Christianity in these demonstrations acquired a political hue. Being largely a proponent of Anglo-Saxon interests, the Christian movement countered the Japanese expansion.

The Stimson Doctrine (Henry L. Stimson was Secretary of State in the Hoover administration) of the early 1930s took the growth of anti-Japanese feeling in China into consideration. This doctrine proclaimed the USA's non-recognition of Japanese expansion in the Far East but, in fact, did not help to safeguard China's territorial integrity. The diplomatic gestures designed to reprove presumptuous warlords and demonstrate that the USA was a true friend of the Chinese people did not prevent the United States from selling armaments and raw materials to the aggressor.

In 1937, when the Japanese started their offensive in China, the USA began to pay more attention to developments in that country. In 1941 missionaries and circles closely associated

¹ Edgar Snow, *Far Eastern Front*, Harrison Smith and Robert Haas, New York, 1933, p. 322.

with them orchestrated a campaign in the USA with the objective of persuading the government in Washington that it was imperative to attach greater significance to its China policy. At a time when the Japanese had set about putting their "Co-Prosperity Sphere" plan into effect and the USA and the European capitalist powers were successfully pursuing a policy of appeasing the aggressor, the missionaries tried to press the White House into ordering a halt to sales of military hardware to Japan. The initiators of this campaign urged strong opposition to what they believed was the widespread view that in order to avoid a conflict with Japan the USA should evacuate all its citizens and military personnel from China. Missionary propaganda focussed on well-disposed assessments of the Chiang Kai-shek government's policies. The following is a sample: "Missionaries ... have never failed to point with pride to the fact that a high percentage of the officials of the government [of China] have been educated in Christian institutions and that many of them are themselves Christians... Madame Chiang has practically become a saint to them."¹ One of the zealots of this propaganda was the editor-in-chief and publisher of the journal *Time* Henry Luce, whose parents were American missionaries in China. His journal named the Chiangs the most popular couple of 1938.

But what could the missionaries offer as a counter to the political game that was being played at the time by the US ruling elite, who regarded the Soviet Union as the main threat to them? The missionaries and their friends set up various committees that urged a boycott of Japanese goods and were vociferous in demanding "non-participation in the Japanese aggression". Activities of this sort only helped the government in Washington to somewhat camouflage its actual political objectives, namely, to direct Japanese aggression to the North, against the Soviet Union.

The attempts of the missionaries to pressure the US Congress had no chance of success because a rupture with Japan was seen as conflicting with the economic interests of the leading US monopolies.

The sending to China of medical supplies as a result of the

¹ John W. Masland, "Missionary Influence Upon American Far Eastern Policy", *The Pacific Historical Review*, Vol. X, No. 3, September 1941, pp. 286-87.

philanthropic activities of the missionaries was largely of symbolic significance. But the sales by the US monopolies to, for example, the Ayukawa concern of equipment for steel mills, for the Japanese oilfields in South Sakhalin, and the financial and technical assistance to the Nakajima, Mitsubishi, and other concerns were of very real significance for the build-up of Japan's military-industrial capability.

According to statistics provided by the US commercial attache in Tokyo and cited by Stanley Hornbeck, chief of the Far Eastern division of the US State Department, in January 1941 the USA accounted for 40 per cent of Japan's metal and cotton imports, 50 per cent of its oil imports, 70 per cent of its metal scrap imports, and so on. Impressed by Japanese military successes at the turn of the century, US financiers joined a consortium of US and British banks to extend a large loan to the Japanese government in the 1930s. Warships built at Japanese docks in accordance with American designs and of American metal steamed towards Pearl Harbor in December 1941, while US dollars were used to purchase the equipment and weapons that Japanese troops used successfully against the US armed forces in the Philippines and in China.

In the 1960s and the 1970s it became the fashion in US academic circles to criticise Herbert Hoover and Franklin D. Roosevelt for their short-sighted Far Eastern policy, to re-write the past Far Eastern policy of the USA. The conspicuous changes in the world balance of strength and the impasse in which US policy found itself on account of the US aggression in Indochina in the 1960s and the early 1970s stimulated the appearance in the book market of works revising historical experience and attempting to attribute to "past errors" the USA's setbacks in the confrontation with the forces of socialism and the liberation movements in the initial decades after the Second World War.

In one way or another, leading American analysts repeated the theories that were implicit in missionary propaganda in the 1930s. They asserted that Washington's lack of determination and desire to support China in the 1930s was the principal cause of the USA's setbacks in the Far East. Fairbank believes that in the 1930s the combination of the US Open Door policy, or rather the declarations relating to that policy, with "ignorant isolationism" paved the way for the catastrophic results of the 1940s,

for the destruction by Japan of the finest, "non-militarist part of Nationalist China".

Moreover, in the 1970s it began to be said in the USA that the US administration's main miscalculation in China was linked to its intention to support Chiang Kai-shek, to manoeuvre between him and the Communist Party of China at the closing stage of the war, leaving without attention other forces in China that were allegedly pursuing the same aims as the USA. In their efforts to present the history of the USA's China policy in a new light, American historians claimed that there was a "third force" consisting of, among others, secret societies, the troops of the Guangxi (Kuanghsi) warlords, and pro-American intellectuals. The Association of Older Brothers (Gelaohoi), a sort of Chinese mafia founded as early as the eighteenth century, functioned as a secret paramilitary organisation. It is now said that secret societies of this type, opposed as they were to Chiang Kai-shek, should have been accorded special attention and might have become Washington's mainstay in China. American historians have focussed attention on the personality of Wang Jingwei, who on March 30, 1940 became head of the "reorganised government" in Nanking. Wang officially obtained from Tokyo the authority to administer all Chinese territory seized by Japan (with the exception of Manchukuo and Inner Mongolia), but in fact he was no more than a puppet of the Japanese militarists. In the 1920s he had made common cause with the Guangxi warlords and in 1931 was appointed head of a national government set up by the Guangxi warlords in opposition to the Chiang Kai-shek government in Nanking. There is little doubt that Wang might have been useful to the USA as a personality standing at the centre of the US-Japanese flirtation in China aimed against the Soviet Union and the liberation movement in China itself.

On the other hand, the proponents of the "pro-Japanese" interpretation of history feel that the USA had paid a high price for its reluctance to make concessions to Japan during the pre-war decade, for the inability of its leaders to ensure to Japanese militarism the role of an advanced outpost in the struggle against the Soviet Union. In 1975, when the rate of US-Chinese rapprochement somewhat slowed down, Charles New published a book under the title *The Troubled Encounters: The United Sta-*

tes and Japan. He cautions the initiators of the USA's "new China policy" against excessive eagerness, reminding them of what were, in his view, dismal lessons of history, notably the circumstance that the USA's orientation on China during the Manchurian crisis of the early 1930s allegedly led to an underestimation of Japan's significance. An outcome of this orientation, as New sees it, was an ineffective US Far Eastern policy and miscalculations that ultimately brought about the collision between Japan and the USA. New's arguments boil down to the contention that as the USA's leading ally in Asia, Japan is disturbed by the demonstration of the "old American love" for China.

Washington's China policy is determined by the political realities in the world rather than any "old" or "new" love for China. Pearl Harbor was not the outcome of "errors" by the US administration, nor of the alleged disregard for the urgings of the missionaries that the USA stop aiding Japan, nor of the American renunciation of dependence on a "third force", nor of any "underestimation" of cooperation with Tokyo. At the close of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, at a time when the booty was shared "between two or three powerful world plunderers armed to the teeth (America, Great Britain, Japan)",¹ the USA joined actively in the sharp struggle to partition the Far East into spheres of influence. The contradictions between the imperialists proved to be much stronger than the subjective ambitions relative to the world's first socialist state. These contradictions could not be settled by appeasement. It was not the wish of the US administration to heed the missionary propaganda in defence of China but the bombs dropped on Pearl Harbor that compelled a vitalisation of the US participation in Chinese affairs during the Second World War.

¹ V.I. Lenin, "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism", *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, 1974, p. 191.

CHAPTER TWO

THE US FIASCO IN CHINA (1940s)

General Stilwell's Mission

On July 12, 1943 General Joseph W. Stilwell¹ went to see Chiang Kai-shek in the latter's office. This veteran soldier—who, in fact, held the main levers of US military strategy in China in his hands—saw that the disastrous policies pursued by Chongqing would have serious consequences for the Allies. He gave the Chongqing dictator an overall picture of the military and political situation in Europe and the Pacific. His arguments, it must be acknowledged, hit the mark. The scale of the fighting on the Soviet-German front was much larger than that of the hostilities in the Pacific. The Soviet people were bearing the brunt of the struggle against the strike force of world fascism, and the destiny of the Second World War was being decided on the battle-fronts in Russia. In only 1943 the Soviet Army had crushed 218 enemy divisions, destroying 14,300 aircraft, 7,000 tanks, 5,000 pieces of artillery, and 296 enemy warships of various classes. The contribution of the US Armed Forces to the common struggle against fascism is well-known: the heavy fighting for Saipan; to gain possession of the Marianas the Americans lost 5,000 men; the battle at Leite; the fighting at the near approaches to Iwojima and Okinawa. These and other developments are evidence of the important role played by the USA in the anti-fascist coalition. The Japanese were going over to the

¹ General Stilwell began his career in China as a junior officer. He was a military attache (1935-1939) accredited to Chiang Kai-shek. He arrived in Chongqing on March 6, 1942, serving as Allied Supreme Commander in the Chinese-Burmese-Indian theatre of hostilities, Chiang Kai-shek's Chief-of-Staff, and deputy commander of the Allied troops in the Southeastern theatre of hostilities.

defensive and their plans for a compromise peace with Chongqing were linked mainly to their desire to compensate in China for the losses suffered by them in the Pacific. In this context Stilwell warned Chiang Kai-shek that a compromise peace was fraught with the threat of a civil war in China.

This talk with Stilwell and then with the US Ambassador C.E. Gauss, who conveyed to Chiang Kai-shek Roosevelt's displeasure with Chongqing's diplomatic manoeuvres and with the passiveness of the Kuomintang armies at the firing lines, unquestionably influenced the stand of the Chiang Kai-shek clique. Many years later ardent defenders of the Kuomintang extolled the "heroism" of Chiang Kai-shek, who allegedly rendered the entire anti-fascist coalition an inestimable service by his staunchness in the talks with Tokyo and by his refusal to sign a compromise peace with the Japanese. Chiang Kai-shek's well-wishers forget that because of the victories on the Soviet-German front and the radical turn in the course of the Second World War Chongqing had no alternative to acceding to the Americans. For Chiang Kai-shek a decision to sign a compromise peace would have been tantamount to suicide. He preferred to reaffirm his loyalty to the Allied cause and ask for American aid and armaments.

Chiang Kai-shek's rejection of a separate deal with Tokyo by no means signified an end to difficulties for the USA's China policy.

On one occasion President Roosevelt said of Stilwell: "I know of no other man who has the ability, the force and the determination to offset the disaster that now threatens China."¹

It was Stilwell's mission to do all in his power to attain the basic strategic objective of the US ruling circles: to hit Japan as hard as possible with the resources of the USA's Far Eastern ally. Stilwell was stunned by what he saw when he arrived in China—the Kuomintang was sabotaging the military efforts against Japan, ceaselessly launching raids against units of the People's Liberation Army, and tightly blockading the liberated areas. In the provinces administered by Kuomintang generals, the revolutionary forces were subjected to vicious repressions and

¹ Barbara W. Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-1945*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1971, p. 1.

democratic elements were harassed by agents of Chiang Kai-shek's secret service. The unity that Chiang Kai-shek so enthusiastically talked about was no more than a coalition of Chinese warlords. From 1926, when his armies moved to the north, up to the fighting with militarist Japan, Chiang Kai-shek's goal was to win the civil war. He owed his survival to his agile tactics and intrigues among notorious local Chinese warlords. He relied on a group of generals, who had studied at the Whampoa Academy and remained loyal to him. The Generalissimo calmly kept his eyes closed to corruption and crime if any of the Whampoa clique were involved.

The Kuomintang's policies and the corruption in Chiang Kai-shek's state apparatus evoked discontent among various strata of society and drastically debilitated the anti-Japanese front in China. Chiang Kai-shek used his best troops (20 divisions with a total strength of 800,000 troops) to blockade the liberated areas. This was a strange war, indeed. An inevitable outcome of the strange war policy was the weakening of the Allied positions along China's southern frontiers. The Sino-Burmese-Indian theatre was described figuratively by Theodore H. White and Annalee Jacoby as "a fabulous compound of logistics ... despotism, corruption, imperialism, nonsense, and tragic impotence".¹

Upon seeing with his own eyes what Chiang Kai-shek was capable of, Stilwell quite justifiably doubted the latter's ability to cope with the difficult tasks confronting him. A sober assessment of the developments in the Sino-Burmese-Indian theatre of hostilities made Stilwell see that the Eighth and the New Fourth People's Armies were extremely efficient fighting machines. He felt that in the interests of ultimate strategy it was quite realistic to use the forces of the Chinese Communists in any part of China; he endeavoured to stop the Kuomintang from persecuting Communists, to prevent the Chiang Kai-shek raids on the CPC's armed forces. The Kuomintang leadership gave Stilwell's recommendations a hostile reception, but saw eye to eye with General Claire Chennault, commander of the US Fourteenth Air Force in China. The latter's links to the largest aircraft manufacturers in the USA explained his insistence on enlarging

¹ Theodore H. White and Annalee Jacoby, *Thunder Out of China*, William Sloane Associates, Inc., New York, 1946, pp. 145-46; *Modern History of China: Essays*, Moscow, 1956, p. 131 (in Russian).

the air force in China. The American plans for fighting the war in China mainly in the air, of which Chennault was an ardent champion, fell in with the wishes of Chiang Kai-shek. The Kuomintang clique sought to preserve its land forces in order to fight the Communists, and conduct the war against Japan with US technological means.

Stilwell saw the behaviour of Chiang Kai-shek and Chennault as a serious hindrance to his actions. During the first years of the war in the Pacific the US Supreme Command, which sought to throw anything against the enemy wherever possible, supported Stilwell's line of thought. The Kuomintang, on the contrary, aroused suspicion in Washington, where the signing of a compromise peace between Chongqing and Tokyo was seen as a very real possibility. American political leaders did all in their power to keep China on their side in the hostilities. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, and Admiral Ernest J. King, head of the US Navy, sided unequivocally with Stilwell who, in their view, believed in the Chinese Communists that constituted a stronger and more reliable fighting force in the struggle against the Japanese.

Stilwell's conclusions were backed up by reports of the US intelligence from China. The Office of Strategic Services analysed the situation in China and endeavoured to give an unbiased assessment of what was taking place there. A special secret report on the situation in North China noted that in North China the Communists exercised the strongest influence and had the only broadly representative organisation. The army, the report said, was a communist organisation and throughout North China the Communists were the principal organisers of the new political and social system. An OSS officer was much impressed by what he saw in the liberated areas: he was amazed by the social and economic progress and by how committed the people were in North China. He reported that even in remote mountain villages people were eager for news about the war in Europe. The bulk of the people regarded the Communists as fighters against oppression and denial of rights, against all that in the course of many years the colonialists had endeavoured to force upon China. The US intelligence saw this as one of the sources of the CPC's strength, and little wonder President Roosevelt believed "that there was no chance that the Chinese Communists would

surrender to the Japanese ... whereas there was always the possibility that the Kuomintang might make a separate peace".¹

Realistically-minded statesmen in the USA were aware that to achieve victory over the Axis powers as quickly as possible cooperation within the framework of the anti-fascist coalition was vital not only with the Soviet Union but also with those forces of the national liberation movements that the USSR, true to the principles of internationalism, steadfastly supported in its foreign policy.

The Soviet people extended disinterested assistance to the Chinese people in the latter's struggle against Japanese aggression. In the period from the autumn of 1937 to the beginning of 1942 more than 5,000 Soviet citizens were personally involved in helping the Chinese behind and at the firing lines. Many of them laid down their lives. These included over 200 volunteer pilots. In the summer of 1939 more than 400 volunteer pilots and aircraft technicians arrived in China from the USSR. Even during the initial years of the Great Patriotic War, years that were particularly hard for the Soviet people, there were Soviet experts, advisers, and volunteer pilots in China. The Soviet government recalled all its advisers by March 1942 after it became clear that the Kuomintang government was openly provoking Japan to attack the USSR and the Kuomintang troops were intensifying their pressure against areas controlled by the Communists, almost entirely ceasing active operations against Japan. The anti-Soviet campaign started by the Kuomintang authorities led, in effect, to the breakdown of trade and other links between the USSR and the government of China.

American military supplies, which began to arrive in China in large quantities in 1942, were used mainly to reinforce the Chiang Kai-shek troops blockading the Eighth and Fourth Armies. Eager to get as much as possible from his friendship with the USA, Chiang Kai-shek made a statement to the effect that his US ally was pursuing the aim of bringing peace and liberation to Asia. The Charter signed by the USA and Britain on August 14, 1942 proclaimed that the sovereign rights and self-government of nations had to be restored. US political

¹ Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins. An Intimate History*, The Universal Library, Grosset & Dunlap, New York, 1950, p. 740.

personalities began to stress that the provisions of the Atlantic Charter related also to countries of the Pacific. The Kuomintang leader was quick to take advantage of the USA's "anti-colonialist" slogans. The delighted welcome that the Kuomintang ruling circles gave to the promise of "independence" to Pacific nations was due, of course, not to an aspiration that these nations become sovereign. The attention that Chiang Kai-shek and his sycophants gave to the question of the "freedom of Asian peoples" was motivated chiefly by the Kuomintang's eagerness to participate in resolving the numerous problems of the Far East and Southeast Asia, to avoid finding itself being done out of its share when the time came to divide the booty. In Chongqing there was a special agency studying postwar problems. It was headed by Wang Changhu, General Secretary of the Supreme National Defence Council. One of this agency's assignments was to analyse the future relations between China and Japan and the postwar arrangement in the Far East as a whole.

Although the USA intended to make Chiang Kai-shek a postwar ally, it tried to limit the influence exercised by Kuomintang China and reduce the Chongqing politicians to the status of pawns serving US global strategy. Ever since the war broke out the US State Department had been closely scrutinising the Kuomintang's plans for the world's postwar arrangement and collecting information related to this question in one way or another. In a telegram to the US Embassy in China on July 21, 1942 Secretary of State Cordell Hull wrote: "Department is endeavoring to follow closely 1) outstanding ideas both publicly and privately advanced, and 2) trends of thinking in the several United Nations on post-war problems."¹ The US Embassy in China was requested to state its opinion in this context. The State Department carefully checked the reliability of the reports carried by *The Washington Post* and the *Central Daily News* of an address made by the President of the Legislative Yuan, Dr. Sun Fo calling for the independence of India, French Indochina, Korea, and the Philippines. On August 18, 1942 the US Ambassador in China reported to Washington that China had some territorial claims. In this connection mention was made of

¹ *Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers. 1942. China*, U.S. G.P.O., Washington, 1956, p. 733.

Korea, Indochina, and Burma. The US Ambassador Gauss astutely noted that the Kuomintang government was only outwardly trying to show its fidelity to the Atlantic Charter. Gauss offered the conclusion that these actions indicated that it was China's ambition to become the leader of the Asian nations.

In 1942 the Kuomintang openly declared its claims on neighbouring countries. Attention is attracted by the circumstance that in August 1942 the semi-official Kuomintang press, notably the *Central Weekly* and the *National Herald*, recommended granting Indochina "independence" with the significant reservation that if Indochina was not prepared for self-administration China would, when the peace conference was held, offer to be its mandatory. The foreign policy of the Kuomintang reactionaries was characterised by great-power chauvinism and great-Han nationalism. The territorial claims on neighbouring countries were one of the most eloquent indications of the great-power policy. Chinese nationalism's great-power foreign policy programme was expounded explicitly by Chiang Kai-shek in his book *China's Destiny* (1943). China's natural frontiers, he wrote, were the Pamir Plateau and the Tien Shan and Altai Mountains in the northwest; Manchuria in the northeast; the Kunlun Mountains and the Himalayas; and the Mid-Southern Peninsula (meaning Indochina, Burma, and Malaya.—V.V.) in the south. Formosa, the Pescadores, the four northeastern provinces, and Inner and Outer Mongolia were together and individually fortresses, it was claimed, vital to the defence and security of China.

The reports in the Chinese press about the Kuomintang's plans relative to some Asian countries were a compelling cause of anxiety for American political leaders. This is eloquently demonstrated by many of Gauss' letters and telegrams. In one of his despatches to Washington Gauss noted: "One sees increased Chinese attention to neighboring countries and to her border regions in the organization under Chinese auspices of Sino-Burmese and Sino-Korean Cultural Associations."¹ Lastly, in Kai-shek wrote: "Korea must be free and independent." The US State Department closely followed the Chiang Kai-shek go-

¹*Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers. 1942. China*, p. 748.

vernment's plans relative to Korea. On February 12, 1942 Gauss informed Hull of his conversation with Tew So Wang, Foreign Minister of the "Provisional Government of Korea".¹ The latter confidentially informed the US Ambassador that he suspected the Kuomintang was planning to rule Korea after the war. In a memorandum to President Roosevelt Hull gave a justified description of the Kuomintang's policy relative to the problem of Korea, writing that the Chinese government was possibly acting on its desire, by granting recognition to the "Provisional Government of Korea", to crush in embryo the forming of any groups "supported by the Soviet Union". The Secretary of State did not comment on the Kuomintang's delusions: the revolutionary movement of the Korean people had already sunk deep roots and only short-sighted politicians failed to see its actual strength; it had gone through the period of formation and had become the foundation for the creation of an independent Korean state. Of course, it was beyond the Kuomintang's strength to suppress the revolutionary movement of the Korean people and spread its influence to Korea.

American political leaders surely saw Chiang Kai-shek's heightened interest too, in the postwar problem of Thailand as well. At the close of July 1942 John C. Vincent, counsellor of the US Embassy in China, had a talk with the heads of a number of departments of the Chinese Foreign Ministry. In this talk he mentioned the statements in the Kuomintang press to the effect that China should have the protectorate over postwar Thailand. The Kuomintang representatives declined to give a definite reply. Vincent wrote of his observations in a memorandum, a copy of which was sent to the State Department. Several days later Gauss reported to Hull on the Embassy's findings in its study of the Kuomintang's view of postwar problems. Among other things the Embassy noted that Thailand in accordance with the view then current in Kuomintang circles should be deprived of its independence and made a protectorate under China.

The Kuomintang leaders did not confine themselves to decla-

¹ Headed by the leader of the Korean nationalists Kim Ku, the "Provisional Government of Korea" was, at the beginning of the war in the Pacific, in Chongqing, where it was under the tutelage of and funded by Chiang Kai-shek. This government had close links to Korean emigres residing in the USA.

rations about what they saw as desirable for the postwar arrangement for the countries neighbouring on China. Chongqing showered the British with offers to send two Chinese army corps to "reinforce the Burmese forces". The British ignored this wooing by Chiang Kai-shek and quite reasonably asked whether the Kuomintang would want to withdraw from Burma after there was no longer a need for its military presence. Fred Eldridge, a war correspondent who accompanied General Stilwell in the latter's campaigns, noted that the British did not want Chinese troops in Burma, fearing that once they entered Burma they would not want to leave. Eldridge recalled that there was a reason why the Chiang Kai-shek government clung to maps on which much of Burma's territory was marked as Chinese. Under pressure from the Americans the British had to agree to the presence of Kuomintang troops in Burma. In June 1942 Kuomintang troops appeared in Burma in the vicinity of Myitkyina, where the Japanese had never penetrated. They pulled down frontier posts and announced that the British had departed and that henceforth they were masters of the country. A Kuomintang administration ruled this area until it was driven out by the Japanese at the close of 1943.¹

US intelligence agencies were in a position to see the Kuomintang's actual intentions towards Thailand as well. Nikol Smith, an OSS officer charged with maintaining contact with the Kuomintang intelligence service and its chief Dai Li, subsequently wrote that the Kuomintang went to all lengths to counter the US penetration of Thailand. Illustrative of this was the fact that two members of Smith's group, taken across Indochina by Dai Li's agents, found themselves, not without Kuomintang complicity, in the hands of the Japanese.

¹ After Chiang Kai-shek was defeated in the civil war remnants of the Kuomintang army, numbering some 15,000 troops, marauded territory along China's southern frontiers and in Burma. Kuomintang troops occupied a large area 200 miles southwest of Kunming. They were under the command of General Li Mi, whom the CIA had secretly moved from Taiwan to Northern Burma. The CIA organised and controlled the airlifting of armaments, equipment, and other supplies to General Li across Indochina and Thailand. In the meantime, the US government was assuring the world that it had no contacts with Li Mi.

In the UN on May 30, 1954 the Burmese government raised the question of Kuomintang gangs, but clashes with these marauders continued on Burmese territory until the beginning of the 1960s.

The USA was very cool to the Kuomintang's foreign policy programme. In Washington it was feared that China's territorial claims might aggravate the USA's relations with its Allies, with Britain in the first place, in this most bitter period of the war when the USA was doing everything to avoid superfluous disputes with the British over the ticklish problem of the future of colonial peoples. Moreover, it was also seen in Washington at the time that China's territorial claims affected the interests of the Soviet Union. "In the northern part of the Pacific ... where American territory approaches closely to Siberia, Korea, and Japan," Roosevelt noted in a letter to Chiang Kai-shek, "it would be undesirable to attempt to exclude Russia from such problems as the independence of Korea. To isolate Soviet Russia in this area of the world would run the danger of creating tension instead of relieving tension." The USA's far-reaching plans in the Western Pacific were put in the following words in this letter: "South of Korea the question of actual bases from which China and America might protect the peace of the Western Pacific is one of those details which may well be left for later consideration."¹ Naturally, in Washington they took into account the Kuomintang's influence among some quarters of the national bourgeoisie in the Asian countries bordering on China. American political leaders planned to turn pro-Kuomintang agents into a US mainstay in Asia. Considerable hopes in this context were linked also to overseas Chinese emigres. This factor was not discounted by the State Department because it was believed that overseas Chinese would have a colossal influence on the domestic and foreign policies of Asian countries.

The USA intended to use for its own ends the plans of the Kuomintang relative to neighbouring countries. It counted on China becoming a strong power after the war capable of countering Japan on the Asian mainland and, subjected economically, usable by the USA for expansion in other countries of the Far East and Southeast Asia. Hence the large role assigned to economic aid to China in the USA's plans. It was calculated that this aid would, on the one hand, keep China in the war on the side of the Allies and as far as possible stabilise it internally and, on

¹ *Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers. 1942. China*, p. 186.

the other hand, enmesh it in debt that would tie it firmly to US capital.

On February 7, 1942 the US Congress passed Act 442 authorising the Secretary of the Treasury, provided there was presidential approval, to extend to China a credit of 500 million dollars. On March 21, 1942 US and Chinese representatives signed the agreement for this credit, which was several times larger than the loans hitherto received by Chiang Kai-shek. The Sino-US agreement on lend-lease was signed in July of the same year. As far as the USA was concerned, lend-lease aid to China was not as effective as in other regions. This is what the US Treasury Secretary had in mind when he called the US credit a duplicate of lend-lease. The money extended under the agreement was used by the Kuomintang government to purchase gold for sale in China. The architects of the loan counted that this would halt the inflation and provide the reserves for paying out dollar-backed bonds.

The USA's rulers endeavoured to take the fullest advantage of the military situation for an assault on the positions held by European powers in the Far East and in Southeast Asia. Washington believed that the Chiang Kai-shek clique would be of considerable help in carrying out this plan. This caused Britain much anxiety. The British ruling circles saw the anti-colonialist declarations of Kuomintang China as a threat to the future of the British Empire, especially as in his relations with Britain Chiang Kai-shek depended on his American ally, helping the latter in every way to bring pressure to bear on British foreign policy and finding solutions to the war-generated problems in Asia to benefit the USA.

Chiang Kai-shek tried to show vigorous support for the US policy towards India. In August 1942 he voiced his apprehensions that the Indian leaders might go over to the Japanese if "they could not count upon sympathy from the United Nations". The only way out, according to Chiang Kai-shek, was for the USA to offer its good offices. In February 1942 Chiang Kai-shek visited India, where he met with members of the Indian National Congress. It was his aim to persuade its leadership that they had to cooperate with the USA and Britain. At one of these meetings he declared that if Britain were to offer India the status of a self-administrating dominion India ought to

accept. This attitude irritated the British government. Churchill displayed firmness, sending Chiang Kai-shek a personal message in which he categorically rejected Sino-US mediation in matters affecting the future of the British Empire. He wrote: "We respected the sovereign rights of China, and had abstained from comment even when the differences between the Kuomintang and the Communists were most acute. We therefore hoped that General Chiang Kai-shek would not be drawn into political correspondence with the Indian Congress or with individuals trying to paralyse the war effort of the Government of India and to disturb peace and order."¹

All this motivated Britain's marked coolness towards its Chinese ally. From the outset of the war in the Pacific the British government refused to take seriously Kuomintang China's claims to active participation in the guidance of military operations. US political leaders regarded British intractability in this issue as an attempt to "write down" China in the interests of the British Empire. However, the Kuomintang clique and the US ruling circles found an insuperable obstacle to their plans in the person of the Soviet Union, which was pursuing a consistent policy in relation to the colonial peoples' future and defending their right to independence. The Soviet Union's involvement in the war against fascism determined the humanist character of the anti-fascist coalition's objectives in the Far East and in Southeast Asia. The Kuomintang's official proclamation of its aggressive plans only weakened the front of struggle against the Axis powers and adversely affected the efforts of the Allies in the Pacific.

In January 1944 General Joseph Stilwell and the British commander-in-chief Lord Louis Mountbatten agreed that the Kuomintang troops concentrated in Yunnan would take part in the Burma campaign. On behalf of the command Mountbatten wrote to Roosevelt and Churchill requesting them to use their influence on Chiang Kai-shek. At a time when the Allies were engaged in crucial operations in the Pacific Roosevelt had to send one message after another to the government at Chongqing. In many of them he endeavoured to compel Chiang Kai-shek

¹ Llewellyn Woodward, *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War*, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1962, p. 422.

to pay more attention to the Burmatheatre of hostilities. More often than not Chiang Kai-shek evaded answering. Most of the refusals from Chongqing to send troops to Burma were officially motivated by "preoccupation with the struggle against the Communists and preparations to repulse a pending Japanese offensive in the vicinity of Han-Luoyang". While American political leaders and strategists were coaxing Chongqing, Japanese troops forced the Chindwin River, invaded Assam and Manipur, and began an offensive against India. The US government could not remain indifferent to intransigence from Chongqing: in January 1944 Roosevelt informed Chiang Kai-shek that unless the Kuomintang forces began an offensive from Yunnan lend-lease aid to China would be cut off.

With the USA bringing pressure to bear Chinese land forces, under American command, became active in Burma. In August 1944 Myitkyina was retaken from the Japanese. In Washington they hailed this victory of American and Chinese arms as further evidence of the USA contributing to the liberation of British colonies. But in that same year, 1944, fortune played false with the American strategists in the Chinese theatre. In March 1944 the Japanese command, which sought in China compensation for the defeats on other fronts, launched a powerful offensive against the Kuomintang troops. The Japanese military's calculations were to seize convenient bridgeheads in China and thereby prolong the war in the Pacific and try and come to terms with the US ruling circles on a compromise peace.

The Japanese offensive was successful to a marked degree. Within eight months the invaders occupied much of the territory of Henan, Hunan, Guangxi, Guangdong, and Fujian provinces. Several US airfields were captured. The crushed Kuomintang front did not pose the Japanese units with any serious problem; danger awaited them behind their lines, where the Eighth and the New Fourth Armies were operating effectively. These revolutionary forces were steadily enlarging the liberated areas.

The growing corruption in the Kuomintang ruling elite was giving many US military leaders and diplomats misgivings. Stilwell sent a report to Washington on the situation in which the Chiang Kai-shek government was finding itself, writing that Chiang Kai-shek's position now hinged on the reactionary policies of the government and the efforts of his secret police to

suppress democratic thought. This was also the conclusion of a group of US experts on the Far East stationed in China since the end of 1943. These experts noted that the balance of strength in China had tilted in favour of the Communists and only "if he is able to enlist foreign intervention on a scale equal to the Japanese invasion of China will Chiang probably be able to crush the Communists... The Communists are already too strong for him."¹

They declared their concern over the situation in China in no uncertain terms. Most of them were shocked by the wrongdoing and chaos in the Kuomintang itself. They were so certain that the national liberation movement would be victorious that they took no pains to conceal their apprehensions. Some military advisers came to what for them was the disturbing conclusion that the US plans to set up an anti-Soviet springboard in China would inevitably fail. They held that by his domestic and foreign policies Chiang Kai-shek was helping the Soviet Union to become the dominant power in East Asia, that these policies were making China much too weak to serve as a counterbalance to Russia. Lastly, they were worried that the USA would lose Chiang Kai-shek himself and, with him, China's northern provinces, Manchuria, Korea, and Formosa (Taiwan).

American political leaders felt that the Kuomintang had placed itself in a dangerous situation. US Vice President Henry A. Wallace went on an urgent mission to Chongqing in June 1944. The purpose of this mission was to determine if there were possibilities and ways and means of bolstering the Chiang Kai-shek regime. Wallace approved the sending of a fact-finding mission to China's northern regions. Its assignment was to gather intelligence about the Japanese and about the forces resisting the latter. Members of this mission who went to the liberated areas recommended that the US administration should try to explore ways of coming to an understanding with the Communist Party of China. The CPC's leaders, John S. Service reported, believed that the country's capitalist development could ensure economic growth, provided there was liberal foreign assistance, and that the USA was the only country in a position to extend such assistance. Service hoped the USA would have a hand in

¹ *United States Relations with China with Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949*, Department of State Publications, Washington, 1949, p. 573.

China's postwar economy, which, he felt, would attract considerable American investments. American Sinologists holding diplomatic posts regarded the political situation in China in the context of the developments in the theatres of hostilities. Vice President Wallace expressed the confidence that Roosevelt would take effective steps to halt the steady deterioration of the situation in East China. If such steps were not taken, he said, the President had to be prepared to "lose" China.

The destiny of the Chinese theatre of hostilities seriously worried military quarters. In July 1944 Stilwell reported that the situation in China was deteriorating and, writing that Chiang Kai-shek was helpless, requested a reinforcement of this important sector of the front against Japan. Stilwell's report received favourable attention from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A memorandum was drawn up and it was signed by Admiral William D. Leahy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This memorandum addressed to the President began on a pessimistic note: "Whether or not there is a possibility of our exerting a favorable influence on the chaotic condition in China is questionable." However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not prepared to abandon hope and insisted on drastic measures to prevent the US effort in that region from ending in disaster.

With Japan doing everything to prolong the war and thereby get the best possible terms for ending it, US governmental and military circles probed the potentialities for making the Chinese theatre more effective. The recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President was: "Until her [China's] every resource, including the divisions at present confronting the Communists, is devoted to the war against the Japanese, there is little hope that she can continue to operate with any effectiveness."¹ Stilwell was a most suitable choice to head the effort to achieve this aim: he had always had a high opinion of the combat capability of the armed forces of the liberated areas and wanted cooperation with them in order to defeat Japan. But towards the close of 1944 there was a major shuffle in the US Command in China. The White House appointed General Patrick J. Hurley and Donald M. Nelson as the President's special representatives

¹ Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems*, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Washington, 1955, pp. 381, 382.

at Chiang Kai-shek's headquarters. On October 31, after Stilwell's dismissal, General Albert A. Wedemeyer took over as commander of the US forces in China, and in November of the same year Hurley replaced Gauss as US Ambassador.

The upper hand was thus finally won by the influential monopoly circles in the USA who in their attitude to China gave priority to "political considerations".

After the Second World War had passed its turning point, the US ruling circles became concerned with planning American postwar expansion in the Pacific. Political considerations, which were aimed at extending and consolidating American influence in Asia, in China in the first place, began to determine the USA's military strategy as well. The USA used all the means at its disposal to unite China under Chiang Kai-shek, at the same time trying to combine the current tasks of the war against Japan with the implementation of Washington's plans for the postwar arrangement affecting the whole of China.

The Missionaries and the Revolutionary Events

Young, well-trained experts with a knowledge of China were valued at the headquarters of General Joseph W. Stilwell. Most of these experts came from missionary families or were closely associated with the Christian Church in China. The sons and close friends of many American missionaries were on the staff of the US Embassy in Chongqing.

During the war polarisation in the missionary community grew increasingly more visible. Some of its members, who had close links to the Kuomintang leaders, went no further than to rebuke their "friends" for "mistakes". Others, most of whom were associated with the National Council of Churches in the USA, more sternly criticised the Kuomintang regime, charging its leaders with corruption, ignorance, and misgovernment. Chiang Kai-shek's past and the degeneration of his entourage repelled many American missionaries and the liberal politicians who shared their views. Well known for his close connections with organised crime, the Generalissimo achieved the status of head of state through his dirty use of the contradictions between individuals and between groups and through the support he got

from the secret police, which crushed opposition ruthlessly.

In 1946 President Harry Truman's special representative offered John Leighton Stuart, President of Yanjing University, the post of US Ambassador to China. This was no accidental choice. Stuart was born in a missionary family in Hanzhou [Hangchow] in 1876. In 1902 he graduated from a theological seminary in Richmond, Virginia, and two years later with his wife returned to Hanzhou. The young Stuart continued the work of his parents, becoming a teacher in the expanding network of Christian educational institutions in China that depended on the support of 21 Protestant organisations and many American universities. In 1919 he became president of Yanjing University. He remained in this post until he turned 70. Because of Stuart's reputation as a liberal with no known sympathies for any particular school of political thought, General Marshall at first enlisted his assistance into forming a coalition government. The new American Ambassador was quite closely acquainted with some leaders of the Communist Party of China. Kept abreast of the US Ambassador's activities, Chiang Kai-shek did all in his power to get the information reaching Stuart come from Kuomintang sources only.

After the Kuomintang offensive on Yanan of March 1947 Chiang Kai-shek assured Stuart that in August or at the beginning of September the Communists would be either destroyed or enlocked in regions far inland. The reason for Chiang Kai-shek's underestimation of his adversary was not only his own narrow-mindedness but also his overriding desire to justify, if only in words, the expediency of continued US aid to the Kuomintang.

Some of the experts on the Marshall mission believed that the Kuomintang administration could be democratised by bringing liberals into the government and thereby strengthening the position of the liberals outside the CPC. Hopes of this kind were harboured by influential members of the missionary community. In July 1947 five Christian leaders met with Chiang Kai-shek's closest associates and stated their views. They tried to persuade the Kuomintang to renounce military force as the only way for saving the regime and urged the liberalisation of the government. They suggested regaining the confidence of the people by democratising state institutions and protection of human rights and freedoms, advised the government to show

that it was anxious to establish an order that would give the people a better livelihood. Madame Chiang, who participated in this talk, was polite and friendly. She admitted that she felt a sense of guilt for the hardships of the people. However, the Kuomintang leader's wife did not confine herself to repentance. She declared flatly that Christians "should not appease Satan", that it was their first duty to support the government in the fight with the CPC.¹

The last hopes of the missionaries close to the Chiang Kai-shek government for saving the Kuomintang regime faded towards the close of 1948. Hostility for the Chiang Kai-shek regime spread among the people. The growth of the prestige of the Soviet Union and of the ideals brought to life by the struggle of the anti-fascist coalition objectively enhanced the prestige enjoyed by the Communist Party of China. The tactics of the CPC leaders, who called for democracy and a united front against China's enemies, attracted the Chinese liberal intellectuals harassed and tyrannised by ignorant rulers. This current was also joined by the movement of young Christians brought up at missionary educational institutions.

Many students of the Christian colleges welcomed the Chinese Communists as the "spokesmen of Chinese nationalism". The striving of these students to follow the CPC was based, according to the assertions of American historians, on "national" rather than "ideological loyalty". One of the first protests against foreign interference (it came from the Centre of Christian Colleges in Chengdu) demonstrated an attitude to a foreign power that was rare for the Christian movement. In an open letter to the Americans in mid-October 1945, 18 Christian organisations deplored the use of American marines in territories in North China controlled by the CPC. Military actions of this sort, the letter stated, would only create a tense situation and would in no way help to form a coalition government in China. The student movement in the winter of 1946-1947 began on the threshold of the civil war, when no hope was left that US mediation (the Marshall mission) would make it possible to set up a coalition government in China. Students of Christian colleges

¹ Paul A. Varg, *Missionaries, Chinese, and Diplomats. The American Protestant Missionary Movement in China, 1890-1952*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1958, p. 301.

joined in the demonstrations protesting against the civil war and the policies of the Kuomintang. After futile attempts to influence the Kuomintang government, some Christian leaders questioned the expediency of appealing to Chiang Kai-shek's reason.

Shedding the last of his illusions, Frank Price, a Presbyterian clergyman and a personal friend of Chiang Kai-shek, tried to analyse the reasons for the ignominious downfall of the Kuomintang regime. The people, he said, were "utterly weary of war and hungry for peace, food and economic recovery at almost any price". Those who supported the Communists, to use Price's words, associated the Kuomintang government with the defence of "favored families, special classes and privileges, vested financial interests, speculators and profiteers, useless officials and bureaucrats".¹

Thus, already during the Second World War and the early postwar years, there were among the missionaries and among American political leaders diverse and sometimes conflicting views on the question of the further road for China's development. The American China experts grouped around General Stilwell and the missionaries harbouring illusions miscalculated.

The heirs of the missionary movement in China hoped that the Christian Church would continue to be active within the "new democracy" programme proclaimed by Mao Zedong, a programme uniting the different strata of Chinese society and people belonging to the various religious denominations. Indeed, the calls for a broad front under the "new democracy" policy inspired the leaders of the Christian movement in China with the hope that their organisations would continue to function after 1949. Representatives of both Christians and Buddhists were elected to the National People's Congress. A programme giving wide freedom to the profession of religion was broadly publicised in China. "Brothers and Sisters in Christ," stated a message of the National Christian Council of China, "our country has already entered upon a new era in its history, and as Christians we should with the greatest enthusiasm give praise and glory to God for that awakening of the social conscience which we see spreading day by day under the New Democracy ... Although the Christian Church in China has had a history of

¹ Ibid., pp. 295, 296.

little more than a hundred years, within this short period it has made a very real contribution to the early beginnings and humble struggles of this movement which has now awakened China to a new destiny.”¹ The National Christian Council pledged its support for the new government in Beijing.

However, in 1949-1950 the new authorities placed the Christian colleges under rigorous supervision, controlling their personnel, budget, taxes, and so on. By 1950 five of these colleges had found themselves without a president and with few foreign teachers. But before October 1950, when Chinese volunteers joined in the war in Korea, representatives of US Christian organisations were still hoping that their colleges would remain independent institutions in the new state (the colleges were being funded from abroad, they still had foreign teachers—although their numbers had dwindled—the practices in them were traditional, and so on). At the peak of the Resist America, Aid Korea campaign, the leaders of the Christian movement came to the conclusion that the removal of American missionaries from work in the Christian colleges would help to preserve Christian institutions in China. Most of the American missionaries left China. By May 1951 eight Christian colleges did not have a single American on their staffs.²

Many American historians have attempted to prove that the Christian Church played a “noble role” in China, that it contributed constructively to the Chinese revolution. John K. Fairbank asserts that the missionaries were revolutionaries from the outside, “for their teaching was essentially an attack on Confucianism and on the Confucian social order”. This, he claims, “was potentially much more devastating than mere communism”. To win recognition for the claim that Christian enlightenment played a revolutionary role in China’s socio-political life, the main arguments put forth are usually the following: Christian religious organisations were the conduit carrying Western civilisation and the Western educational system to China and were the object relative to which the anti-imperialist orientation of Chinese nationalism was strikingly manifested (in other words, they were a “stimulator of revolution”). Other historians main-

¹ Jessie Gregory Lutz, *op. cit.*, p. 451.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 451-59, 461-63.

tain that because of the Christian colleges changes in China became not only possible but necessary.

Objectively speaking, the missionaries were indeed a mainstay of foreign expansion in China. Were not the missionaries the people who strove to train in China the personnel needed by American industrialists and businessmen? Were they not the people who helped to create the climate facilitating the sale of American goods in the Chinese market? Did not missionary propaganda extol US policy and the activities of US political institutions? Small wonder that the unequal treaties imposed upon China by the capitalist states contained the provision that missionary activity would not be obstructed.

The complex dialectics of the missionary movement is quite evident. On the one hand, the missionaries acted as advisers and interpreters to merchants and industrialists. But, on the other hand, many of them, motivated by altruism, sacrificed their lives to save people suffering from infectious diseases, compiled dictionaries, and translated literature, in other words, they made a contribution to the development of Chinese culture.

Influential American religious organisations had not entirely lost their hope of recovering their influence in China. This was seen at the close of the 1950s when voices were to be heard in the USA noting that there was the possibility of according official recognition to the PRC. At a conference convened in November 1958 by the National Council of Churches, the Protestant Church made public its recommendations that the US government should establish diplomatic relations with Beijing while preserving its guarantees to Taiwan and South Korea, and that it should take steps to have the PRC admitted to the United Nations Organisation. Representatives of religious organisations in the USA made no secret of their hope that the restoration of relations between China and the USA would make it possible to restore links between the Chinese and American churches. Spokesmen of the Christian Church in the USA stressed that the wisdom and strength of the opposition to communism did not lie in a refusal to conduct any negotiations with the PRC. They urged giving thought chiefly to the terms on which the USA could send its Ambassador to Beijing. The Kuomintang lobby in the USA and right-wing spokesmen of the opposition regarded these recommendations as evidence of the Church's

“penetration by Communists”. In the USA undisguised anti-communism was fanned also by the many Christians who followed Chiang Kai-shek to Taiwan and settled there.

Converting the population in China to Christianity was a US objective the Americans failed to achieve. The number of Chinese Christians never exceeded one per cent of the population. Following the expulsion of the missionaries, the Christian Church in the PRC became a weak institution and its future looked uncertain.

After Mao's death and the Chinese leadership's reconsideration of the legacy of the “cultural revolution”, the Christian Church regained a growing role in China. It seemed that it had been dealt an irreparable blow in the mid-1960s, at the height of the “cultural revolution”. All churches and church-run schools were closed in 1966. Priests, monks, and nuns were sent to factories and rural communes for “re-education”. The Young Men's Christian Association, one of the most important centres of the Christian Church in the country, ceased to function even in Shanghai, China's most cosmopolitan city.

Since the 1970s many Western theologians, sociologists, and Sinologists began to reappraise the role played by the missionary movement in China. Some sought to answer the question

whether the Church was not partly to blame for the failure of missionary activity in China. Others, taking for granted the egalitarian ideas of the “cultural revolution”, tried to find a symbiosis between Christian morals and the views of the architects and inspirers of the Chinese commune.

The world's leading religious organisations called upon their followers to study the “Chinese phenomenon”. In 1972, when Richard Nixon made his voyage to Beijing, a Chinese department was opened at the Brussels Catholic Centre, while a department for the study of Marxism in China was set up at the Lutheran World Federation. By 1975 at least 25 Christian China research centres had been opened in the USA, Europe, and Australia. The Brussels Catholic Centre initiated the formation of the Catholics of Europe Interested in China organisation. The North American division of this organisation began functioning in 1979. The objective of this organisation was to generalise the experience of the missionary movement in China and, on the basis of that study, work out a new

approach to China for the Christian organisations. Former missionaries attended a number of meetings sponsored by the Catholics of Europe Interested in China to consider, in particular, the idea of a positive attitude to Chinese realities. They urged a more profound study of China and of the socio-political views current in Chinese society and in the East as a whole.

After 15 years of inactivity, the Young Men's Christian Association re-opened its doors. On September 21, 1980, after a long interval, the Christians of Shanghai gathered for a jubilee service to mark the 30th anniversary of the founding of the local Protestant Church. The Catholics resumed services in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Chengdu.

The change of the attitude of the Chinese authorities to religion encouraged Western Christians to look for ways of establishing contacts between the Chinese Christian Church and the Christian Church of other countries. It was felt that much could be done in this direction by Chinese emigres living in Southeast Asia and in Hong Kong. With the formation of a large Christian community in Hong Kong were linked the hopes for the creation of a channel through which to influence Chinese Christians in the mainland.

The absence of foreign missionaries has become a major hallmark of the reviving Christian movement in China. The fact that the clergy has begun to speak of the way for the independent development of the Church in China underscores the wish of the authorities and the clergy to restrict the ideological and cultural influence of the USA in China.

CHAPTER THREE

"ASIA FIRST"

The "China Lobby"

With the victory of the anti-Hitler coalition and the growth of the Soviet Union's prestige among the liberated nations of Europe and Asia, it would seem that the ideas of peace and justice had triumphed throughout the world. The San Francisco Conference instituted the United Nations Organisation with the purpose of maintaining and consolidating peace in the postwar world. However, the prospects for a peaceful postwar settlement and the attainment of full independence and political sovereignty by all peoples did not have the understanding of certain segments of American opinion. Doubts tortured those quarters that fearfully watched the spread of liberation movements in the world and the growth of democratic sentiments in the USA itself.

Proponents of priority attention to Asia, lobbying for Chiang Kai-shek, became more active in the US Congress. These were spokesmen of the "Asia First" group, which sought to influence the government in order to involve the USA more intimately in Asia, above all on the side of Chiang Kai-shek in China. In the opinion of Donald M. Nelson, who headed the US government's war production board, US businessmen had to see China as an industrial domain of the USA that was no less or may be even more important than the American West in the early twentieth century.

The material interests of the American monopolies prompted the activities of the "China Lobby" in the USA.

The developments linked to the redistribution of wealth, to the growth or diminution of the role of individual monopoly groups, which, among other things, reflected the structur-

al changes in the US industry that had expanded on the yeast of military spending, inevitably led to the appearance on the American political scene of new forces that gave greater or renewed special attention to the Pacific basin. In the US Congress the opposition, consisting mainly of proponents of priority attention by the USA to the Pacific, became more strident as the national liberation movement widened in Asia and new monopoly associations interested in Far Eastern affairs grew stronger. The influence wielded by this group acquired weight with the rapid economic development of the West coast states and the burgeoning of the new monopoly associations.

The Second World War brought the Rockefellers a net profit of over two billion dollars. In part this came from the growth of oil consumption in industry, used both as a fuel and in the production of armaments-related chemicals. Most of this family's investments were, as before, in Latin America, the Middle East, and Asia. The Rockefellers wanted China turned into their second most important domain after Latin America. The loss by the USA of its dominant role in China would be a devastating blow at the Rockefeller empire. The owners of Standard Oil were not prepared to reconcile themselves with this. Their interests coincided with those of the Bank of America, which was closely associated with the Export-Import Bank in funding American projects in China.

The swift economic growth of the West coast states reinforced the new finance-monopoly groups that had a large stake in Asia's, chiefly China's, problems. Steel mills and also militarily important industries such as aircraft- and ship-building sprang up in these states. Wartime conditions were used with considerable benefit by one of the strongest financial groups in the USA, that of California. During the war this group's main financial institution, the Bank of America, acquired the muscle to compete with leading New York banks. The traditional interests of these monopolies in the Far East became the invisible springs that largely determined the increased support that the Republican majority in Congress gave to the opposing, Europe-oriented group.

When among the conservative Democrats and Republicans united under the "Asia First" slogan the question arose of

a leader of the opposition to the Europe orientation, the candidates most frequently mentioned were Senator William Knowland and General Douglas MacArthur.

In 1945 Earl Warren, Governor of California, rendered Knowland, then 37, an inestimable service by helping him to become a member of the US Senate. True, a large role was played in Knowland's career by his father, who made extensive use of his newspaper, *Oakland Tribune*, to this end. From the beginning of his political career the young Senator demonstrated that he was an adherent of the most reactionary ways of implementing domestic and foreign policies.

General MacArthur played the role of spokesman of the annexionist groups. MacArthur's appointment to the post of Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in the Pacific was regarded in the USA as a considerable success of the Asia-oriented group.

MacArthur exemplified the shift to the right in postwar US foreign policy: he was credited with the steps taken by the US administration to revive the Japanese monopolies as soon as possible, and suppress the democratic forces and national liberation movements in Japan, China, Indochina, Korea, and other Asian countries. He assiduously enforced the policy of the US Command in Japan—renunciation of cooperation with the Soviet Union and also with other countries that fought in the war in the Pacific. In the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Affairs committees this determination displayed by MacArthur met with vigorous approval. Proponents of the "Asia First" policy acclaimed the general, calling him a national hero who had won glory in the "struggle against communism".

The Knowland and the MacArthur groups vehemently criticised the US government for giving priority attention to Europe, opposed the sending of US land forces to European countries, and found acceptable the notion that in Europe there should be total reliance on a revitalised West German army. The European policy programme was countered with a programme providing for massive aid to Chiang Kai-shek, the accelerated remilitarisation of Japan, and the formation, of a powerful strike alliance in the Far East.

The proponents of increasing US influence in the Pacific

were not squeamish about what they did if it helped to put pressure on the government. The institution of lobbyism was particularly effective. Witnesses of the activities of the "China Lobby" noted that these were unprecedented in terms of impertinent interference in governmental affairs and in shaping public opinion in the USA. The "China Lobby" consisted of, among others, businessmen seeking to retrieve their privileges in China, political brokers dreaming of a rapid career, adventurers, and professional anti-communists.

For all practical purposes, the "China Lobby" came into being in 1940. In the spring of that year Song, a brother of Chiang Kai-shek's wife, arrived in Washington and stayed there until 1943, attending courses at Harvard and Columbia universities. Upon returning to China he was made Finance Minister and then Foreign Affairs Minister of the Kuomintang government. In 1944 his assets in the USA were estimated at 47 million dollars. He was extremely active during his stay in the USA, skilfully making influential friends, who included Harry Hopkins, Henry Morgenthau, Henry Luce (owner of *Time*, *Life*, and other publications), the newspaper magnate Roy Howard, and the newspaper columnist Joseph Alsop.

Henry Luce began to show an economic interest in Chinese affairs. He owned large packets of shares in some of the biggest US monopoly corporations that had infiltrated the economy of Taiwan (Westinghouse Electric, American Express, Reynolds). American sugar companies, in which Luce capital played a large role after the war, controlled 60 per cent of the sugar industry on Taiwan, while industrial concerns took over the mining of minerals on the island. During the Second World War this newspaper magnate had founded a powerful organisation, United China Relief, with the objective of mustering the utmost support for Chiang Kai-shek. People familiar with Henry Luce's economic interests did not see as accidental his decision to become the patron and head of the China Institute in America.

Congressman Walter H. Judd (Minnesota), who was a leading "China lobbyist" known for his missionary activities in China, addressed the House of Representatives on March 15, 1945. "Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt," he said, speaking angrily, "made the basic decision right after Pearl Harbor to hold

defensively in the Pacific while disposing of Germany and Italy in Europe. So we poured 98 per cent of our supplies into Europe and less than 2 per cent into East Asia, and less than 10 per cent of that went to the Chinese. Up until a few months ago, when we finally began to consider the Chinese armies of sufficient importance to make an all-out effort to be of assistance to them, they had only two-tenths of 1 per cent of all the supplies that we sent abroad to our armies."¹ The debate grew acute and was over not only the China problem as such but also and rather over the choice of the ways and means of pursuing the USA's foreign policy.

The "China Lobby" directed its criticism at Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who resisted its pressure. It charged General Marshall with having tried to get an agreement between the Kuomintang and the Communists, attributed to him the decision to cut off 500 million dollars' worth of aid to Chiang Kai-shek, in 1947, and demanded the dismissal from the State Department of experts who were speaking of the actual situation in China. From New York, Washington, Chicago, and San Francisco the China Central News Agency circulated information slanted in favour of the Kuomintang and their friends in the USA. According to Senator Wayne Morse, this agency, which was controlled exclusively by the Kuomintang, spent 654 million dollars to shape US public opinion in the period 1946-1949.

It was in this period of doubt and feverish quests for acceptable ways of implementing the China policy that passions flared up also over the liberal Institute of Pacific Relations. In March 1947 Alfred Kohlberg advanced the idea of an inquiry into the activities of the IPR. This enterprising textile dealer, who had offices in China, Japan, France, Britain, and Switzerland, was extremely active in Chinese affairs. At the turn of the century he had rushed about Far Eastern countries in search of profits and established contacts with Chinese textile manufacturers. In 1941 he became a director of the American Bureau for Medical Aid to China and a member of the IPR's finance committee. He had pragmatic motivations for his interest in the IPR. His close contacts with the

¹ Joseph Keeley, *The China Lobby Man. The Story of Alfred Kohlberg*, Arlington House. New Rochelle, New York, 1969, pp. 37-38.

ruling circles in Chongqing induced him to keep a close eye on everything that could be to the detriment of the Chiang Kai-shek clique and weaken its position in the confrontation with the CPC. Moreover, where possible he tried to direct developments into the channel desired by his Kuomintang friends. When an article by T. A. Bisson entitled "China's Part in a Coalition War" appeared in the *Far Eastern Survey*, a magazine published by the IPR, Kohlberg suddenly began taking an interest in the institute's publications, especially in articles written by T. A. Bisson. The latter had given a picture of the development of two Chinas. One burdened with feudal survivals, oppressed and disinherited; the other—a democratic nation. According to Bisson, the term communism was not applicable for assessment of the revolutionary movement in China; he believed that a more apt term would be bourgeois democracy adapted to the specific agrarian relations prevailing in China.

In 1943 Kohlberg went to China and tried to collect material for arguments that would cast doubt on the many charges that were being made against the Chiang Kai-shek regime. Upon his arrival in China Kohlberg struck up a close acquaintance with General Claire L. Chennault, head of the Flying Tigers, and General Thomas S. Arms, head of the infantry training school at Stilwell's headquarters. He got a lot of significant information from them. The theory that the CPC had a special identity and that there were New Dealers in the communist movement was presented in Kohlberg's reports to the State Department as insinuations by the IPR. He stopped at nothing. The IPR, which was widely known in the world academic community, was called "Red" and a centre of the world "subversive activities of the Communists". In March 1947 IPR members received a letter signed by leading personalities of the institute who qualified Kohlberg's charges as "inaccurate and irresponsible".

The situation was not conducive for the Kuomintang lobby, for the conservative circles in the USA that instituted litigation against the IPR and regarded the persons accused by them as symbolising a "defeatist" policy in Asia.

The Bank of China hired the services of David E. Charney, a leading expert on social relations. This highly paid agent

had been involved in the political in-fighting in the USA and had helped the forces that were most in line with the interests of the "China Lobby" win the upper hand.

Among the 17 collective agents registered in the USA and paid by the Kuomintang there were several prominent US corporations operating in the sphere of monopoly business and in the sphere of ideology. One of them, Allied Syndicate, Inc., a New York public relations firm, received from the Bank of China a net income of 10,000 dollars and fees amounting to 50,000 dollars. Universal Trading Corporation, whose aim was to promote US-Chinese trade, had assets in 1949 totalling 21,674,751 dollars. Well-known American industrialists, bankers, and academics took part in the activities of the "China Lobby".

The political clamour over the problem of "Europe or Asia" reached its climax in 1947. The proclamation of the Truman doctrine and the President's request for congressional approval of 400 million dollars for military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey prodded the Republican leaders into a reappraisal of US policy toward China. The bellicose opposition in the House of Representatives used this occasion for an attempt to prove that there was no sense in maintaining contacts with the CPC and in the USA's efforts to form a coalition government in China. The Truman administration, which gave the impression that it was ready to accept a compromise and reconcile the warring sides in China, was accused by Judd of trying to help the "communist minority to topple the lawful government". Secretary of State Acheson endeavoured to persuade the opposition that the Chinese government was viable and that "it was not on the verge of collapse". The idea of a class alliance of the USA's ruling elite with imperialist Europe eclipsed the China problem for the USA, albeit for a time.

The "China Lobby" very forcefully demonstrated in Congress that it was prepared and had the potential to jeopardize the government's programme of aid to Europe in the event the government made no concessions. The rejection of the Chiang Kai-shek aid bills by the House of Representatives was regarded by experienced American politicians as a triumph of the proponents of the Europe orientation. Members of the "China Lobby" bided their time, waiting for an opportunity.

This opportunity finally came. Congressman James P. Richards (a Democrat of South Carolina) submitted an amendment to the bill on military aid to the NATO powers. The amendment envisaged halving the administration's aid programme of 1,100 million dollars and was passed by a majority vote. Knowland, Styles Bridges, and other senators charged that the administration was responsible for the confiscation of American property in China.

Cases of some circles in the Republican Party stating their understanding and support for the "China Lobby" grew frequent. These circles championed the interests of US monopolies that were less closely linked to European capital, were waiting for new opportunities to enforce the Open Door principle, and were prepared to show greater determination in the struggle against traditional Western colonialism.

Americans in Indochina and Chiang Kai-shek's Machinations

In Pentagon documents published in 1971 US policy relative to Vietnam in the period from 1940 to 1950 is assessed as profound incomprehension (Roosevelt had no intention of returning the Indochina colonies to France, and after his death US policy towards the countries of Indochina was at a crossroads). Although this thesis was widely commented upon in the American press in the early 1970s, it had a long history. Some American historians had earlier also attributed the specifics of American policy towards Indochina during the Second World War and Washington's subsequent miscalculations in Asia to Roosevelt's striving to remove French influence from that part of the world. Senator Joseph McCarthy, who won notoriety as the stage-manager of the "witchhunt" in the USA, accused the deceased President of betraying the interests of the USA and its West European allies and of harbouring the "seditious" idea of a postwar trusteeship in Indochina. In the wake of the Senator some ultra-reactionary publicists attempted to prove that Roosevelt had "betrayed" the peoples of Southeast Asia, China, and Europe.

State Department documents and the memoirs of US statesmen and military leaders published in the 1960s brought to

light the story of the intense struggle between imperialist states for Indochina. As in earlier publications, in these Roosevelt is depicted as categorically opposed to French influence in Indochina, as acting against the recommendations of his foreign affairs department. For example, in one of these documents the State Department recommended the employment—in military operations or in the administration of Indochina—of Frenchmen who knew the country and its problems. Here, a very significant reservation was made, namely, that the employment of Frenchmen should only help to carry out military operations but not influence the final decision of Indochina's postwar status.

US political leaders made desperate attempts to prevent any French political actions in Indochina. The story of the USA's struggle for Indochina was used in support of the claim about the USA being "anti-colonialist".

In the face of the Allied victory over world imperialism's most aggressive forces and of the growing anti-colonialist feeling in the world Washington could not openly proclaim aggressive plans relative to any former colony, including Indochina.

The lofty vision of aiding backward peoples, of helping them to achieve national independence was used to win public support for postwar trusteeship over Indochina and over some other Asian countries. Trusteeship became the curtain from behind which US imperialism was preparing to expand American economic and political influence in Asia. American "anti-colonialism" proved to be—as was seen with the utmost clarity during the rapid spread of the national liberation movement in the East—in total conflict with the concepts of the class unity among imperialist states aimed against liberation revolutions. As did many other Western academics, Hans J. Morgenthau, for example, critically reassessed US policy relative to the colonial possessions of Britain, France, Holland, and Portugal. Some American analysts are of the view that the "anti-colonialist" motive in US foreign policy, which manifested itself with particular clarity during the Second World War and the early postwar years in relation to Indochina, prevented unity against the "communist threat".¹ "We have

¹ Louis J. Halle, *American Foreign Policy. Theory and Reality*, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1960, p. 298.

no more interests here [in Indochina]..." said General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny (French High Commissioner in Indochina during the early postwar years.—V.V.) addressing the USA. "And the propaganda you Americans make that we are still colonialists is doing us tremendous harm."¹

The Kuomintang ideologues made no secret of the Chiang Kai-shek regime's intentions relative to Indochina. The Kuomintang clique was against the restoration of the conditions that obtained in Indochina under French rule. It was impressed by the policy pursued by Washington in the Philippines and it saw this policy as a model for the entire Pacific. The regime in Chongqing believed that China would under all circumstances be a participant in the colonial administration of Indochina.

For influential circles of the French bourgeoisie the news that the USA and Britain intended to institutionalise Indochina's partition along the 16th parallel was tantamount to the explosion of a time-bomb. What disturbed these circles most was that without seeking France's opinion, the USA and Britain had decided to partition Indochina into two roughly equal parts. The North would be occupied by Kuomintang troops, and the South by the British.

The USA sought to influence the political situation in Indochina through its Kuomintang agents. Well-informed about Chiang Kai-shek's plans with regard to Indochina US political leaders were fully determined to enlist Chinese nationalism into their service in this case as well. Washington encouraged the Kuomintang to find a mainstay among Vietnamese nationalistic organisations.²

In a telegram to Paris dated August 12, 1945, Jean Sainteny, who led a secret French mission to Indochina, noted: "In fact the Chinese are preparing to take Tonkin and to this end are multiplying their intrigues to prevent intervention by Alessandri's units and our commandos... I repeat: the Chinese,

¹ Robert Shaplen, *The Lost Revolution*, Harper & Row Publishers, New York, 1965, p. 80.

² A Vietnamese nationalistic organisation, the Vietnamese Revolutionary League (Dong Minh hoi), was founded in Liyewu Zhou, China, in October 1942. Like the Kuomintang-sponsored "Provisional Government of Korea", this organisation received monthly cash subsidies of 100,000 Chinese dollars from Chiang Kai-shek.

supported by some influential American personalities, are trying to take Indochina from us. As a result, we French, poorly armed and numbering only 2,500, are compelled to face three Japanese and 20 Chinese divisions and to contend with constant resistance from some high-ranking American and Chinese officials."

American intelligence agents besieged the French mission on all sides, intercepting its correspondence and obstructing movement for the French in the country. When Chinese troops arrived in the north, the French there were disarmed. In a conversation with the French General Alessandri, the American General Gallagher and the Chinese General Wang informed the former that since the question of returning Indochina to France was being discussed by the Council of Five in London, and also in Paris between the French and the Kuomintang, they could not assume the responsibility of transporting the French delegates to Hanoi. Gallagher added that there could be no question of a French protectorate in Indochina.

Judging from the reminiscences of eye-witnesses, the activities of American and Kuomintang troops turned Vietnam into a concentration camp for the French. For French citizens the situation in Indochina deteriorated sharply when Kuomintang military units appeared in the north of the country. French High Commissioner Jean Sainteny tried to attribute the behaviour of the American representatives in Indochina in those years to "incomprehension, errors", etc. According to him, the Americans did not understand the problems related not only to the whole of Indochina but also to the whole of the Far East. Meanwhile in Hanoi the US representatives, he wrote, "played beyond measure, perhaps involuntarily, into the hands of Annamite nationalism". "In the eyes of the Americans," Sainteny noted, "we were mad and incorrigibly stubborn when it came to restoring the colonial past, against which they [the Americans.—V.V.] were opposed in the name of an infantile anti-colonialism, which had blinded almost all of them."¹

Unlike the Americans, the British demonstrated an inten-

¹ Jean Sainteny, *Histoire d'une paix manquée. Indochine 1945-1947*, Amiot Dumont, Paris, 1953, pp. 50-51, 124, 125.

tion to assist colonialist France, deciding upon vigorous steps¹ in support of France in Indochina. On September 6, 1945 a force of 750 British troops landed in Saigon, and a battalion of French infantry arrived together with them. The British commanding officer informed representatives of the revolutionary authority formed in the south of the DRV that the responsibility for disarming the Japanese army lay with the British and the French. The British released and armed 1,400 French prisoners-of-war. On September 23, 1945, aided by the Japanese, the French and the British made an attempt to take into custody the Administrative Committee of South Vietnam that had been formed in the course of the revolution of August 1945.¹ France and the Chiang Kai-shek clique signed an agreement in Chongqing on February 28, 1946, in which the French made some concessions: they agreed to grant certain privileges to Chinese residing in Indochina, mark out a special zone for China in the port of Haiphong, grant tariff-free transit across Indochina for goods of Chinese origin or being transported to China, give China the most-favoured-nation status in Indochina, sell to China before the stipulated date a sector of the Yunnan Railway running across Indochina, and renounce the French concession in Shanghai. In return the Chinese agreed that their troops in North Vietnam would be replaced by French units by the spring of 1946. The Kuomintang regime did all in its power to drag out honouring this agreement. The Chinese command planned to withdraw from Indochina only after the opium harvest was brought in and the rice and livestock were requisitioned. In this situation the revolutionary forces in Indochina found themselves under double pressure: from the colonialists and from nationalist organisations linked to the Kuomintang.²

¹ Somewhat later, in December 1946, the French colonialists made another attempt to arrest the DRV government, which they had recognised, and this triggered a general armed uprising against them.

² When the Kuomintang troops occupied the northern part of Indochina, bourgeois-nationalist organisations stepped up their activities. These organisations, notably Dong Minh hoi, Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang, and Dai Viet, used the support of the Kuomintang to form a nationalist bloc headed by Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang, which had the greatest confidence of the Kuomintang. The nationalist bloc tried to use its influence to subvert the elections in the country, and after the DRV government was formed to remove the republic's leadership.

The deteriorating situation in which the Kuomintang armies found themselves during the civil war in China eroded the US government's course towards using Chinese nationalism in its interests in Indochina. On January 6, 1946 the overwhelming majority of the Vietnamese population voted for the Viet Minh candidates to the country's National Assembly. With Ho Chi Minh at its head, the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam pursued a flexible policy, taking the actual situation in the country into account and making skilful use of the inter-imperialist contradictions. The agreement with France gave the revolutionary forces a respite, enabling them to free Vietnam from the further presence of marauding Kuomintang troops and contributing to a speedy rout of the bourgeois-nationalist groups opposed to the DRV.

In its official diplomacy in Indochina the USA sought to pose as a champion of the liberation of colonial peoples, as a staunch defender of the Vietnamese people's independence. Washington began to look for new ways of asserting its influence in this region and when France, in its attempts to restore the colonialist regime in Indochina, appealed to the former emperor Bao Dai, veteran US diplomats acted as intermediaries. William C. Bullitt, emissary of the US monopolies and former US Ambassador to France (1936-1941), made much headway in this direction: he met and talked with French officials in Indochina and with ministers in Paris. He was interested in everything: the economic potential, the economic situation, and information on candidates for leading political office.¹ Bullitt met with Bao Dai in Hong Kong in the autumn of 1947 and in Geneva in September 1948. This veteran American politician did everything in his power to persuade the former emperor to champion Vietnam's status of "independence". Well aware that the French needed him, Bao Dai dragged out the talks, feeling US support and endeavouring to drive a hard bargain. Finally, in March 1949, French President Auriol and Bao Dai arrived at a common view. Bao

¹ The French High Commissioner Emile Bollert telegraphed to Paris: "Although this is a private visit, Mr. Bullitt is showing an unusually keen interest in economic matters, and in the two talks I have had with him he questioned me closely about the industrial and trade situation in Indochina in the past and at present."

Dai accepted the formula that together with the colony of Cochin China Vietnam would be "independent" within the framework of a French Union. Adopting the title of head of state, the former emperor had to sign a protocol guaranteeing French interests, particularly the special "rights of France in defence" and foreign policy.

Having permitted France to take over the command heights in South Vietnam, the USA did not relinquish the idea of controlling Indochina. It looked closely for a social bulwark, a foundation on which it would erect the edifice of US colonialism in Indochina. The Diem family attracted Washington's attention. Linked by family ties, the Diem brothers belonged to a mandarin family that had always held high office at the imperial court. They were not regarded as being wealthy, but they had always benefited enormously by administrative office; the Diems managed to be appointed to the most lucrative offices at the imperial court and later in the French colonial administration.¹

Ngo Dinh Diem desperately wanted power. He negotiated with the French, the Japanese, and the Americans, doggedly trying to outstrip others in answering the question of who would come out on top. At first, he faithfully served the Japanese, who skilfully protected him against the humiliated French. But in 1945, when the Japanese wanted to give him the post of prime minister during the rule of Bao Dai, he turned down the "honour". Had this happened a year or two earlier, he would have considered it wise to accept the title, but now with the days of the Japanese empire numbered, this zealous votary of the Catholic Church wanted to have nothing more to do with the "Co-Prosperity Sphere". When the Viet Minh army entered Hanoi, Ngo Dinh Diem was in hiding in a monastery. But he was soon remembered. The Americans, who were giving Bao Dai special attention,

¹ Prior to the Second World War Ngo Dinh Diem, the most prominent member of this family, held administrative office for many years. In 1933 he was internal affairs minister in the Bao Dai government. By the time war broke out Ngo Dinh Diem had on his conscience innumerable crimes against the country's patriotic forces. He enjoyed the support and confidence of the Japanese colonialists. His friends noted his amazing ability to emerge scot-free from the dirtiest of affairs.

had not forgotten Ngo Dinh Diem either. When the US emissary Bullitt visited Bao Dai in Hong Kong, Ngo Dinh Diem was invited to join the two men for "consultations on the future composition of the government".

There was nothing that could crush the people's aspiration for freedom. Artificially maintained by the Kuomintang, the reactionary groups in Indochina and in Korea were regarded with contempt by the people.

Lenin's description of the bourgeoisie of oppressed nations is entirely applicable to these conciliatory groups: "The bourgeoisie of the oppressed nations persistently utilise the slogans of national liberation to deceive the workers; in their internal policy they use these slogans for reactionary agreements with the bourgeoisie of the dominant nation ... in their foreign policy they strive to come to terms with one of the rival imperialist powers for the sake of implementing their predatory plans."¹

These groups were opposed by the revolutionary forces. A large role was played in the liberation of China, Korea, and Indochina by the national liberation movement of the Chinese people, the selfless struggle of the Korean guerillas in North-eastern China, and the partisan movement in Indochina. With internationalism as the basis of its unity, the movement against the colonialists attracted growing numbers of people. Unlike the conciliatory groups, the revolutionary movement had direct links to the national liberation democratic movement and to the revolutionary and patriotic forces of different countries. The Communists, who shed their blood in the heavy fighting against the enemies of their people, had the support of the working people, while the conciliatory groups in most instances, on account of their deals with the colonialists, isolated themselves from the masses, from the struggle for national liberation.

The Kuomintang clique's favourite tactic was to blackmail its American patrons; it had tested this tactic time and again

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination", *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, p. 148.

during the war and in most cases it had justified itself. When the clique wanted more American aid, it claimed that "China was being threatened" by the Soviet Union, declaring that "Russia would dominate China" if the necessary US aid was not forthcoming. When the Europe orientation group finally gained the upper hand in the US Congress and it became obvious to the Kuomintang that it would be difficult to count on getting the desired amount of aid from the USA, Chiang Kai-shek offered absurd arguments that could have a response only from the most adventurist quarters in the USA. He spoke of the possibility of the Kuomintang receiving assistance from the Soviet Union.

His policies cast doubt on the expediency of US aid to Kuomintang China—the prospect of paying too high a price for leaving China empty-handed did not, of course, suit the American business community. The Americans were dealing with a thoroughly corrupt, double-dealing, and hypocritical regime. Ardent champions of the ideals of American democracy, who were not burdened by links to the Kuomintang dictator, spoke openly of the need to replace the Chiang Kai-shek administration. Many of them pointed to the unbridled corruption, to the predominance enjoyed by a venal bureaucracy. The Kuomintang tried to save the face of the regime, to show Washington that this was a viable regime. To this end they made attempts to curb profiteering, to eradicate the black market. In August 1948 Chiang Kai-shek's son, Jiang Jingguo, who was then only making his first steps as a politician, was assigned to enforce law and order in Shanghai. He had the support of the mayor, but he was hamstrung by the head of the local underworld—the secret gangster Green society. Jiang Jingguo underestimated the Shanghai gangsters; the influence of the Greens extended even to Chiang Kai-shek.

The activities of Chiang Kai-shek's wife, Song Meiling (Jiang Jingguo's stepmother), and of her sister, who married the banker H.H. Kung, were willy-nilly often directed towards helping the underworld syndicates that controlled the black market. While of the three sisters only Sun Yatsen's widow Song Quingling won the admiration of the working people as head of the Institute of Philanthropy, the two others became deeply involved in the shady affairs of their husbands.

In Shanghai the activity of Jiang Jingguo's agents ended with their discovery of a storehouse of forbidden goods. It turned out that these goods were owned by the Yangtze Development Corporation, which was controlled by the Banker Kung. Jiang Jingguo decided to arrest the banker's son, David Kung, but Madame Chiang took a plane to Shanghai to cool the ardour of her stepson. Kung left for the USA and thus avoided a scandal. Chiang Kai-shek's son did not reign long in Shanghai. His mission came to an end on November 1, 1948. He had only slightly disturbed the hive of profiteers, corrupt bureaucrats, and racketeers.

An important development that reinforced in Washington the opponents of US aid to the Kuomintang was Chiang Kai-shek's ruthless suppression of the Taiwan separatists in 1947. American politicians found themselves face to face with an unpleasant paradox: the life of many advocates of the ideals of American democracy, all of them graduates of US institutions of higher learning, was in danger. They had been incarcerated in Kuomintang prisons and had to leave China in order to find a safe haven.

The history of these events is noteworthy.

Immediately after Tokyo capitulated, pro-Japanese elements among the ruling Formosan elite raised the question of the "independence" of Taiwan. But Kuomintang forces soon flooded Taiwan following their defeat on the mainland. "The dogs have gone, but pigs have come to replace them," said the inhabitants of Taiwan about this unexpected change of administration. The rising that took place under the slogan of "Formosa for Formosans" was directed against the newcomers, and it was joined by pro-American leaders of the local separatists, among whom the Liao brothers—Thomas and Joshua—were extremely popular. The former, an alumnus of Ohio State University and holder of a Ph. D. degree, had an American wife. The latter, regarded as a theoretician of the Taiwan separatists, had come to Taiwan from the USA in 1946. Involved in the rising of 1947, he was thrown into a Kuomintang prison, and upon his release, in 1948, left for Hong Kong.

The Chiang Kai-shek forces drowned the rising in blood—more than 10,000 persons were imprisoned. Many of the fugitive Taiwan separatists failed to find asylum in Hong Kong and

settled in Japan. Their status in Japan proved to be much more complex than they had expected. MacArthur preferred to deal with Chiang Kai-shek. Zheng Qun, a former prime minister of the Chiang Kai-shek regime, called upon him in August 1948. In his talks with MacArthur and with many officials of the Japanese government Zheng Qun sought an agreement on future Japanese-Taiwanese relations "with the purpose of promoting economic coordination and collective security in Asia". Without cooperation with China and the whole of Asia, the Japanese press noted at the time, Japan would be unable to carry out its programme of rehabilitation even if it was supplied with food and raw materials from the USA.

In December 1949 the Taiwanese emigres in Japan sent MacArthur a message requesting him to use Allied troops for the immediate occupation of Taiwan and, under international control, conduct preparations for a plebiscite on the island. This message was shelved at the headquarters of the occupation forces.

Being informed of the situation on the mainland, the US Embassy was increasingly inclined to recognise that Chiang Kai-shek's defeat was inevitable. The Generalissimo's hopes that the US presidential elections in 1948 would be won by Thomas Dewey, the Republican candidate, were misplaced. Dewey's promises of all-out support for Chiang Kai-shek no longer had any significance, while the money contributed by the Kuomintang to the Republican candidate's election fund proved to have gone down the drain.

The questions constantly discussed by the Generalissimo with his supporters were: What was to be done? How to make the Kuomintang continue look credible? Whom to send to Washington to "enlighten" intractable American political leaders about the situation in China and make them loosen the purse-strings in favour of the Kuomintang? One candidate after another was considered. The choice finally fell on Song Meiling, Chiang Kai-shek's wife. "I shall make another try," she promised. In Nanking they hoped that the US government would invite Madame Chiang as its guest. How great then must have been their disappointment when US Secretary of State Marshall made it known that he would be "pleased" to receive Chiang Kai-shek's wife as a "personal friend".

When Madame Chiang arrived in Washington, there were other surprises waiting for her. "Nobody is interested in us," she wrote in her first anxious message home. Indeed, official Washington, now gazing at the world through its European window, was not prepared to waste any time on the Kuomintang envoy, although she had mobilised her entire arsenal of political intrigues, using all her energy and her own money and that of her friends to breathe new life into the pro-Chinese lobby. Madame Chiang took up her residence near New York, in a small colony of extremely wealthy Chinese families; the house of her brother, head of a Chinese bank and one of the richest men in the world, was turned into the headquarters of the "China Lobby". This "Lobby" concentrated its efforts on whitewashing Chiang Kai-shek, on explaining his fall as being due entirely to errors in US policy, to "betrayal" by the US government.

On two occasions Madame Chiang was received by the Secretary of State and on one managed to get the ear of President Truman. It seemed that the President listened to her attentively. She explained that she had come to the USA to request support for her husband "against the Communists". Further, she asked for American leadership of the military efforts in the civil war, for General MacArthur's appointment to the command of the Kuomintang armed forces. MacArthur had at the time just announced the formation of the Syngman Rhee government in South Korea and said that the barrier partitioning Korea had to be "pulled down". Chiang Kai-shek felt he had to have the support of this "idol" of the US ultra.

The more active the Chiang lobby became, the more authoritative grew the voice of the realistically-minded political leaders. In order to show his colleagues that it was useless to help Chiang Kai-shek, Senator Mike Mansfield read the following excerpt from the *U.S. News & World Report* in the House of Representatives: "The effort to find out what really happened to the \$4,350,000,000 of American taxpayers money given to China since 1941 is leading investigators to great personal fortunes amassed by a few Chinese... They are fortunes comparable to those made by Americans in the period of this country's industrial growth.¹ It was not all that hard to find out

¹ Felix Greene, *A Curtain of Ignorance*, Jonathan Cape, London, 1968, p. 54.

how such large fortunes were made by the Kuomintang elite: the manufactured goods and military hardware received from the USA as aid were resold in China at profiteer prices and enriched many leading members of Chiang Kai-shek's clique.

Hundreds of millions of dollars in gold and foreign currency disappeared into a bottomless barrel through Hong Kong and Portuguese Macao. Large sums went out of the country through government channels, finding their way to banks in Zurich, Buenos Aires, New York, and San Francisco, where China's wealthiest families had piled up enormous fortunes. Even according to the very modest statistics of the US State Department, during the war Chiang Kai-shek received from the USA 645 million dollars in loans and 825,700,000 dollars in equipment. The Kuomintang returned a portion of this aid to the USA to finance the "China Lobby", which, in its turn, was demanding an increase in American aid to Chiang Kai-shek. The US taxpayers were thus made the victims of a huge swindle.

By the beginning of 1949 the People's Liberation Army of China had completed the defeat of the Chiang Kai-shek divisions that had a total complement of 520,000 effectives. On January 31 the PLA marched into Beijing. The Chiang Kai-shek units that had not been smashed, including air and naval units, hastily left the mainland. These were commanded by generals known for their loyalty to the Generalissimo. US warships helped to form a bridge for the fleeing Chiang Kai-shek forces. The transportation costs were part of the 338 million dollars for economic restoration and the 125 million dollars for the purchase of military equipment endorsed by the US Congress on April 2, 1948. After December 1948 the Chiang Kai-shek clique transported to Taiwan China's gold reserves, silver bars, foreign currency, and national art treasures.

Subsequent developments showed that following its total collapse on the mainland, the Chiang Kai-shek regime acquired a new asylum on Taiwan. The Generalissimo and his allies in the USA were hoping to turn the island into an unsinkable aircraft-carrier of the US Seventh Fleet, continue the civil war, and return the Kuomintang to the mainland.

CHAPTER FOUR

ON THE ROAD OF CONFRONTATION

In the early 1970s, when the USA was actively looking for mutual understanding with Beijing, Western political leaders and then official circles began paying special attention to the diplomatic history of the eve of the war in Korea. What occurred at the time? What started the many years of American-Chinese confrontation, the long period of reciprocal hostility and suspicion between Washington and Beijing? Retired diplomats and a large cohort of historians and journalists analysed the USA's political setbacks in China just before the war in Korea. They recalled US diplomatic activity aimed at building a bridge to the leadership of the Communist Party of China after the Second World War and getting the Chinese Communists to split away from the Soviet Union. During the cold war period this line in the USA's China policy was sharply attacked by the Republican right wing, which blamed Secretary of State Dean Acheson for many of the failures in China.

In January 1973, in a report headed "The United States and Communist China in 1949-1950", the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations reminded people of the USA's stand towards China in those years. According to the report's authors, the fact of its publication was linked to the pending recognition of the PRC by the USA. This is what explains the largely well-wishing—from the angle of the USA's new China policy—interpretation of the US attitude towards China at the time. As the report stated, the Truman administration refrained from recognising the PRC in 1949 exclusively for tactical considerations. "It is also a well-recognized criterion," the report declared, citing an Acheson report (October 1949), "that a government

which seeks recognition is willing to state that it will carry out the international obligations created by treaty and international agreements of the predecessor government." The US Senate reminded the PRC leaders that they should take the experience of the past into account and be more tractable if they wanted recognition.

The prehistory of the war in Korea, the diplomatic struggle preceding the US aggression in that country presents a complex and contradictory picture of deliberate actions by cold war proponents, intrigues by American diplomacy in China, and efforts by the Syngman Rhee and Kuomintang reactionaries.

In 1949 and in early 1950 nobody, it seemed, caused such considerable anxiety among the ruling politicians on Taiwan and in South Korea as did US Secretary of State Dean Acheson (who replaced Marshall in this office). The cautious approach taken by US diplomacy—for which the responsibility was borne by Acheson—to Chinese problems aroused serious apprehensions among the Chiang Kai-shek followers and among people of their ilk in Seoul. Some Taiwan and South Korean politicians, known for their unsurpassed anti-communism and their still greater ignorance, wasted no time in labelling Acheson a "Communist". Others, although they did not believe this absurdity, supported the charge, counting on Acheson's removal during the next campaign of investigation into "un-American activities". The anti-communist strategists of the McCarthy period were ready to accept any fantasy for a fact.

The uninformed observer was indeed surprised by Acheson's behaviour. On April 14, 1949, in reply to an inquiry from the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations regarding a loan to Chiang Kai-shek, Acheson expressed doubt that this aid would in any way influence the course of events in China. Since 1945, the Secretary of State explained, the USA had invested two billion dollars in China but this had not restrained the "communist movement". Many officials in the USA agreed with Acheson that the Chiang Kai-shek regime was helpless, that it was unable, even with massive desire and support from without, to withstand the revolutionary forces in China. The bill on aid to the Kuomintang met with resistance in the US Congress and was ultimately defeated.

After a prolonged debate most American political leaders

admitted that the USA had suffered a political Waterloo in China, an admission that false pride had earlier prevented the proponents of an "American age" from making. The firm stand of the Soviet Union, the general anti-colonialist feeling that was gaining strength in the world, and the anti-colonialist propaganda conducted in the USA compelled experienced political leaders in Washington to renounce the use of military force against the Chinese revolution. But how was the adverse impact of the American defeat in China on the USA's positions in Asia to be offset?

"The deteriorating situation in China," said Cho Byong Ok, Syngman Rhee's personal representative in the USA, sounding the alarm, "is creating a world tragedy, which is most strongly affecting us. Much is being said in the press about the possibility of the communist regime (in the PRC.—V.V.) being recognised by the United Kingdom, India, and other countries of the British Commonwealth... I hope that the American people awakens and understands the actual situation."¹ The voice of the South Korean politicians could hardly have any visible impact on the diplomatic game that was started in London and then in Washington. The Kuomintang lobby realised that it needed stronger arguments if it were to gain anything. It was then that the so-called domino theory, the theory of a revolution starting a chain reaction, was born.

How were the USA's allies to be prevented, if necessary, and whatever the means, from recognising the PRC? The State Department concentrated its efforts in that direction. Secretary of State Dean Acheson brought diplomatic pressure to bear on Britain and France to ensure their non-recognition of the PRC.

It was hard for the South Korean leaders to answer questions from newsmen about the possibility of Britain and USA recognising the new government in China. "Britain and the USA," they declared in reply, "are focussing more attention on the economic rather than the ideological aspect, and for that reason they may recognise the communist government. But relative to the Chinese Communists the Korean republic will not maintain the same attitude that in this case will be adopted by the USA and Britain."

¹ *The Facts Speak Out*, Pyongyang, 1953 (in Russian).

On July 11, 1949 the South Korean Ambassador to the USA Chang Myun was received by Acheson to whom he relayed Seoul's plan for reinforcing its US allies. He noted, in particular, that South Korea was waiting for the moment when the USA would at last undertake the "decisive role in support of a Pacific pact or a similar alliance of Asian countries for the protection of their common security". Acheson, according to Chang Myun, noted that the USA had no possibility of officially participating in a Pacific anti-communist pact. The mission of the Philippine representative Carlos Romulo to the State Department on the same issue ended in similar failure. Like Chang Myun, he informed his government of the State Department's restraint and of the caution of most Asian diplomats. In Seoul the US China policy now evoked not only perplexity but undisguised dissatisfaction.

Meanwhile, the Seoul camarilla's suspicions were aroused by Chiang Kai-shek's flight, the beginning of the process of recognising the PRC and the intrigues of US diplomacy. The fate of the Kuomintang seriously worried Syngman Rhee and he deliberately aggravated the situation in the country, whipping up anti-communism and anti-Sovietism for this purpose. His personal representative in the USA Cho Byong Ok tried all doors, telling all who would listen that the South Korean army was hopelessly weak, with most of the troops having nothing to fight with except their fists. Statements of this sort, which were lies pure and simple, conformed to the interests of the anti-Soviet sections of American society, who regarded support for the Syngman Rhee regime as central to the opposition to the Soviet policy of uniting Korea on a democratic basis.

The setbacks and ineffectiveness of US aid in China prompted the State Department to back up the prestige of the South Korean regime, which was one of the main recipients of US aid in the Far East. On June 2, 1949 W. Walton Butterworth, who headed the Office of Far Eastern Affairs at the State Department, summoned the Seoul Ambassador Chang Myun and told him of the State Department's apprehensions. These were linked to the government's instability (resolutions of no confidence in the government were being submitted in the National Assembly), the corruption in

Seoul, and the dissemination by South Korean leaders of false information about the state of their armed forces. Butterworth bluntly spoke of the damage that was being inflicted on US-South Korean relations by false information about the quantity of armaments that the USA had transferred to the South Korean army. However, the principal aims pursued by the US cold war warriors and the South Korean reactionaries coincided.

The Seoul government used various means to pressure the US Congress. Anti-Soviet and anti-communist propaganda was accompanied by undisguised provocations at the 38th parallel. In the period from January to September 1949 there were 432 attacks along the land frontier and innumerable incursions into the territory of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea by sea and by air. This placed enormous hardships on the population of the areas adjoining the 38th parallel in North Korea, the gambles of the Syngman Rhee military causing numerous casualties. Many ranking US military made no secret of the fact that the South Korean government was provoking frontier incidents in order to obtain US assistance. "Anti-communism has always been much more flimsy than the thatched roof of a Korean hut," some quick-thinking US congressmen vainly reminded Seoul. Feeling that he had the support of the cold war proponents and the local reactionaries, Syngman Rhee used the bogey of anti-communism whenever possible.

The advocates of resolute action gathered in Tokyo, where affairs were in the hands of Douglas MacArthur, a leader of the "Asia First" group in the US Congress. Their aim was to halt the crisis of the Chiang Kai-shek and South Korean regimes. At the close of October 1949 head of the Seoul mission in Japan introduced the South Korean Defence Minister Shin Sung Mo to William J. Sebald, diplomatic adviser at MacArthur's headquarters. Shin Sung Mo gave the assurance that Seoul was strong enough to launch an attack and seize Pyongyang within a few days. Brigadier General William L. Roberts, head of the US military mission to South Korea, who had been in Tokyo together with the Syngman Rhee minister, shared the latter's confidence. Losing all sense of proportion, Roberts spoke of the South

Korean army as "My army", "My troops". He kept repeating that if it was called upon to do so the Seoul army could overrun North Korea.

On October 7, 1949 Syngman Rhee gave an interview to Joseph Johnston, the then Vice President of the United Press. On the next day the interview was carried by Seoul newspapers with the ominous headline: "Pyongyang May Be Taken in Three Days". "The North Koreans asked me," declared Syngman Rhee, "to appeal by radio to loyal Koreans in the North to depose the communist regime and they are expecting us to join them. I am firmly convinced that we can take Pyongyang in three days. It is much easier to defend our homeland, Korea, along the frontier with Manchuria than along the 38th parallel. What reasons, despite this, restrain me from acting? I am doing so because the United Nations and the USA are drawing attention to the possibility that this sort of action could develop into a third world war. That explains our patience and our expectation of the moment when the problem of communism is resolved in parallel with other problems."¹ What should have been the expectations of the people of South Korea in the New Year of 1950? Syngman Rhee decided to answer this question himself. "We must remember however," he said didactically, "that in the New Year, in accordance with the changed international situation, it is our duty to unify Southern and Northern Korea by our own strength."²

The year 1950 came. On January 5 Truman declared that the USA had no desire to obtain special rights or privileges, or to establish military bases on Formosa. "The United States government," he promised, "will not pursue a course which leads to involvement in the civil conflict in China." Truman's statement triggered yet another wave of anxiety among the Republicans. In the US Congress there were voices urging the occupation of Taiwan. In the view of William Knowland, MacArthur was the only person who could "coordinate" US policy in the Far East and "bring order" to that explosive region. Knowland's views gave Taipei and Seoul little consolation. "I shuddered," Syng-

¹ *The Facts Speak Out.*

² Wilfred G. Burchett, *Again Korea*, International Publishers, New York, 1968, p. 125.

man Rhee told correspondents on January 7, "when I learned that the government of Britain had recognised the PRC... Communism," he said, "should not be encouraged in Asia."¹ After Britain's recognition of the PRC was announced there followed news that was no less alarming for Seoul.

Confusion reigned in South Korea's National Assembly in the morning of January 13, 1950. The place was filled with agitated deputies, all shouting: "Acheson! Acheson!". For Seoul the statement of the US Secretary of State of the previous day about the US "defensive perimeter" was like a bolt out of the blue. Speaking at the National Press Club on January 12, 1950, Acheson said, in part, that the US "defensive perimeter runs along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the Ryukyus..." and "from the Ryukyus to the Philippine Islands." The South Korean MPs were thrown into disarray. They reread Acheson's statement over and over again and kept asking in surprise why South Korea and Taiwan were not included in the US "defensive perimeter".

Of course, the Secretary of State did not confine himself to excluding Taiwan and South Korea from the US "defensive perimeter". The main thing in the Acheson speech was its anti-Soviet keynote. Acheson attacked the Soviet Union, drawing his arguments from the "Asia First" arsenal, although the speech was designed to give a boost to the Europe orientation of US foreign policy. He alleged that the Soviet Union was not pursuing a mission of liberation: its purpose was to establish "Russian dominance" in China, Manchuria, and elsewhere. He misrepresented Soviet policy and tried to put forth US policy in a favourable light. The USA, he declared, held that it was the right of "every nation, of every people, and of every individual to develop in their own way, making their own mistakes, reaching their own triumphs but acting under their own responsibility."² The lofty mission of Asian nationalism, Acheson stated, was to fight foreign interference and poverty, and in this there had always been parallelism between American interests and those of the Asian countries; the USA, he said, had always been opposed to China being controlled by a foreign power. The

¹ *Chosun Ilbo*, January 9, 1950.

² *China and US Far East Policy, 1945-1967*, a publication of Congressional Quarterly Service, Washington, 1967, p. 259.

Soviet Union, he alleged, countered Asian nationalism.

This was a clear and deliberate attempt to smear the internationalist alliance between the Soviet and Chinese peoples. There was no accident about this. As early as May 1949 the Korean emigre press had drawn attention to the promise made by the leaders of the CPC to protect all foreigners pursuing their "normal professions" in China and to their desire to establish, following the proclamation of the new state, diplomatic relations with foreign countries. Although in promises of this sort there seemed to be nothing that could give comfort to imperialist political leaders, the British leaders and the "realists" in the USA supporting them were prepared to have faith in the possibility that tendencies favourable for the West would develop among the CPC leaders, and that the internationalist links between the Soviet Union and the Chinese revolutionaries could be eroded. This was one of the reasons that the USA omitted mentioning Taiwan and South Korea in its "defensive perimeter". Moreover, this same circumstance motivated the State Department when it rejected the solicitations of Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman Rhee for formation of a Pacific pact.

Acheson's line was a blow to Chiang Kai-shek. Panic gripped Taiwan in May 1950. Gold was hastily shipped from Taiwan to Hong Kong. In the course of May the Kuomintang people transferred at least 50 million Hong Kong dollars to that British colony. According to the Hong Kong travel agency many of these people left for South America (quite a few went to Brazil) via Hong Kong. The USA hurriedly evacuated its citizens from Taiwan. The PRC leadership's declared determination to liberate Taiwan, and the support that this got from the diplomatic intrigues of Britain and the USA, generated hysteria not only on Taiwan (matters reached a point where the President of the Philippines Elpidio Quirino, an ally of the USA, declared that his country would not be seriously threatened if Taiwan passed to the PRC).

Syngman Rhee and his supporters only further accentuated the failure of Washington's diplomatic game in China: they were merely temporarily calmed by the agreement for joint defence and mutual assistance signed between the USA and Seoul on January 26, 1950. The foreign policy linked to Acheson's name did not justify itself.

Internationalism predominated in the national liberation movement of China. The PRC leaders declared their unqualified solidarity with the Soviet Union and its foreign policy. On February 14, 1950 the USSR and the PRC signed the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance and some other agreements. This triumph of internationalism in the CPC leadership was dispiriting for the British "appeasers" of the Chinese revolution and American followers. The bourgeois press was anxiously reporting that Soviet experts were going to China and that the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society had nearly 32 million members. In the USA the jingoist elements felt that their hour had come. In February 1950 McCarthy addressed a long tirade to the Senate, charging that there was "communist" activity in the State department. McCarthy aimed his main and most venomous attacks against the Far Eastern experts who, in his view, "had given China to the Communists". The anti-communist hysteria in the USA put new heart in Syngman Rhee and his supporters.

At the elections in May 1950 the Syngman Rhee party won 48 seats in the National Assembly; the other 120 seats were won by other parties. In other words, despite the repressions less than 20 per cent of the seats went to Syngman Rhee's henchmen. This time Syngman Rhee did not follow the inquiry procedures that he had learned in Washington. He simply used the prerogative of the strong, imprisoning another 13 deputies of the South Korean National Assembly without any explanation. It seemed that he had decided to break the will of his compatriots, charging the imprisoned deputies with, among other things, petitioning the UN, making public cases of corruption among the authorities and, lastly, opposing any South Korean invasion of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. He threw caution to the winds when he felt anybody in the US Senate had offended him again. He was furious upon learning that Senator Connally (of Texas) had replied in the negative to the question whether Korea was an essential part of the US defence strategy. "Senator Connally," he declared publicly, "must have forgotten that the United States has committed herself and cannot pull out of the Korea situation with honor."¹

¹ I.F. Stone, *The Hidden History of the Korean War*, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1952, p. 12.

The South Korean reactionaries placed great hopes in a visit that John Foster Dulles was to make to Korea in June 1950. A leading Republican in the Truman Democratic administration, Dulles had initially given every support publicly to the Acheson line in the USA's China policy. Even despite pressure from the Kuomintang lobby he felt it was possible to extend diplomatic recognition to the PRC government. But strong links to the conservative wing of the Republican Party had, especially in the heyday of McCarthyism, the most direct impact on determining Dulles' political stance. During the Second World War Dulles worried about the Soviet Union's enhanced role in international affairs; it irked him that American political leaders, analysts, and writers paid tribute to the Soviet Union's struggle against nazism, hailing the victories on the Soviet-German front. Dulles' biographers cite his speech of March 18, 1943, calling it the speech about the "Six Pillars of Peace". Already then Dulles had publicly articulated the anxiety of the American reactionaries over the future settlement of Far Eastern problems; he urged "caution" relative to the Soviet Union, called attention to the "unresolved conflict" in China, and did not conceal his alarm that Japan might be weakened.

On June 19, 1950, he addressed the National Assembly of South Korea. "The eyes of the free world are upon you. Compromise with communism would be to take the road leading to disaster." This was unquestionably a tribute to the adventurist policy of Syngman Rhee, who had brushed away all the reasonable proposals of the DPRK for a peaceful reunification of the country. Dulles assured his listeners of the "readiness of the USA to give all necessary moral and material support to South Korea", which was fighting against communism. Dulles kept the promise he gave in Washington to Chang Myun. "If we cannot defend democracy in a cold war," Syngman Rhee said pompously, "we shall win in a hot war." Soon afterwards it was learned that Seoul had rejected a proposal from the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK for uniting the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK and the National Assembly of South Korea into a single legislative body and thereby achieving the country's peaceful unification.

Dulles' first act upon arriving in South Korea was to go straight to the 38th parallel, which General Roberts had long ago called a "front"; he posed for a photographer, standing beside an armoured train at a distance of one or two miles from the frontier, poring over a map lying on the parapet of a trench. Intervening in everything, even purely military matters, he went into the details of troop location, the firing lines, etc. After Dulles' visit to the 38th parallel the Seoul press quoted him as addressing the South Korean army: "No adversary, not even the strongest, can resist you... The time is not far off when you will be able to display your prowess."¹ Dulles assured his South Korean friends that they had the solidarity of Washington in their struggle against Pyongyang. For the bellicose South Korean politicians and military leaders statements of this kind meant far more than words of consolation.

Talks with MacArthur were scheduled. At these talks, in the presence of the US War Secretary Louis Johnson and the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Omar Bradley, Dulles discussed the military situation in the Far East with MacArthur. By that time the US army units based in Japan were preparing for landing operations, the warships of the US Seventh Fleet were on combat alert, and air strength was being built up at bases in Japan. The Syngman Rhee devotees were doing everything to aggravate the situation. In the morning of June 25, 1950 the world learned with alarm that hostilities had broken out in Korea. On that day Dulles, who had arrived in Tokyo by air, hurried to see MacArthur in the company of State Department adviser William J. Sebald. MacArthur spoke in his usual manner, stressing that he knew more about military affairs than his visitors: he said he was confident that the South Korean army would quickly mobilise the needed reserves and stated that "powerful US forces" had to take part in the operations. This was no declaration. Dulles knew that acting under orders from MacArthur heavily armed US landing craft were already on their way to South Korean shores, and that these vessels had the covering support of planes from US airfields in Japan.

¹ Wilfred G. Burchett, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

From the outset of the war in Korea President Truman was worried that the PRC might become involved and took various steps to localise the conflict. The US command had decided on bombing targets in North Korea before US land forces joined in the hostilities in Korea in 1950. Long before the Chinese volunteers crossed the Yalu River US pilots were instructed to avoid bombing power stations and other installations important to China and thereby avoid actions that could influence the PRC into joining in the Korean war. The foreign policy steps made by the US government took into account the need for a cautious approach to the Taiwan problem, to Chiang Kai-shek's participation in the conflict, for declarations of hopes that outstanding issues with the PRC would be settled. In domestic policy Truman calculated chiefly on pressuring the US Congress opposition, which reflected the thinking of extremist elements interested in extending the conflict. General MacArthur was their idol.

As soon as war broke out MacArthur insisted on bringing Chiang Kai-shek troops into the Korean adventure.

In 1950 the population of Taiwan numbered eight million people. Among American military experts there was no consensus about the number of bayonets available to Chiang Kai-shek's army on Taiwan or about its potential. Some American military men in Tokyo and Washington ventured to assume that Chiang Kai-shek had nearly 50,000 effectives. But with their usual hypocrisy professional propagandists depicted the situation on Taiwan in a more favourable light. "U.S. military men," one report stated, "believe that a Red invasion can be turned back by the U.S. Seventh Fleet together with the Nationalist Army of about 500,000 men."¹ It suited the proponents of extending the conflict in the Far East to inflate the myth about the potentialities of the Chiang Kai-shek army for making a large contribution to the common "struggle against the forces of communism". They ran a smear campaign against US political leaders, charging them with helplessness, attributing to them the setbacks in the Korean war, explaining that these setbacks were due largely to the latter's reluctance to use the Taiwan ally, who they claimed was thirsting for action.

¹ George H. Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1965, p. 403.

On June 29, 1950, two days after Truman announced the "quarantine" of Taiwan, Chiang Kai-shek declared that he would send up to 30,000 troops to Korea. In a memorandum to Washington, the Taiwan overlord wrote that his soldiers were prepared to fight on the USA's side in Korea and requested that 20 C-46 planes be sent to Taipei to airlift these troops. At first the impression was that the US military leaders were prepared to accept Taipei's offer and even recommended permission by the Secretary of War to the Kuomintang thugs to mine the coastal waters and attack PRC troops. However, upon weighing the pros and cons, the government finally rejected the idea of drawing Kuomintang troops into the war in Korea—Chiang Kai-shek's offer was not accepted by Washington: the risk of escalating the conflict was much too great.

MacArthur was sincerely disappointed, he demanded, with growing insistence, an extension of the Korean conflict and more active support for Taiwan than that rendered by the State Department, and was adamant on the point of his opponents enlisting Chiang Kai-shek into total involvement in the USA's aggressive actions in the Far East. He felt that Chiang Kai-shek merited US aid if only because he had been defeated and fled from the mainland as an anti-communist. The State Department, he held, had to help him to fight communism. Chiang Kai-shek praised the efforts of the American military and their representative in the Far East Douglas MacArthur. "Our people and armed forces," he declared, "have pledged fidelity to General MacArthur, lauding his firm leadership in the common struggle against totalitarianism in Asia." Chiang Kai-shek announced the formation of the foundations of a "Sino-US alliance", calling MacArthur a "comrade-in-arms".

In most cases MacArthur rejected diplomatic and political conventionalities, depending more on weapons. The initial successes of the better-armed US forces over the army of the DPRK reinforced MacArthur in his belief that he was acting correctly. The defenders of Pyongyang fought heroically. This was acknowledged by MacArthur himself. But the forces were unequal. The following questions formed the basis of the general's telegrams to Washington: Why am I not allowed to develop the offensive to the North? Why am I not permitted to bomb the power station on the Yalu River and the bridge

across the Yalu? Why am I not permitted to cut the enemy's supply lines? These questions were constantly on the general's lips.

In a message to foreign war veterans MacArthur urged converting the Pacific into an American lake. His "Asian programme" envisaged, in particular, turning Taiwan into a base for US bombers and thus providing supremacy over all Asian ports, from Vladivostok to Singapore, and the moving of the US strategic frontier from the USA itself to beyond the Pacific. He saw the "defeatists" and "appeasers" as overly naive when they expressed apprehensions about the possibility of aggressive actions intensifying anti-colonialist feeling in Asia and alienating continental Asia from the USA. "Those who speak thus [advocates of a more moderate policy.—V.V.] do not understand the Orient," MacArthur said building a theoretical basis for his arguments. "They do not grasp that it is in the pattern of the Oriental psychology to respect and to follow aggressive, resolute and dynamic leadership, to quickly turn from a leadership characterised by timidity or vacillation; and they underestimate the Oriental mentality."¹

The Navy Secretary Francis Matthews soon stated his solidarity with MacArthur. Speaking in Boston, he urged beginning a war of aggression as a preventive measure against any nation that did not accept American diktat. This was serious. The elections to the US Congress were drawing near. Not very much time remained until November. Two years previously the Democratic Party and its candidate Harry S. Truman were victorious: Dewey, Dulles and other Republican rivals of Truman were unable to win voters with peace slogans as their opponent did. It was later found that the peace declarations were no more than a screen for the nation's continued militarisation.

In the White House they were aware that the attitude adopted by MacArthur and Matthews was fuelling suspicion of the USA among the ruling circles of European states. The European bourgeoisie's growing disaffection was underscored by the US press itself, which thereby acted in favour of the proponents of the Europe orientation in US policy. In the West

¹ David Rees, *Korea: The Limited War*, Macmillan & Co. Ltd., London, 1964, p. 75.

there was growing apprehension about there being a very real danger of a political split between Europe and the USA, a split that could lead to the disintegration of the Atlantic community. In this context the alarm was sounded that Western Europe might dissociate itself from America's actions, in other words, that it "may remain neutral". In reply to the call for troops to reinforce MacArthur, the Dutch newspaper *De Telegraaf* replied that the Dutch were not mercenaries to fight for the interest of others and to answer for American blunders. The reproaches in the American press about the return of Dutch troops to the Netherlands from Indonesia at a time when MacArthur needed them evoked more vocal protests than ever before. Indeed, the days of mercenary armies had passed. The Dutch could not be forced to go to Korea to fill the breach in the American lines.

While it interfered grossly in the internal affairs of the Korean people, Washington felt it had to draw a line beyond which—from the standpoint of American interests—it would be inexpedient to go. The Washington administration—Averell Harriman tried to drum its stand into MacArthur's head—wanted to refrain from ill-considered actions and try and localise the conflict. In Washington they took into consideration the Soviet Union's military strength and firm policy, and the enhanced political activity of the People's Republic of China, which was trying to use political means to halt the aggression by the USA and its allies in Korea.

The PRC government welcomed the efforts of the Soviet Union and neutral countries that were condemning the aggression in Korea and speaking up in defence of the PRC's rights. The Soviet Union called on an end to hostilities and the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea. It staunchly urged the PRC's admission to the United Nations and the participation of the PRC and the DPRK in the Security Council's discussion of the Korean issue. A PRC Foreign Ministry statement in September 1950 noted the efforts of the Soviet Union and India to obtain a positive decision on the question of the PRC's admission to the United Nations. "The Chinese people know," the statement said, "that these steps [the US opposition to the PRC's admission to the UN.—V.V.] are a covert part of the USA's big war and aggressive actions

against China... The Chinese people are convinced that all of the USA's secret designs will come to grief."

Intoxicated by initial victories, MacArthur gave the impression that he was totally ignoring the precepts of the US administration. His friends and the Kuomintang lobby in Washington were stirring up public opinion and calling for an extension of the war in the Far East. MacArthur was publicly asked (especially by the Republicans) whether a second front could be opened on the continent by the Chiang Kai-shek forces. The general replied in the affirmative. He remembered, of course, the explosion of indignation set off in government circles by his independent decision to begin negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek as early as July. In August US aircraft made their first raid over PRC territory. The PRC demanded that the UN censure the US aggression and waste no time taking steps to compel US troops to pull out of Taiwan and other Chinese territories. MacArthur was somewhat restrained by the measures taken by the US President. On October 9 Truman approved a directive to MacArthur: "In any case you will obtain authorization from Washington prior to taking any military action against objectives in Chinese territory."¹

In the meantime, the threat to the PRC's security was mounting. Interventionist troops under MacArthur were drawing closer to the PRC's frontiers. The USA persevered in its policy of avoiding a direct collision with China. Truman announced that the US Seventh Fleet would be recalled as soon as the Korean conflict ended and that the USA would turn the problem of Taiwan over to the United Nations.

The PRC was determined to halt any further spread of the US aggression. Using diplomatic and public relations channels, the Chinese leaders informed the USA and world public opinion that it was prepared to be directly involved in the armed struggle of the Korean people. The first intimation that China intended to enter the Korean war was given on September 25 in a conversation between General Nieh as representative of the PRC and the Indian Ambassador K. M. Panikkar. In reply the Indian Ambassador mentioned possible

¹ Cited from Robert McClintock, *The Meaning of Limited War*, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1967, p. 43.

actions by the USA: the destruction of China's industrial regions by bombardment from the sea and air. However, the PRC leaders did not discount even the possibility of defeat in Korea. In this event they counted on prolonged resistance at strongpoints in mainland China. In Beijing they even took into account the possibility that the USA might use the atom bomb in Korea. This is what motivated General Nieh, when he replied to Panikkar's question: "We have calculated all that. They [the Americans] may even drop atom bombs on us. What then? They may kill a few million people... After all, China lives on the farms. What can atom bombs do there?"¹

The government of the PRC declared on October 10, 1950 that it "cannot remain indifferent to the situation resulting from the invasion of Korea by the USA and its allies, from the threat of the war spreading". From the Indian Ambassador in Beijing the world learned that the PRC might enter the war if the US troops continued advancing in North Korea. Zhou Enlai made it plain to the Indian Ambassador Panikkar that if the Americans crossed the 38th parallel, China would have no alternative to entering the Korean war.

Of course, this statement gave a boost to those forces in the USA who were opposed to an extension of the conflict, who were urging a policy of moderation. On October 12 MacArthur found two telegrams on his desk: one from Averell Harriman, and the other from General Marshall. The first paid tribute to MacArthur's courage in transcending difficulties and expressed good wishes; the second, written in a dry language, contained the information that the President wanted to talk to MacArthur. This talk took place on Wake Island and was reminiscent more of an international conference; gathered there were representatives from political and military departments. Many problems were considered. Truman needed assurances, and these were forthcoming. MacArthur declared that he was prepared to apologise if his message to the war veterans organisation had caused embarrassment. Truman said that he considered the incident closed.

MacArthur ignored the PRC's warnings and urged Truman to believe him that the war was coming to a close, that China

¹ K. M. Panikkar, *In Two Chinas, Memoirs of a Diplomat*, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1955, p. 108.

would not intervene and that soon, by January 1951, it would be possible to transfer one of the divisions from Korea to Europe and transport the Eighth Army to Japan.

Shortly before this meeting ended it became obvious that MacArthur's assertion as to an early victory and military successes was premature. The general was asked what he thought of the newly-received intelligence reports that China was preparing to enter the war. MacArthur evaded a direct reply, but said that the latest intelligence reports were unquestionably evidence in favour of decisive measures consistent with his plan.

At this conference with Truman MacArthur remained true to his mode of behaviour: he reacted sensitively to criticism of his plans for implementing the USA's Far Eastern policy and regarded himself as the leading authority on Eastern affairs. In conversations with his associates he did not hide his dissatisfaction over the conference on Wake Island. Washington, he said, had fallen so low that in his eyes it was sliding into the Franklin Roosevelt position in foreign policy. As for Truman, he was outraged by the general's attempt to hold himself on an equal footing with the President. It was his firm belief that policy-making should be in the hands of official political leaders rather than of generals and admirals.

MacArthur proved to be wrong in assuming that the PRC would not enter the Korean war. In the course of several weeks, especially at the beginning of October 1950, shortly before MacArthur's offensive across the 38th parallel, Beijing radio kept warning that "the Chinese people will not be unresponsive if their Korean neighbours are attacked". By October 24 three armies of Chinese volunteers had crossed the Yalu River, and these were followed by another seven armies. For the US command this entry of Chinese volunteers into the war was not unexpected, for it had intelligence data on the numerical strength of the Chinese troops in Manchuria. In July 1950 the strength of the Chinese units in Manchuria was estimated by American experts at 116,000 effectives, towards the close of August—at 250,000 effectives, in September and October reports were received of massive movements of Chinese forces in that region, while in mid-November 1950 the strength of the Chinese volunteers in Manchuria and Korea

added up to 850,000 bayonets. On November 1 the Chinese volunteers engaged the aggressors.

Fearing that the new situation in the theatre of hostilities would reinforce the "peace" sentiments in Washington, MacArthur sought to warn the Joint Chiefs of Staff against drawing hasty conclusions. He used all the forces at his disposal in his next offensive.

A powerful counter-offensive by the Korean people's army and the Chinese volunteers crushed the entire eastern flank of the troops that on MacArthur's orders began an offensive in the closing decade of November. American and South Korean units retreated in disorder. The situation in Korea threw the State Department into dejection. MacArthur's prestige plummeted visibly among the USA's European allies and in Washington itself. The British and American press charged that MacArthur's actions had brought Chinese units into the hostilities, that MacArthur's course might bring on another war. In-fighting broke out in the US Congress around the debate over MacArthur's stand. The whole affair became a scandal. Many Senators demanded an inquiry into why MacArthur had infused US troops with hope at a time when an offensive was being planned against them in Korea. What were the limits to MacArthur's boasts? newsmen asked.

Despite the growing opposition, MacArthur stuck to his guns. In a letter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff he set out his programme for further action, demanding: "1) Blockade the coast of China; 2) destroy through naval gunfire and air bombardment China's industrial capacity to wage war; 3) secure reinforcements from the Nationalist garrison on Formosa to strengthen our position in Korea if we decide to continue the fight for that peninsula; and 4) release existing restrictions upon the Formosan garrison for diversionary action, possibly leading to counter-invasion against vulnerable areas of the Chinese mainland." As the world learned subsequently, MacArthur had another, personal plan for a "victorious end to the war": this was, first, to drop between 30 and 50 atom bombs on territory north of the Yalu River—as MacArthur saw it, this would create a belt of radioactive cobalt that would make Korea's northern frontiers secure for the USA; second, to use Chiang Kai-shek troops supported by two US Marine

divisions.¹

MacArthur did not confine himself to a correspondence with Washington; he felt he was justified in acting as he saw fit in the obtaining situation. He ordered the bombardment of the bridges across the Yalu. His programme evoked fierce debates in Washington. Tempers flared as MacArthur made increasing demands and raved about using atom bombs in the Korean war. Realistically-thinking statesmen in the USA looked on with apprehension at the activities of the Republican right wing and its hero MacArthur. At the root of these apprehension was the motivation to prevent the situation from erupting into a world conflagration to which the MacArthur programme of "determined actions" could lead.

The bombing of the bridges across the Yalu affected the interests of the PRC, while the employment of Chiang Kai-shek troops could complicate the USA's relations with its allies. A blockade of the Chinese coast would in fact have been a blockade of the Soviet Union, from where China received most of her imports. The USA's European allies' commercial interests likewise were to be taken into account.

On April 11, 1951 MacArthur learned that he had been relieved of his command and got a relevant statement: "With deep regret I have concluded that General of the Army Douglas MacArthur is unable to give his wholehearted support to the policies of the United States Government and of the United Nations in matters pertaining to his official duties. In view of the specific responsibilities imposed upon me by the Constitution of the United States and the added responsibility which has been entrusted to me by the United Nations, I have decided that I must make a change of command in the Far East. I have, therefore, relieved General MacArthur of his commands and have designated Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway as his successor... It is fundamental, however, that military commanders," the President said for the edification of others, "must be governed by the policies and directives issued to them in the manner provided by our laws and Constitution. In time of crisis, this consideration is particularly compelling."² MacArthur's fate was sealed.

¹ *Newsweek*, April 20, 1964, p. 15.

² *The Truman-MacArthur Controversy*, edited by Richard Lowitt, Rand McNally & Company, Chicago, 1967, pp. 45-46.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE DULLES POLICY AND ITS REASSESSMENT

The Republicans won the presidency in the 1952 elections and the first act of the Eisenhower administration was to nominate John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State. By that time the latter had become well known for his friendly links to the Rockefeller family. The influence of the Morgans was predominant up until 1952 when the Republicans came to power in Washington. All the postwar Secretaries of State—Edward Stettinius, James F. Byrnes, Dean Acheson, George Marshall—were either friends of the Morgan family or closely linked to traditional European policy (the Marshall Plan, for example), which had brought the Morgans unheard-of dividends.

Upon assuming the office of Secretary of State in the new, Eisenhower administration, Dulles became widely known as the Rockefeller man (head of a law firm representing the Rockefeller interests, and then of the Rockefeller Foundation, and so on). Outstanding talent for political intrigues was a hallmark of the Dulles family. Small wonder that during the Second World War the younger brother, Allen, was entrusted to conduct separate negotiations with nazi emissaries in Switzerland, while John, who had visited Seoul shortly before the outbreak of the Korean war, was able to show that Democrats and Republicans were united in enforcing Far Eastern policy.

John Foster Dulles was keenly interested in Far Eastern problems; along with Truman and Eisenhower he headed the “China group” in US governmental circles. This group made the concrete elaboration of foreign policy programmes contingent upon the settlement of what it felt was the main issue, namely, the strengthening of the USA’s positions in China.

Dulles' views were shared also by MacArthur. Upon his retirement in the 1950s, the latter made quite a few attempts to contribute to the Republican ideologico-political arsenal. He went so far as to offer an interpretation of Marxist theory. "Karl Marx," he wrote, "shunned the use of violence and sought the voluntary acceptance of the principle of communal ownership of the sources and means of production... The element of force was injected by the Bolsheviki after the close of the First World War. Then was combined the theory of Karl Marx with the principle of Nihilism."¹ Out of this, the general concluded, communism was born (?). An ignorant interpretation of Marxism, entirely in keeping with MacArthur's line of thinking. But what led one of the staunchest architects of the "positions of strength" policy into this sort of exercises in "theory"? Obviously not in order to denounce the experience of the working class of Russia who had to use violence against those who refused to renounce voluntarily their "right" to live at the expense of others. Nor to question the inevitability of the victory of the system in which the means of production are owned by society as a whole. And, of course, not in order to identify—as many of his fellow Republicans aspired to do—the general and the particular in the theory and practice of the Russian Bolsheviki and the Chinese Communists. It was his purpose, as he put it himself, to "stop the advance of Socialism in this country [the USA]".

Subsequently, Reagan's advisers would draw from the luggage of the right-wing Republicans these selfsame charges against their rivals in the political in-fight, charges that were so popular among them during the days of MacArthur and Dulles. "Let the rich grow richer, and the poor become poorer"—has been and remains the slogan of US conservatism, which reacts with hostility to the increase of taxes on the monopolies, to governmental control of business, and to governmental intervention in the "private affairs" of industrialists.

It took many decades to build up the arsenal of ideas and political intrigues now being used by the Republican President Ronald Reagan in his China policy. In their confrontation

¹ Douglas MacArthur, *A Soldier Speaks. Public Papers and Speeches of General of the Army*, Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, New York, 1965, p. 295.

with the American liberals, the diehard right-wing Republicans had long ago formulated the ideologico-political credo under which Reagan is acting as the US President. Many prominent members of the Democratic Party won eminence by their efforts to enlist the services of talented builders capable of working creatively in order to heal a society that they felt was not a terminally sick society. Inspiring the Republicans, American conservatism used the cult of war-profit wealth to counter the liberal hope of "transforming" capitalism with the state exercising a beneficial influence. This cult could not be reconciled to governmental intervention in the "private affairs" of industrialists, to the curtailment of the privileges and rights enjoyed by the states, or to federal taxes; it inspired hard-line thinking threatening humanity with tragic consequences by bringing adventurist pressure to bear on socialist countries.

General MacArthur had, in his time, in fact recruited military men to intervene in the affairs of the state. This tradition was guarded and fostered by the Eisenhower-Dulles administration, an indication of which was the appointment of Admiral Arthur W. Radford to head the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Admiral Radford's career was closely linked to the US Pacific policy (participation in the hostilities in the Pacific in 1944-1945; commander-in-chief of the US Pacific Fleet in 1949; head of the Philippines-Taiwan strategic area in 1952). He was associated with the MacArthur group. He did not conceal that the aim of the USA's Asia policy was to convert South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Indochina into "beach-heads against communism". A Reuter correspondent noted that Admiral Radford's appointment was linked to the US government's plans to resolve Far Eastern problems in the immediate future. Radford was regarded as a militant advocate of an aggressive policy. He was, in particular, rabidly in favour of US military intervention in Indochina and publicly urged the "destruction" of the PRC.

US Vice President Richard M. Nixon favoured a hard-line course in the Far East, using the "domino" theory—that of the chain reaction of revolutions—to support his arguments. "If Indochina falls," he declared in December 1953, "Thailand

is put in an almost impossible position. The same is true of Malaya with its rubber and tin. The same is true of Indonesia. If, this whole part of Southeast Asia goes under Communist domination or Communist influence, Japan, who trades and must trade with this area in order to exist, must inevitably be oriented towards the Communist regime.”¹ The theory of the “falling domino” was thus brought into being.

In 1953 the USA drew close to a military conflict with China. President Eisenhower instructed the US Seventh Fleet not to obstruct an attack by Chiang Kai-shek on mainland China. The general impression was that MacArthur’s ideas were about to be translated into a gamble that could spark another world war. The US administration was deliberately exacerbating the situation in the Far East.

In January 1954 Eisenhower proclaimed his “massive retaliation” doctrine, while Dulles explained what it meant. At the close of 1952 Eisenhower and Dulles had gone on a tour of Korea. Upon returning to the USA they insistently upheld the MacArthur idea that the Korean war might be extended, publicly declaring that if the armistice terms were rejected the USA would strike at China not only on the Korean front but in any place of its own choosing. This laid the foundations of a new doctrine. The speech of the Secretary of State before the Council on Foreign Relations in New York on January 12, 1954 started a wide-ranging debate over the “massive retaliation” doctrine. “The way to deter aggression,” Dulles exhorted his countrymen, “is for the free community to be willing and able to respond vigorously at places and with means of its own choosing.” In announcing a new US policy, Dulles swept away all the restrictions implicit in the American experience in Korea, and urged reliance on “massive retaliation” from the standpoint of the choice of the target and from the standpoint of the means for making this strike. Moreover he emphasised that in the event hostilities broke out in Korea they would not be confined to Korean territory.

Only six months had elapsed since the armistice was signed in Korea, but Dulles was urging the renunciation of the

¹ Cited from Gabriel Kolko, *The Roots of American Foreign Policy. An Analysis of Power and Purpose*, Beacon Press, Boston, 1969, pp. 99-100.

military-political concepts developed in the USA during the Korean adventure. These concepts took into consideration the increased Soviet military and political capability (fear of retaliatory sanctions) and the attitude of the Western bloc allies who were pursuing their own economic and political interests. Dulles attempted to put his doctrine into effect with a clumsy suggestion that in the colonialist war in Indochina the French use atom bombs to save the garrison at Dien Bien Phu. Neither in theory nor in practice did the Dulles doctrine win the number of proponents needed for its implementation. The prospect of turning any local conflict into a flashpoint that could start a world war frightened the USA's NATO allies, while the bellicose statements of the US Secretary of State drew growing criticism of the administration's policy in the USA itself (Chester Bowles, Adlai Stevenson, and others).

Opposition to the "massive retaliation" idea compelled the Secretary of State to somewhat back down and try to "explain" the new doctrine. He attempted to disperse the apprehensions that the USA would not shrink from unleashing a nuclear war. Endeavouring to play down the impression, he said he did not mean "turning every local war into world war. It does not mean that if there is a Communistic attack somewhere in Asia, atom or hydrogen bombs will necessarily be dropped on the great industries of China or Russia".¹ Despite these reassurances, the Eisenhower administration persevered with a hard-line foreign policy that led to the militarisation of the economy and an unbridled arms race.

The new Republican slogan of "rolling back" or "liberation" was designed to supplant the "containment of communism" doctrine of the early postwar years. The proponents of "rolling back communism" urged mobilising all the means of influencing socialist countries: military, political, ideological, and economic.

At the beginning of the 1950s, while focussing attention particularly on NATO, American political leaders steered a course towards the formation of military-political alliances in Asia. It was Dulles' design to form military-political alliances

¹ Cited from Tristram Coffin, *Senator Fulbright. Portrait of a Public Philosopher*, E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., New York, 1966, p. 120.

in the Pacific on a bilateral (with Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and other countries) and on a multilateral foundation (ANZUS, SEATO). The needed theoretical concepts, based on anti-communism, had been worked out by that time.

In the view of W. W. Rostow, a leading American academic who headed the planning of American foreign policy for a long time, the USA had, while pursuing its policy of forming blocs, first, to build up the "military strength of Free Asia", and, second, to "eliminate the ideological threat of Communist victory in Asia".¹ He suggested forming anti-communist alliances in Asia for precisely these purposes. Dulles relied exclusively on the idea of military superiority, on "massive retaliation". Given this attitude, the relations between states were squeezed into the pattern of the rivalry between armed forces confronting each other. In looking for a *casus belli* in any revolutionary movement, the makers of this straightforward scheme did not see the dramatic changes that had taken place on the international scene. Underestimation—sometimes total disregard—of external factors was what led to setbacks, particularly to senseless attempts to involve neutral states in military-political blocs ("any show of neutralism," they declared, "is amoral").

Despite Dulles' calculations, neutralism gained strength. In Asia the development of international relations in favour of the socialist community was determined to a large extent by the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China, which abided by the principles of internationalism in its relations with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, and by the principles of friendship and cooperation with its Asian neighbours. Another factor complicating the situation in Asia for the USA was that in matters relating to foreign policy its West European allies sought, more insistently than before, to follow a path that was largely in keeping with their own interests. With the isolation of the PRC as their target, the USA's political actions in the Far East did not always command support from European allies. Britain, for example, and following in her wake the other members

¹ W.W. Rostow, *An American Policy in Asia*, The Technology Press of Massachusetts Institute of Technology and John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, 1955, p. 6.

of the British Commonwealth displayed a considerable interest in trade with the PRC. Of course, this eroded the US policy of isolating China.

The quest for prescriptions against what Dulles saw as a dangerous "social disease"—neutralism—yielded no tangible results. The USA encountered serious obstacles for its Asian policy. Together with the People's Republic of China India sponsored the Bandung Conference of Asian and African Nations in April 1955. At that conference the representatives of 31 Asian and African nations worked out the basic principles of peace and cooperation among states: respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in internal affairs, and recognition of the equality of all races and nations, big and small. The Bandung Declaration was hailed not only by the peoples of Asian and African countries but also by all other states and peoples sincerely striving for peace and freedom. Warm approval for the Bandung decisions was signalled by the Soviet Union and all the other socialist states.

The Afro-Asian solidarity movement, which gathered momentum after Bandung, became a powerful barrier to the imperialist policy of forming blocs. The concerted actions by India and China in this movement enhanced the prestige of the People's Republic of China and helped to mobilise the forces of national liberation on a common platform of anti-colonialism. The anti-colonialist struggle fused with the movement for disarmament directed into the general channel of struggle against the USA (protests in India, Japan, and other countries). Bandung spelled out the isolation of the US-backed regimes on Taiwan and in South Korea and intensified anti-US feeling in neutral states looking for and finding a bulwark in the policies pursued by the socialist community countries. The USA, which had labelled neutralism "amoral", found its Asian policy in crisis.

Hardly had the 1954 Geneva Conference of the foreign ministers of the great powers on a political settlement in Korea and Indochina ended than the Dulles-inspired diplomacy stepped up its efforts to escalate the cold war. A tense situation had developed by that time in the area of the Taiwan Strait (the dispute over the islands of Quemoy and Ma-tsu). Supported by Admiral Radford, head of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, Dulles demanded US intervention in any conflict with China, even if another civil war was started by Chiang Kai-shek. Pressure from the Chiang Kai-shek lobby, from the "Asia First" group, grew visibly in the US Congress. In January 1955 the US Congress passed a resolution authorising the President to use armed force to defend Taiwan and the Chinese coastal islands where Chiang Kai-shek troops were entrenched. The USA thus found itself on the brink of being drawn into a conflict with the use of the nuclear weapons at its disposal. The situation in the Far East deteriorated.

Meanwhile, the ruling circles of European capitalist countries openly declared their apprehensions that the USA and its European allies might be involved in a mire of conflicts in the Far East at the expense of a lessening of attention for European affairs. Dulles' main argument against these apprehensions was that no weakness must be displayed in the Far East so as not to encourage the enemy in other parts of the world.

Moderate Democrats concerned about the USA's global interests and guided by the common class positions of cooperation of the West European and American monopolists were deeply disturbed by Dulles' activities. They regarded US interference in China's internal affairs as "criminal folly", for the risk-laden actions over Taiwan could, in their view, lead to a general war in Asia, in which the USA would find itself single-handed. The extremists contended that for the USA it was not important to reinforce its allied relations. Counter-arguments were offered by the opposition group. The most significant of these in the assessment of a possible exacerbation of the situation in the Taiwan Strait was seen in the risk of losing allies. Were allies crucial to the USA? Proponents of an affirmative reply referred to the need, "in the interests of the nation's own security", to maintain military bases on the territory of allied nations, to obtain from the latter vital raw and other materials and, lastly, to constantly feel their moral support.

US interests, linked to the necessity of countering centrifugal tendencies in the capitalist world and pursuing a more acceptable—from the standpoint of these selfsame interests—policy towards the Soviet Union, fostered the growth of a trend among the USA's rulers to reconsider relations with China. In

this tense period liberal opinion in the Democratic Party was clearly articulated by Senator Fulbright. When William Knowland insisted that Chiang Kai-shek had to be returned to the mainland, Senator Fulbright, speaking in Arkansas, declared: "If the leaders of Red China seem willing to abide by minimum standards of civilized conduct, we ought to find the basis for negotiations." He felt it was his duty to add: "I do not belong to the Knowland war party."¹

In the period of the Eisenhower-Dulles administration, Fulbright's programme on the question of US-Chinese relations took into consideration the need for negotiations with Beijing (particularly on the question of the release of 11 US pilots held in China) without any preconditions. He presumed there would be serious difficulties in settling the "China problem", but censured the attempts of his colleagues to ignore the new leadership in China and the new methods of diplomacy in relations with Beijing. The Senator believed that some form of settlement could be reached with Beijing. Probably, to avoid the rebuke that he was championing a lost cause, Fulbright added that he would oppose convening a conference with the participation of China that would be "used by the Communists for propaganda purposes."

Knowland, who personified the "Asia First" group in the US Congress, caused the Senator from Arkansas much more than merely annoyance. Knowland's statement that victory by communism would be the result of peaceful coexistence and nuclear irreparability went beyond the usual "Europe or Asia" polemic. Senator Fulbright had serious forebodings about the assumption that the USA was unable to find peaceful solutions to complex international problems. He felt that if preference were given to military strength the USA would lose the goodwill of India and other nations and this would lead to defeat in the cold war.

However, although Eisenhower heeded moderate opinion, he continued his "hard line" in his Asian policy. On April 20, 1955 he asked Congress to approve an increase in aid to nations belonging to alliances sponsored by the USA. This request was granted. In the 1950s US military and economic

¹ Tristram Coffin, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

aid to Far Eastern nations exceeded US military and economic aid in Europe several times over.

For Fulbright criticism of the experience of the "China policy" by the hardliners meant also that it was vital to resolve many current problems of US Far Eastern policy. During a period of a relative thaw in 1956 Beijing suggested an exchange of journalists between China and the USA. Dulles was adamant in rejecting this offer. Towards the close of 1957, when Dulles gave in, it was too late: China's leadership had adopted a hard stand. Contrary to what Dulles was preaching, Fulbright urged a reconsideration of US policy towards China. As early as during the first postwar years he had dissociated himself from the "Asia First" group headed by Knowland, and from the Chiang Kai-shek lobby that was hoping to bring Chiang Kai-shek back to the mainland. Fulbright depended on the think tanks of research centres and of various socio-political organisations. Moreover, he had the support of veteran diplomats.

Arthur H. Dean, formerly head of the US delegation at the negotiations on a local settlement in Korea and who was known for his clashes in the past with the Taiwan lobbyist Alfred Kohlberg, found himself in the focus of attention in 1954. He had once been asked a loaded question that could only draw a negative reply: "You want to deal with communist China?" Dean rejected this formulation of the question but said he believed that if there was any possibility, apart from military means, of driving a wedge between the PRC and the USSR that possibility ought to be studied by Washington. If there was such a chance it had to be used. This premise rested on the belief that the leaders of the Communist Party of China were more interested in consolidating their power in China than in actions on the international scene.

In the mid-1950s the formula "curbing China without isolating it" underwent discussion, first in academic circles. In 1956 Senate commissions began openly to urge a re-defining of US policy towards China (William Langer, Wayne Morse, Hubert Humphrey). At a conference on the Far East at Columbia University, a major report was presented by the Sinologist A. Doak Barnett on the subject "The United States and Communist China". Speaking of the reasons for the victory of

the Communist Party of China, Barnett acknowledged that the successes of the Chinese Communists were largely due to their skilful appeal to the Chinese people's nationalist sentiment during the war with Japan and in the postwar period. The fusion of revolutionary communism with nationalism, he noted, was motivated by tactical considerations, but to an even larger extent it expressed the confidence of the Communists that China would win respect, international prestige, and the status of a world power.¹ The closing report at the conference recommended, in particular, the lifting of the restrictions on travel by American media correspondents and academics to China and on the import of the most significant publications from the PRC. Regarding the question of recognising the PRC, speakers at the conference advanced mainly two viewpoints: the first was the assertion that a positive settlement of the issue would demoralise the USA's Asian allies and help to reinforce the regime in China; the second, on the contrary, was the hope that it would be possible to establish "useful contacts" and thereby remove divergences in the "free world". Despite the differences that surfaced during the debate on these pressing issues, the US academics spoke openly, for the first time following the long period of McCarthyism, in favour of a reconsideration of the USA's policy towards the PRC.

The inclination to doubt the foreign policy pursued by the USA at the time would subsequently be attributed to Eisenhower. The President asked whether it would not be the best policy to try to pull China away from Russia rather than drive the Chinese even deeper into an alliance unfriendly to the United States.² However, even if they existed, doubts of this kind could not have any substantial influence on the practical implementation of policy. The government's official attitude to China was based on its uncompromising stand relative to socialist countries. Official propaganda acted on the invention that world communism was a threat, and the belief that China was part of the "world communist underground" was cultivated in the USA.

¹ *The United States and the Far East*, The American Assembly Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, New York, 1956.

² Forrest Davis and Robert A. Hunter, *The Red China Lobby*, Fleet Publishing Corporation, New York, 1963, p. 252.

The US ruling circles regarded any change in US policy towards China as an undesirable departure from basic foreign policy principles. Arthur Dean's theory had been nipped in the bud: it fell to pieces upon hitting the wall propped up by personalities like Dulles, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Walter S. Robertson, and the Senate GOP leader William Knowland. The arguments of Fulbright, Dean, and other proponents of a new look at the China policy came into conflict with the official line of giving priority to instruments of military and political pressure.

The Dulles policy towards China was structured in accordance with Washington's ideological orientation on military superiority and on its guideline of "massive retaliation". In this approach the confrontation between the different social systems on the world scene was squeezed into the pattern of rivalry between opposing military forces. Dulles' line of reasoning relative to problems of the USA's China policy was based largely on the belief that Sino-American contradictions in Asia were one of the principal hindrances to US recognition of the PRC. "We waited sixteen years before recognizing the Soviets!" he exclaimed. It was his opinion that this recognition was a miscalculation stemming from ignorance of the situation. This, he argued, should be a lesson. "We cannot recognize the Chinese Communists," he told the US public, "until they give up their objective of driving the United States from the Western Pacific. We cannot have a hostile nation controlling the Western Pacific... The Chinese Communists are talking in the same vein as the pre-war Japanese with their co-prosperity sphere."¹

The Eisenhower Republican administration adopted the slogans of "rolling back" and "liberation". Dulles decided to use these slogans in order to head a crusade against the socialist countries with the use of military, political, ideological, and economic levers. The stereotypes developed in the period of the Dulles diplomacy could not get on with the principles of peaceful coexistence with the socialist world and with adaptation to the new realities for foreign policy in the world. The Dulles policy remained immutable, although, so it seemed, the

¹ Andrew H. Berding, *Dulles on Diplomacy*, D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., Princeton, New Jersey, 1965, p. 57.

voice of the opposition increasingly resembled the notes of the horns that, according to legend, caused the walls of unsailable Jericho to crumble.

The Taiwan lobby in the USA spread its activities. At the close of the 1950s the Kuomintang clique began to pay more attention to propaganda—to its newspapers and information agencies in New York, San Francisco, Chicago, and Washington. Acting on behalf of Chiang Kai-shek, the organisations, foundations, and societies that in one way or another supported the administration's anti-China policy attacked academic and other institutions urging a revision of the relations with China. By the 1950s the Kuomintang lobby had accumulated considerable experience of influencing the USA's China policy. During the McCarthy period it contributed to the harassment of leading American Sinologists. The most fervid supporters of Chiang Kai-shek, for example, John McCormack, Walter H. Judd, William J. Knowland, Robert Taft, Joseph McCarthy, N.J. Smith, Styles Bridges, and Arthur H. Wandenbergh, struck at some State Department personnel, charging them with betraying US interests in China. They expended a large effort to expel O. Edmund Clubb, John Davis, John Carter Vincent, John Stewart Service, and other veteran diplomats from the diplomatic service.

One of the most authoritative pro-Chiang Kai-shek organisations in the USA, the Committee of One Million (it had more than a million members), declared in its programme documents that it would counter every movement that could reinforce the strength and prestige of "Communist China to the detriment of the national security and integrity of the USA". The banner of anti-communism gave the committee the assistance, over a long period, of highly conservative organisations such as the American Legion, the American Federation of Labor, Veterans of Foreign Wars, and the United States Chamber of Commerce. The committee's members were distressed by the talk that the PRC would possibly be admitted to the United Nations, that there might be an easing of the embargo on the sale of strategic goods to mainland China, and that the USA might reconsider its China policy. The Kuomintang clique was seriously disturbed

by the arguments of the liberals that the Chiang Kai-shek army was aging and that a gulf lay between Chinese and the natives of Taiwan. At the turn of the 1960s the growing role of the neutral states on the international scene influenced the alignment of strength in the United Nations. This confronted Taiwan with the threat of isolation. Matters reached a point where Senator John F. Kennedy publicly declared that if he became President he would be prepared to sacrifice Quemoy.

...In October 1957 the US columnist C.L. Sulzberger called on Chiang Kai-shek and his wife. Sulzberger was a little dubious about how he would be received for he did not know whether Chiang Kai-shek was informed of the fact that he had written advocating US recognition of the PRC. He recorded his talk with Chiang Kai-shek. The questions were put by the American journalist.

Question: Had Beijing tried to get Chiang Kai-shek to agree to some kind of peace talks and coalition government during the "100 Flowers" campaign the previous winter?

Answer: Yes. The Communists hadn't contacted him directly but had sought to win over his high-level officials.

Question: Why, since he advocated limited war as the only way of liberating China, hadn't he taken off?

Answer: You know the answer. It is the United States.

Question: Would he have to consult the US before, for example, landing a battalion on the mainland?

Answer: Yes, if circumstances demanded it, but he would keep the US advised of everything.

Question: What did Chiang consider as an alternative to coexistence except war?

Answer: Nothing. The present situation was one of "neither war nor peace".

Chiang Kai-shek then leaned forward ... and said: "Now let's speak plainly and without hesitation. What do you think? Will the American people support me in a limited war?"

Sulzberger replied: "Frankly, I do not think so. Until 1945, that would have been possible. But since the atomic age began most people don't care to risk a nuclear war which would destroy civilization. They don't think war can be limited."

"I am afraid you are exactly right," Chiang said to Sulzber-

ger's surprise. "That is an accurate statement of the American view."¹

This conversation between Sulzberger and Chiang Kai-shek vividly illustrated the impact of the perceptible changes in international relations on the USA's China policy. The change of the military-political balance of strength in the world in favour of socialism dramatically undermined the practical significance of the Dulles foreign policy postulates. Twelve days before the above conversation took place a Soviet rocket had placed the first-ever satellite in orbit around the Earth. As well as having a nuclear arsenal the Soviet Union thereby made it clear that it had the necessary means of delivering these weapons to a target. Although a fervent proponent of resolute action, Chiang Kai-shek had to follow Washington in acknowledging existing realities. The risk of a global conflict, that would signify universal annihilation, prevented politicians from ill-considered actions, cooling the ardour of indefatigable adventurists. Even Taipei's best friends in the USA began to realise that Chiang Kai-shek would be well-advised to abandon his absurd hope of becoming China's ruler and live out his days in peace on Taiwan.

Of course, views of this kind drove the Chiang Kai-shek lobby into a rage. Chiang Kai-shek's agents tagged the label of Communist "duffers" and "scamps" to their opponents in American political circles.

The Committee of One Million feverishly collected signatures of Congressmen under "Statements on China" demanding undeviating implementation of the policy of non-recognition of the PRC by the USA. In 1961 statements of this kind bore the signatures of 351 Congressmen—55 Senators and 296 members of the House of Representatives (171 Democrats and 180 Republicans). Each new statement was complemented with new appeals: against the USA pursuing a "two Chinas" policy, against trade with the PRC, and so on. The committee disrupted the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations hearings of the Conlon Report (1959), which recommended a more flexible approach to China within the terms of the

¹ C.L. Sulzberger, *The Last of the Giants*, The MacMillan Company, New York, 1970, pp. 426-27.

USA's commitments to Taiwan and its other allies in Asia. The Senate Committee showed an interest in the report, but pressure from the right, chiefly from the Committee of One Million, halted the document's movement.

A meeting protesting against the PRC's admission to UN membership was sponsored by the Committee of One Million in September 1961 in New York. The motivation for this was the administration's consent to the inclusion of the question of the PRC's admission to the UN on the agenda of the then upcoming session of the UN General Assembly. Messages of approbation were sent to the meeting by former US presidents Hoover and Eisenhower, the politicians Barry Goldwater and Richard M. Nixon, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, and others.

Solidarity with the "China Lobby" was expressed at the time by the American China Policy Association, that was set up in 1945 and headed by Alfred Kohlberg, a millionaire import-export merchant, and William Loeb, publisher of the Manchester *Union-Leader*. Also identified with the "China Lobby" was the so-called China Emergency Committee headed by Frederick C. McKee, a Pittsburgh industrialist. McKee was known not only as a manufacturer of funeral accessories but also as a rabid anti-communist. Walter H. Judd, a former missionary in China and member of the House of Representatives since 1943, initiated the founding of these two organisations and served both as an adviser. This hater of the Chinese people headed the Chinese refugees assistance fund. He accused Dean Acheson of treachery on the allegation that the latter had, in his opinion, "written off China". Addressing a meeting of the Committee of One Million, he thundered that if China were admitted to United Nations membership, the Committee of One Million would at once launch a national campaign to compel the USA to resign from the UN.

Hamilton Wright was regarded as one of Taipei's chief spokesmen in the USA. A member of the "China Lobby" and head of the Hamilton Wright Organisation, Inc., he launched a vigorous propaganda campaign to win support for Chiang Kai-shek. Representatives of the Hamilton Wright Organisation toured many countries, arranging exhibits, brainwashing editors and journalists, pushing films (for example, "Taiwan—Show

Window of Asia") and television programmes in European, Middle Eastern, Southeast Asian, and South American countries. Of course, attention was focussed chiefly on influencing public opinion in the USA itself, on brainwashing the American elector. Articles sponsored by Wright's enterprising aides appeared in 900 newspapers. This intense propaganda campaign was motivated by the obsession to "influence US policy".

Senator Fulbright published Hamilton Wright's correspondence with Sampson Shen, director of the Kuomintang news agency. In his letters Wright put heavy stress on the dangers awaiting the Chiang Kai-shek coterie on the international scene. His advice for transcending these dangers was that there should be a redoubling of the counter-propaganda effort, especially during election campaigns in the USA. His programme for 1960 envisaged a wide propaganda drive in Latin American states. "These countries [of Latin America]," he wrote to Shen, "have 21 votes in the United Nations and have voted consistently against the admission of Red China to the U.N. This must not change."¹ Wright visited Turkey, Iran, southern Africa, Italy, and other countries to elucidate possibilities for influencing public opinion more effectively. For Southeast Asian countries he recommended not only tested means such as bribing the press but also support for religious trends—as a "convenient way to the heart of the people". Wright reminded his clients of the large sums that had been paid for a campaign in favour of Taiwan and demanded money from them. "Money," he wrote in one of his letters, "is the grease for the wheels of a propaganda campaign." The contracts that were signed provided for expenditures amounting to 300,000 dollars annually. The difficulties encountered by the Chiang Kai-shek clique and the conservative sentiments in US political circles played into the hands of resourceful businessmen. Senator Fulbright noted that American newspapers accepted articles prepared by a paid foreign agent, approved them, and published them as objective news stories. Wright specified: "That is done every day of the week."

The bribing of "useful" people was common practice for

¹ *Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives of Foreign Principals in the U.S. Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 88th Congress, 1st Session, U.S. G.P.O., Washington, 1963, p. 693.*

the Wright group. "Last year," Wright frankly informed the Senate Committee, "Ambassador George Yeh said to me: 'Ham, I think your organization should develop a man who can become an authority on China. One who knows us, our way of life, our problems, a man who can write with complete understanding.'" Wright proudly declared that they had developed such a man. The American press began writing of Donald Frifield as of a leading authority on Chinese problems. To camouflage the purely propaganda activities of this "authority", articles signed by him were prepared for the press on other subjects (Japan, the Philippines, Korea). For this fraud Frifield was paid a monthly fee of 1,333.33 dollars. Hamilton Wright's Taiwan agent received an annual fee of 20,000 dollars.¹

The hearings on the activities of foreign lobbyists before the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations mirrored the new currents in the US China policy. The US ruling circles were looking for new ways and means of putting their China policy into effect. The old "China lobbyists" were sacrificed to this quest. The number of Taiwan agents registered officially with the US Department of Justice decreased. The Chiang Kai-shek clique could only rely mainly on three organisations: the Kuomintang branch, the information service, and the Central News Agency. In Congress, in the Pentagon, in the business world and among academics those who were perseveringly championing the interests of the regime in Taipei did not, of course, lay down their arms in the 1960s and 1970s, but, unlike in the past, their possibilities had diminished visibly.

In the mid-1960s, amid the fanfare of dazzling debates and vociferous conclaves, whose sponsors were zestfully weighing the dividends to be drawn from the shifts in Chinese politics while continuing to demonstrate fidelity to Taipei and the former stereotypes, the spotlight was held by Walter H. Judd. But already then he began to feel the weakness of his posture. The ranks of Chiang Kai-shek's supporters were thinning. Senator Joseph McCarthy and generals Claire L. Chennault and Patrick J. Hurley were gone. The diplomats William C. Bullitt and Walter S. Robertson, and Senators William Knowland and

¹ Ibid., pp. 789-801.

Jenner had left the scene long ago. The head of the "China Lobby" Albert Kohlberg had also quitted this world. Obscurity had claimed the energetic activities of the publisher of *Time* magazine Henry R. Luce, while his wife, Clare Boothe Luce, who had likewise been an ardent supporter of Chiang Kai-shek, acknowledged the need for a new approach to the China policy, an acknowledgement that was tantamount to public repentance. The publication of the names of Congressmen supporting the lobbyist opposition to China's admission to the UN ceased in 1961.

In the mid-1960s Beijing's anti-Americanism enabled Judd to attack fellow-Congressmen who were urging a reconsideration of the China policy and hoping for an opportunity in some way to influence the character and essence of the government in China. Judd's principal argument was that the character of the government determined foreign policy and, on that basis, he stuck to his contention that Americans were labouring under a dangerous delusion. He and those associated with him underscored the international character of the communist movement ("All Communists agree on the question of a world revolution") and depicted the Communist Party of China as an inalienable element of that movement.

Judd juggled with historical documents. Speaking in March 1966 before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in the capacity of an authority on Far Eastern problems, he attempted to misrepresent US-Chinese relations of the past in order to validate US Far Eastern policy of the Dulles days. He claimed that by authorising the US special envoy Patrick J. Hurley to visit the liberated areas of China in 1944 the USA had granted an "official status to the communist insurrection" and thereby "undermined the morale" of the American ally, the Kuomintang. Judd offered the conclusion that the talks with the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, suggested by some Congressmen, would "demoralise" the Saigon government just as "Chongqing's prestige" was eroded in 1944-1946 by the USA's negotiations with the Chinese Communists.

Judd vehemently disputed the suggestion that President Nixon should support Beijing's admission to the UN. He opposed the view, generally accepted in Washington in the early

1970s, that Soviet-Chinese relations would not improve. He saw these relations not as rivalry between two states but as a clash between two currents in the world communist movement. As seen by Judd, the divergences with the Soviet Union were over not what to do but, above all, how things were to be done ("The divergences concern only the quest for ways to overwhelm us [the USA]"). He lost no opportunity to use the "export of revolution" bogey to intimidate American opinion.

The Nixon visit to Beijing and the interest displayed by the Chinese side to promote relations with the USA generated discord in the pro-Taiwan community in the USA and, it seemed, definitively shook the stand held by Judd and his associates. Astute columnists drew attention to a highly significant fact when Nixon lifted the 21-year embargo on trade with China: there was no vocal reaction to this action. Many felt that whatever negative response there was in Congress it came from individuals and reflected only a shadow of the general opposition to contacts with Beijing organised in the 1950s by the "China Lobby". This shadow was Judd. The admission of the PRC to the UN further unsettled the "China Lobby".

The Committee of One Million died a natural death in 1970.

Walter Judd undertook the burden of rallying the shaken cohort of lobbyists. In February 1972 the press named him as the founder of the new Committee for a Free China to replace the Committee of One Million. It was asserted that the new lobbyists were not out to torpedo Nixon's visit to the PRC, that all they wanted was to announce their presence. The Committee intended to study the UN's role in order to weigh its benefit and harm to the USA. Judd defined his attitude as follows: The UN is now a different organisation, and it may not prove to be as useful as it once was. The lobbyists opposing Washington's new approach to the problems of its China policy portrayed the Beijing leaders as "smiling tigers" waiting to receive "Taiwan on a silver platter".

“New Frontiers”

The “new frontiers” policy required flexibility in the approach to complex international problems. By the 1960s the US State Department was jettisoning, albeit reluctantly (the load it inherited proved to be much too heavy), the Dulles foreign policy recipes. The new President resolutely took the helm of the American ship into his hands and needed new pilots free of the prejudices of Dulles’ day.

In 1960 the question of a policy towards China was among the central issues in the presidential election campaign. Senator John F. Kennedy spelled out the changes that would be introduced in the USA’s Asian policy—chiefly in regard to China—if he were elected to the White House. One of these changes, it was stated, would be the rescinding of the US commitment to defend the offshore islands of Quemoy and Ma-tsu, to which the Kuomintang was clinging tenaciously. Chester Bowles captured the limelight as foreign policy adviser to the Democratic Party’s presidential candidate Kennedy. The programme drawn up and announced by Bowles recommended: first, abstaining from any actions sustaining the myth that the Chiang Kai-shek government represented the whole of China or would return to the mainland; second, encouraging the neutralisation of the islands offshore of China; third, persuading the Taipei government to adopt the role of an “independent Formosan republic”. Adlai Stevenson, mentioned, as Bowles was, as a candidate for the post of Secretary of State in a Democratic administration, suggested a more radical programme. State Department aides used protocols of the Sino-US meetings in Warsaw to prove documentally that in the light of Beijing’s negative posture the bold Democratic programme was unrealistic.

Bowles wanted to get an intimate understanding of the essence of world developments, setting aside the premise that the world opposing the USA was “violently hostile”. He censured the foreign policy extremists who regarded any debate as a quest for one simple answer, as a confrontation solely between two sides, one of which was right and the other wrong. In his memoirs Chester Bowles, who played an incomparably more important role in the American hierarchy

than the diplomats who styled themselves as old China hands, charges State Department officials with idealising the history of the relations between the USA and the PRC. He debunks the assertion that it was traditional American policy to prevent interference in China's internal affairs (the Open Door policy). The British, French, and Americans forced the Manchu emperors to sign unequal treaties that gave the three powers the right to, among other privileges, collect taxes and establish special courts in China.¹

One of Kennedy's first requests to his adviser, Chester Bowles, regarding the USA's China policy, took into account the need to bring into line the administration's new approach to foreign affairs and the attitudes of Chiang Kai-shek's supporters. Through Zhou Enlai Beijing articulated its hopes that the Kennedy administration would change the USA's China policy. Would the American government, as distinct from the line pursued by Eisenhower, make a small concession as a first step? Would the new President take the initiative on himself? Would the USA pull its armed forces out of Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait? Beijing asked.

Unlike their predecessors of the 1940s, the US political leaders of the 1960s had to deal not with a group of persons claiming to be the ruling party, but with the CPC leadership that was at the helm of power in China. Therefore, in their quest for ways and means of influencing the Chinese leadership they sought to make an in-depth analysis of the most pressing problems confronting the country led by the Communist Party of China. The government in Washington closely studied China's food problem. Kennedy announced publicly that if the CPC leaders desired to receive food from the USA the administration would be prepared to consider this question.

Bowles, who in 1962 studied China's food problem, shared his considerations with the President. He noted that reliance on the nation's own resources would not enable the Beijing government to solve the food problem, which not only threatened the people with further privation but could destabilise

¹ Chester Bowles, *Promises to Keep. My Years in Public Life, 1941-1969*, Harper & Row Publishers, New York, 1971, p. 393.

China politically. He saw three options for the Chinese government: first, to do nothing, on the assumption that one more famine "would not change the course of history"; second, purchase grain from capitalist food-exporting countries such as Australia, Canada, and the United States; third, by overt or covert means to seek control of the food surplus areas of Southeast Asia, in other words, take action that would involve the risk of war. Bowles' analysis led to the suggestion to play on China's food problem, thereby influencing Beijing and compelling it to pursue in Asia a foreign policy acceptable to the USA.

Without changing imperialism's basic strategic aims in any way, the "new frontiers" ideologues called for the development of means that would foster Western influence in Asia; they viewed the USA's Asia policy not from the standpoint of particular interests of monopoly capital but through the prism of the interests of the forces of imperialism in their global confrontation with the forces of socialism and the revolutionary movement in Asia. Aid on favourable terms, charity, gratuitous loans and many other seeming paradoxes of the imperialist "new frontiers" policy were, where possible, fitted into the framework of a humanitarian concept of assistance. Bowles took a rational-egoist attitude to problems of this sort without fearing the charge of hypocrisy. His recommendations on selling food to China on favourable terms harmonised with the architectonics of the "new frontiers" policy and were accepted by Kennedy. Preparations were started to provide China with wheat free of charge or on favourable terms. Even an intermediary was selected—the Prime Minister of Burma U Nu. But the US design was derailed by the Chinese government's stand—an intensification of anti-Americanism—and U Nu's fall from power. Opponents of direct contacts with Beijing suggested waiting until the "dust had settled".¹

In a conversation with Edgar Snow in 1960 Zhou Enlai drew the former's attention to an article by Chester Bowles in the April 1960 issue of the journal *Foreign Affairs* under the heading of "The 'China Problem' Reconsidered". "This article," Zhou Enlai declared, "aroused not only protests from the

¹ Chester Bowles, op. cit., pp. 402-03.

Chinese people on the mainland but also condemnation among the Chinese population on Taiwan." In the article Bowles had suggested that the USA should aim at creating an independent "Chinese-Formosan state". Bowles himself admitted that there evidently would be objections to his suggestion in mainland China as well as from the Kuomintang and the Chinese living on Taiwan. It would hence come to nothing, but in terms of a normalisation of Sino-US relations it would only "tie the knot tight". Bowles' suggestion, Snow said, was a *ballon d'essai*. Zhou Enlai insisted that it could only be called a *ballon d'essai* if such an approach were rejected because of a failed sounding, but if it was maintained, despite the failed sounding, it would signify tying the knot tight.

The two sides got down to looking for an acceptable compromise. According to information about the Warsaw talks leaked to the press, the USA assured Beijing in 1962 that it would not back Chiang Kai-shek's intention to attack China. Indeed, Chiang Kai-shek stopped talking about invading the mainland. The Chinese leadership decided to pull its troops back from the coastal regions. Then there followed a series of "serious warnings" about the actions of Chiang Kai-shek and his patrons. These were the first steps towards mutual understanding of the sides on the Taiwan issue, and in the early 1970s they led to the formation of "liaison groups" in Washington and Beijing, thereby bringing the USA close to accepting the concept of "two Chinas". The Kennedy administration was to a large extent tied down by the activities of pro-Taiwan elements in the USA.

US political leaders searched for ways to a mutual understanding with Beijing that would be more acceptable to American interests. At the beginning of the 1960s the "new frontiers" policy, one of whose directions was the quest for ways of normalising relations with the PRC, encountered resistance in the USA itself. The opposition drew its strength from the disaffection over the outcome of the Caribbean crisis and the signing of the partial test-ban treaty. In large measure Beijing's attitude to India and the events in the Taiwan Strait fettered any initiative by American political leaders relative to China.

Movement to End Isolation

The open discussion of problems of US-Chinese relations in the USA in the 1960s was unquestionably propagandist in essence because any practical steps by the administration towards improving relations with China required public support, especially during election battles.

What was the opinion of the participants in this debate, of the authors of innumerable works on China and on problems of American-Chinese relations? Most American experts, in a fairly rare consensus on this matter, accentuated the need to reconsider these relations (the prevalent idea was basically "to contain China without isolating it"). The concrete suggestions by participants in the debate at hearings before Senate committees and in many articles and books boiled down mainly to the following: the USA should seek to normalise relations with the PRC, mute its resistance to the PRC's admission to the UN (they felt that US security would be better served if the PRC became a member of the UN), state its readiness for talks on establishing official relations (without prejudicing relations with Taiwan), and declare that it would be prepared to accredit newsmen, academics, and other specialists from China. A memorandum containing similar suggestions was signed by academics in Canada, Ceylon, France, India, and Japan.

The hearings of experts before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee were followed by a hearing of Chinese affairs before the US Joint Economic Committee (April 1966). In the recommendations of the latter committee, which also heard evidence from leading American academics, it was noted that the embargo on US trade with China was hurting American interests rather than proving to be an effective instrument of intimidation. Committee members arrived at the conclusion that US interests would benefit if the PRC promoted trade and credit relations with capitalist countries. Such recommendations were offered, in particular, by one of the most highly regarded authorities on China in the USA, A. Doak Barnett.

Fairbank, Barnett, Morgenthau, and some other academics recommended dropping the primitive, as they put it, attitude to Asian problems and the world communist movement. Fairbank vigorously backed Barnett; in support of his assumptions Fair-

bank, even more emphatically than Barnett, underscored Chinese traditions and the specifics of Chinese society, which was burdened with feudal and religious survivals. Taking into account the views expressed by academics in hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator William Fulbright recalled a passage from Fairbank's book *The United States and China*. "The Chinese society," Fairbank wrote in this work, "is very different from our own. We cannot hope to succeed in our policy toward China unless we take account of this difference. Consequently, one of our worst enemies is wishful thinking, subjectivism and sentiment. Another is plain ignorance. We court disaster if we let our patriotic defensive measures against Russian expansion, or a purely doctrinaire anti-communism, dictate our China policy. Our policy must take full account of China's own process of social change. We cannot remake Chinese society in our own image. We have to go part way in the process of Sino-Western adjustment."¹

At the time Fairbank wrote these lines many American political pundits were looking for a new social bulwark in China and declaring that they would go so far as to sacrifice Chiang Kai-shek if they found it. It will be recalled that proponents of thinking of this kind were subsequently labelled traitors by the McCarthyists. McCarthyism fizzled out, while the liberal Fulbright counselled that it would not be a bad idea to draw a lesson from the McCarthyists' short-sightedness, which bordered upon plain ignorance. Little wonder that in his book *The Arrogance of Power* Fulbright devoted a whole chapter to the history of China and the Chinese revolution. He focussed on the "consequences" of Western relations with China, the Chinese revolution, the theory and practice of Chinese foreign policy, and US-Chinese relations. He attributed the growth of Chinese nationalism, which gained strength in the struggle with external enemies, chiefly Western imperialists, to the great disparity between China's "fierce ancient pride" (Celestial Empire, Middle Kingdom) and the humiliations poured down on it by the West. Fulbright unequivocally acknowledges that China was pillaged by Western powers, which were joined by Japan in the

¹ *US Policy with Respect to Mainland China*, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 89th Congress, 2d Session, March 1966, U.S. G.P.O., Washington, 1966, pp. 177-78.

closing decade of the nineteenth century. Also, he had to admit, albeit very cautiously, the USA's participation in the struggle, especially indisputable facts such as the role played by the USA in crushing the Yihetuan Uprising. Fulbright depicts the Open Door policy, proclaimed by the USA relative to China at the close of the last century, as a noble move to preserve China's territorial integrity and persuade the Chinese that the USA was the only great power they could regard as their friend and, possibly, defender. This was a misrepresentation of history.

The pundits who urged an end to the policy of isolating China drew upon pronouncements of officials of the Chinese government when they spoke in an encouraging vein. A French emissary visiting Beijing was told that in the final count the Americans were no more than an adversary, but that they were an esteemed adversary. Statements of this kind gave many American political leaders grounds for assuming that China would look for a way out of the difficulties hindering an improvement of its relations with the USA.

Another viewpoint, insisting on an uncompromising stand relative to China and a victorious consummation of the aggression in Vietnam, was articulated in academic circles perhaps to a lesser degree than the first but it still strongly influenced the planning of American policy in the Far East and in Southeast Asia and, as before, had the approval of the barons of the military-industrial complex. At the hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations Barnett, Fairbank, Morgenthau, and others, but chiefly Fulbright, were attacked by Walter H. Judd, the Chiang Kai-shek lobbyist and member of the House of Representatives, David N. Rowe, professor of political science at Yale University (born in Nanking, studied at Princeton, and the Asia Fund representative on Taiwan from 1954 to 1956), and Harold C. Hinton, professor of international affairs at the George Washington University.

Judd and his associates had wide recourse to the tested terminology of Western propaganda used in different variants to prove the "ruthless violence of the Communists", the latter's aspiration to crush freedom and people's identities, and their persevering drive to export revolution. The history of the world communist movement knows of many instances of

imperialism's apologists seeking to smear communist ideals with references to individual uncharacteristic cases of adventurism in the communist movement, to the demagoguery of the "ultra-revolutionaries", the rhetoric of dogmatists, and so forth. Of course, they sometimes achieved their goal, misleading decent people, who had been unable to work out the complexities of the ongoing revolutionary processes for themselves.

Although this trend among American experts was not so widely mirrored in literature as the first, it visibly affected thinking in the government and was in keeping with the traditions of the bipolar age. This is shown strikingly by the official attitude to an eminent academic, who urged renouncing old myths and acquiring a realistic understanding of developments. Hans J. Morgenthau, director of the Centre for Study of American Foreign and Military Policy, professor of political science and modern history at the University of Chicago, former consultant to the US State Department, and author of many books, suddenly found himself in disfavour. In the summer of 1965 he was relieved of his position and at once came under the surveillance of the FBI. A White House aide was given the special assignment of keeping a close watch on Morgenthau's pronouncements. In response Morgenthau declared that to line up support for its policies the government was having recourse to defamation, intimidation and, most frequently, coercion.

What had Morgenthau done? He had spoken against dogmatic attacks on communism, against what he felt was a doctrinaire approach to developments in Asia. "The identification of Asian with Chinese Communism," he wrote in his last book, "is similarly the result of the crusading opposition to Communism as a political philosophy and a way of life. Such identification is justified in philosophy and ethics, but has no place in foreign policy."¹

The attitude adopted by Judd and his associates, Morgenthau noted, was counter-productive; he wrote that "the basic direction of her [China's] policies is determined primarily by her traditional national interests".² He was certain that Chiang

¹ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Vietnam and the United States*, Public Affairs Press, Washington, 1965, p. 55.

² *Ibid.*

Kai-shek would never return to the mainland, and it was his belief that the Kuomintang government was kept from sinking only by the presence of the US Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait. This proved to be enough for an academic well-known in the USA to fall into disgrace.

In pursuing a policy of "containing" China without isolating it, the USA counted, of course, on normalising relations with it and, given favourable circumstances, drawing it into the orbit of the capitalist world. "Our stance toward Mainland China," Walt W. Rostow, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, wrote in early 1969, "has been that we looked forward to the day when they decided that they wanted to move toward reconciliation with their neighbors in Asia and, if they wished it, with us. We have done nothing hostile toward Mainland China. We have resisted its aggressive actions in various parts of the world. But we have made it clear that there is an alternative relationship available to Asia, to the world and to us—when the Chinese leadership decides that it wants that."¹

On January 27, 1969, at his first News Conference, Nixon declared that he saw "no immediate prospect of any change" in US policy as long as China did not show a readiness to "respond". Nixon's tour of Asia added fuel to Beijing's criticism of the USA. Although the USA had lifted some restrictions on trade with and travel to China, many American experts doubted the expediency of US-Chinese meetings that, at ambassadorial level in Warsaw, continued the contacts started in Geneva in the 1950s. A conference on Chinese policies opened on January 24, 1969 at the privately funded Centre for the Study of Democratic Institutions in Santa Barbara, California. The 80 participants included senators Edward Kennedy, William Fulbright, John Sherman Cooper, Mark O. Hatfield, and Alan Cranston.

Fulbright and Kennedy cautiously criticised the activities of the Chiang Kai-shek government on Taiwan and in the United Nations. "We," William Fulbright said, "should move to reduce further our direct military involvement in the Taiwan area. I also think that we should announce that as soon as

¹ *The New York Times*, January 5, 1969.

events in Vietnam permit we will begin removing the limited military facilities we have on Taiwan and also turn over to the Nationalist Chinese the responsibility for patrolling the Taiwan Strait."

What was the motivation for this statement? Possibly, Fulbright had in mind the Chinese note of November 1968 proposing February 20, 1969 as the date for a resumption of the negotiations in Warsaw and calling on the United States to "dismantle all its military installations on Taiwan". The Senator pointed out that in the note there was no specific reference to any Chinese determination to liberate Taiwan and that this generated the hope that the PRC would adopt a more flexible policy. As regards the Chinese on Taiwan, they could not, he said, continue to justify their role in the world on the obviously fictitious argument that they represented the 800 million people of mainland China.

The status of Taiwan remained the central issue in US-Chinese relations. Most of the participants in the conference leaned towards the "two Chinas" policy. For instance, Edwin O. Reischauer, former US Ambassador to Japan and one of the leading proponents of the capitalist world building bridges to China directly and indirectly, through the USA's allies, offered the view that at the close of the 1960s Japan, as a country of the "free world", had more influence on China than previously and that the political effect of trade between the two could only flow one way, and that was toward China; he conceded that in the 1950s, when the socialist countries accounted for two-thirds of China's trade and influenced its development there may have been some reason for fears of the influence that China, as a member of the socialist community, might have had over Japan. But now 70 per cent of China's trade was with capitalist countries, most of whom were allies of the USA. Reischauer said that in his view China's trade with industrialised capitalist countries, notably with Japan, was a "window on the world" and that it was in the USA's long-term interests that this window should be as wide as possible.¹

¹ *Mainland China in the World Economy*. Hearings Before the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, 90th Congress, 1st Session, April 1967, U.S. G.P.O., Washington, 1967, pp. 5-6.

This problem attracted attention also because the embargo that the USA had imposed on trade with China was preventing leading powers of the capitalist world from influencing China. Indeed, the USA had used economic levers to pressure the monopolies in allied nations, especially where the key positions were in American hands (for instance, Japan and Britain) to isolate China economically. In this context, West European and Japanese monopolies often acted to prevent an expansion of the American share in their production sphere and opposed the use of American equipment and raw materials, fearing that this might be detrimental to trade with China. It was assumed by academics that implementation of the American foreign policy doctrine of containment without isolation would, first, open the window on China much wider not only for the USA but also for its main allies and, second, make American goods more competitive in the markets of third countries trading with China.

The passions that flared up over the USA's China policy fused with the political struggle on the domestic scene. The press named Edward Kennedy as a possible rival to Nixon at the 1972 elections. He had already been proclaimed the head of the new "China Lobby" in the USA. Edward Kennedy became the political banner-bearer of the National Committee on United States-China Relations funded by the Ford and Rockefeller foundations. Fulbright and his closest associates on Capitol Hill were seen as Edward Kennedy's allies. This alliance relied not only on the Ford and Rockefeller foundations but also on support from intellectuals of the National Committee on United States-China Relations—professors A. Doak Barnett (Columbia University), Edwin O. Reischauer and John K. Fairbank (Harvard University), Whiting and Ekstein (University of Michigan), and many other members of the intellectual community. At the close of March 1972 some leading China experts invited Edward Kennedy to a banquet attended by 1,000 persons, to whom, with television cameras focussed on him, he repeated the arguments of the "China policy" critics. His work as head of the "new China Lobby" was not in vain. Through its Secretary of State the Republican Nixon administration officially dropped the view that the Taiwan rulers were the true rulers of China and embarked upon the "two

Chinas" policy. Nixon and his Secretary of State recognised the senselessness of some of the foreign policy actions initiated by John Foster Dulles. They recalled that Dulles had rejected Beijing's offer to accept American correspondents in 1956, and Beijing was paying in kind. They noted that the Dulles-inspired arguments about a "Chinese threat", against which the SEATO wall was built, were no more than a myth. Government officials did not confine themselves to declarations in favour of a change of relations with China. American tourists were permitted to bring back to the USA purchases from China to the sum of 100 dollars. To some extent this was to help China obtain convertible currency. Individual groups of Congressmen and journalists were permitted to visit China. The government lifted restrictions on trade with China by foreign subsidiaries of American firms. Lastly, the contacts at ambassadorial level were resumed in Warsaw, and the numerical strength of the US military presence on Taiwan began to be reduced. The Dulles political guidelines thus underwent a significant reassessment.

CHAPTER SIX

TURN TOWARDS PARTNERSHIP

Ping-Pong Diplomacy

Mao Zedong received Edgar Snow on December 10, 1970, and a question asked by the American columnist was whether rightists like Nixon would be permitted to come to China. Mao replied that Nixon would be welcomed because "at present the problems between China and the USA would have to be solved with Nixon". Mao added that he would be happy to talk with Nixon, whether he came as a tourist or as President. The report on Snow's conversation with Mao under the heading "The American Friend" appeared in the streets of Chinese towns. What struck the eye in this report was Mao's statement: "The Chinese people is the friend of the peoples of the whole world, including the American people."

Intrusive journalists once compelled Henry Kissinger, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, to state his opinion about Snow's efforts during the preparations for his [Kissinger's] first visit to the PRC. Kissinger clearly belittled Snow's role, saying that the latter had only given a general picture of what was by that time already known to the administration in Washington. Indeed, it is hard for a politician to share laurels with a journalist, even with one who was widely known by that time. Although Kissinger spoke coldly of Snow's efforts, they were part of the American preparations for a visit to China first by the US President's adviser and then by Nixon himself. Of course, as the President's personal aide Kissinger was much better informed than the American journalist. While Snow was in Beijing, Kissinger closely followed the voting in the UN on China's admission and the views in different countries about the further presence in the UN of

Taiwanese delegates, who were unlawfully occupying the place of China's representatives.

The Americans worked hard on what to them was the most acceptable formula of a double representation in the UN—of the PRC and Taiwan. It did not prove to be very hard to produce a formula of double representation. A much harder problem was to get the world community to accept it. Even the USA's allies began to question the expediency of the double representation formula for China in the UN. The Japanese Foreign Ministry conveyed its doubts to the US Embassy in Tokyo, and on January 22, 1971 Prime Minister Eisaku Sato told the opening session of the Diet that Japan wanted closer bilateral relations with the PRC and suggested opening contacts with China on a government-to-government level. The Americans were informed that feeling in favour of Beijing was growing in the UN Secretariat and there was no longer anything they could do to dampen that feeling.

In the spring of 1971 the Chinese leadership took a step to facilitate the initiatives of the Nixon administration. An American ping-pong team that was playing in the world championship in Nagoya, Japan, was invited to visit the PRC. This was not merely a visit by a sports delegation. It was the first time in 20 years that Americans were official guests in China's capital. Every consideration was shown to the visitors: they were given the freedom of the city—they wandered about the streets, took photographs, and bought "Mao jackets" and Mao badges. The team was received by Prime Minister Zhou Enlai.

"My request to you," he declared, "is that upon your return to the USA you convey greetings to the American people from the Chinese people. In the past there have been many contacts between China and the USA. They have been in suspension for a long time, but now, after you accepted our invitation to visit China, a new page has been opened in the relations between the Chinese and American peoples."

Zhou's words got a response in the USA. What was opened was not merely a "new page" but, as US Secretary of State William P. Rogers noted, a "new chapter" in US-Chinese relations. The White House responded with concrete acts. On April 14 Nixon announced that the USA was prepared to issue

visas to persons or groups in China wishing to visit the USA; American currency restrictions would be eased; the government would lift the restrictions on American oil companies supplying fuel to ships or aircraft going to or from China, with the exception of Chinese-owned or Chinese-chartered ships or aircraft going to or from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or Cuba; henceforth American ships and aircraft would be permitted to carry Chinese freight between non-Chinese ports, while American-owned vessels flying a foreign flag would be permitted to enter Chinese ports; a list would be issued of non-strategic goods that could be exported to China, and there would be a list of goods that could be imported from China after that list was analysed and approved. Nixon subsequently recalled that China and the USA found themselves dancing a delicate minuet, during which mutual confidence rose dramatically and mutual intentions grew more specific. Ping-pong diplomacy reached its highest point.

Kissinger became absorbed in the secret negotiations with the Chinese leaders. His practical actions were propped by the theoretical quests of leading members of the "realistic" school of American foreign policy. The predecessors of this policy left as their heritage to Kissinger an approach that regarded every nation, regardless of its social system, as a source of action with its own specific needs, aspirations, aims, laws, and claims. This view of international relations was known as "traditionalist". The "traditionalists" saw international relations as a sum of diplomatic and military measures undertaken by a state to satisfy its ambitions. "Egoism" in foreign policy constituted the philosophico-ethical foundation of the proponents of "political realism". As a specific school of bourgeois thought, "political realism" had acquired shape by the beginning of the twentieth century. Kissinger assimilated the ideas of such pillars of this trend as Alfred T. Mahan, Reinhold Niebuhr, Nicholas Spykman and, later, the most outstanding spokesman of this school Hans J. Morgenthau. These pillars regarded the struggle for power, geopolitical factors, as the foundation of international relations, and attributed the basic reasons of crisis situations in the world to human psychics (clearly, a social-Darwinist concept), to aggressiveness allegedly innate in the

human being. Morgenthau wrote that policies, both domestic and external, were a struggle for power modified only by the various conditions under which this struggle proceeds on the domestic and international scenes. Harmony between "national interests" and the strength ensuring them comprise the expediency advocated by the "political realists". This approach did not rule out sober political thinking and decisions dictated by the intelligence of an experienced statesman.

Kissinger's visit to the PRC as the President's representative took place in July 1971. Travelling from Saigon via Thailand and India, he arrived in Islamabad on July 8. Pakistani President Yahya Khan took a spirited part in facilitating Kissinger's secret trip. At a lunch in honour of the American guest, he spoke only of Kissinger's indisposition, saying that he had to take some treatment and rest at his (Yahya Khan's) residence in the mountains. This was the information dispensed to correspondents. In the morning of July 9 Kissinger boarded a Boeing-707 of the Pakistan Air Lines. Yahya Khan's personal pilot was at the controls. On board were Chinese navigators and four officials from China.

At the military aerodrome in Beijing Kissinger was welcomed by Marshal Ye Jianying, PRC Foreign Ministry representative Huang Hua (who was Ambassador to Canada at the time), and some other persons. Both these senior Chinese officials had been involved in negotiations with the Americans as early as the 1940s. Secret negotiations were held in China's capital from July 9 to 11. Discussions were mainly about the upcoming visit to China by President Richard M. Nixon. Kissinger's talks with Premier Zhou Enlai were longer, as the American guest himself conceded, than with any political leader other than, perhaps, Anwar Sadat of Egypt. Subsequently, recalling these negotiations, Kissinger would write that at the time he had no illusions about the social system represented by Zhou Enlai and had no intention of concealing his negative attitude to it. The principal objective of this meeting of representatives of states with different social systems was, in his opinion, the striving of the sides to use the prevailing world balance of strength in their own interests.

The pragmatic approach taken by Kissinger, as by other orchestrators of the USA's China policy, sprang from the con-

cept of a "triangular" as well as of any other "multipolar" diplomacy and was linked chiefly with the aspiration to find the most acceptable (for Washington) ways of influencing the "interaction of many independent" fields of power with the use of the Chinese side as an instrument, as it were, for pressuring the socialist world, notably the Soviet Union as the leading force of that world. The turn in the USA's China policy was explained from this angle by President Nixon too. The changes in the world, particularly in the communist world, he noted, required a broader American approach to international problems. In that the international environment of the USA had become "multipolar", and American diplomacy had to adjust itself accordingly did the American President see one of the principal motivations of his visit to China.

At the talks with Kissinger Zhou Enlai suggested the spring of 1972 as the time for a visit by the US President. This was accepted by Kissinger. Zhou Enlai said that the organisational aspects of the visit would be handled by Huang Hua. The draft communique that Huang Hua put on the table suggested that Nixon ask Beijing to send him an invitation and that the purpose of the visit would be to discuss the Taiwan issue as a first step towards normalisation. The Americans rejected both suggestions. They felt it was humiliating to appear in China as a supplicant and they were not willing to put the Taiwan affairs into the foreground at once. The sides ultimately agreed on the general tenor of the statement on the upcoming visit of the US President to the PRC. The Xinhua News Agency officially announced that on behalf of the government Zhou Enlai had invited the US President to visit China at any time he felt was acceptable up to May 1972. The President accepted this invitation "with pleasure".

That Nixon would visit China was announced at the height of the UN debates on the China problem.

President Nixon spoke in categorical terms. He made it clear that it was his intention to normalise relations with the PRC but he would not do this at the expense of Taiwan. This statement was made principally to neutralise opposition in the USA itself, but it could not reinforce the Taipei regime. The idea of China having a "double representation" in the UN, advanced by the US administration in April 1971, got

a hostile reception both in Beijing and in Taipei. Neither side accepted the "two Chinas" formula. Two resolutions—one on the "double representation" of China in the UN and the other requiring the restoration to China of its lawful seat in that organisation to be regarded as an important question under Article 18 of the Charter, stipulating a two-thirds vote—were drafted on US initiative. American diplomats seemingly did everything in their power. The US Ambassador to the UN met with the heads of more than a hundred foreign missions. The State Department courted ambassadors. A few days before the decisive voting George Bush, the US Ambassador to the UN, assured the President that Taiwan would retain its seat in the UN.

American diplomacy stepped up its manoeuvres. Beginning with the 5th and up to the 26th session of the UN General Assembly the USA unchangeably headed a group of countries that opposed a just settlement of the China problem. The force of inertia also operated in this context. Washington's anti-China diplomacy conflicted with the positive tendencies in international relations of those days, when the principles of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems were winning universal recognition. Meanwhile, the fruit of the preparatory work for the Nixon visit to China were ripening. In this situation administration aides displayed an astounding inconsistency: on the one hand, they insisted, with a doggedness meriting better application, on a settlement of the China problem in the UN on the basis of the "two Chinas" formula and, on the other, they vitalised the dialogue with the Chinese government, which was flatly rejecting this formula.

The draft resolution introduced by a group of socialist and developing countries contained provisions on the recognition of the PRC representatives as the sole legitimate spokesmen of China in the UN, on the PRC's membership of the Security Council, and on the deprivation of the Chiang Kai-shek clique of all rights to the seat held by it in the UN and in all the agencies affiliated to it. The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries showed that their stand on the China question was consistent and firm. A resolution passed by the UN General Assembly on October 25, 1971 recognised the

PRC representatives as the sole legitimate representatives of China in the UN and demanded the expulsion of Taipei representatives from that organisation. The resolution got the votes of 76 nations (with 35 nays and 17 abstentions).

The General Assembly resolution on the China question caused a storm in political circles in Washington. Leaders of the Republicans, and of the Democrats for that matter, urged the administration to cut back its financial assistance to the UN. American politicians who failed to assess the situation soberly resented the anti-American demonstration in the UN—34 countries that were getting aid from the USA had voted against the American draft resolutions. Even many of the USA's friends, having previously been informed of the US-Chinese contacts, felt that they were being duped and resisted American pressure.

A particularly violent uproar was raised at the time by conservative Republicans. Senator Barry Goldwater, known for his hawkish stand in the debate on the US aggression in Vietnam, demanded the USA's resignation from the UN. Ronald Reagan, then Governor of the State of California, sent a telegram declaring his solidarity with Chiang Kai-shek and charging the UN with having descended to the staging of a mock trial. At the time Reagan hardly expected that some twelve years later he would, as President of the USA, be considering visiting the PRC ruled by the government that he was attacking with his habitual callousness.

On October 26, 1971, the administration showed that the bridges had been burned. At a news conference Secretary of State Rogers declared that he could only express satisfaction over the PRC's admission to the UN; talks with Beijing on concrete matters relating to the visit to China by the US President were being completed at the time. In parallel curtsies were dropped in the direction of Taipei. The justification offered to Chiang Kai-shek boiled down to the following: the US government was exerting the most energetic efforts to achieve its aim by all possible means in keeping with considerations of principle. Washington attached significance to maintaining the principle that, within the realm of possibility, no member should be expelled by a simple majority vote. In this context, it was specially stressed that Japan, Australia,

New Zealand, Colombia, and some other countries co-authored the American resolution. The Secretary of State expressed his regret that Taiwan was expelled from the UN. The architects of Washington's new China policy endeavoured to display sympathy and compassion when they had to enter into contact with representatives of regimes that were dependent entirely on American strength. The latter were overtly and covertly declaring their doubt about the credibility of American commitments.

The positive outcome of the China question in the UN and the US-Chinese contacts in that organisation helped to create the conditions for the development of broader relations between the USA and China.

The Invitation to Nixon and the Political In-Fighting in Beijing

The exacerbation of the political in-fighting in China in 1971 was linked to the steep shift in the Chinese leadership's tactics in foreign policy highlighted by a sharp vitalisation of diplomatic activity to achieve unchanged objectives by new means. A working conference of the CPC leadership that was turned into a plenary meeting of the CPC Central Committee was convened in the summer of 1970 on Mao Zedong's initiative in the holiday resort town of Lushan, Jiangxi Province. On August 23 Lin Biao addressed the plenary meeting, suggesting the preservation of the office of Chairman of the PRC in the new Constitution, although earlier Mao had opposed a similar suggestion and refused to assume that office. Some Chinese leaders proposed Lin Biao for that post. This was enough. Lin Biao was accused of "grasping for power much too eagerly". The participants in the plenary meeting learned for the first time of China's secret talks with Washington. The thesis that it was necessary to "unite with the USA" against the Soviet Union in effect voided the keynote of Lin Biao's report to the Ninth CPC Congress ("struggle against US imperialism and Soviet revisionism"). Probably apprehensive of being made a scapegoat, Lin Biao expressed doubt about such a sharp twist in policy. His position was further

jeopardized, and this is what ultimately led to the events of September 1971,¹ which culminated so dismally for the deputy Chairman. In December 1980 it was announced in Beijing that beginning in the spring of 1971 Lin Biao had been masterminding plans for an attempt on Mao Zedong's life. The Chinese press gave the details—the plot was led by Lin Biao's son, Lin Liguo, who was a high-ranking officer in the Chinese Air Force headquarters.

The American researcher Thomas W. Robinson published a survey of Lin Biao's political and military career. Unquestionably written before the events of September 1971, this survey offers some interesting conclusions that help to understand subsequent developments. Lin became a member of Mao's immediate entourage in 1930. Lin's successful career was interrupted by divergences with Mao, but the latter's suspicions about Lin were shortlived. In his early writings, Lin attributed a service role to the political factor, regarding it as one of the elements needed for a military victory. He centred his attention on guerilla warfare, and this was subsequently reflected in the thesis "Long Live the Victory of the People's War". He divided the world rigorously into enemies and friends, with no one between (the "enemy is hated and despised"). The circumstance that this survey of Lin's biography was written for Project Rand can hardly be considered accidental. In the USA they obviously realised that, during the latter years, Lin had considerably reinforced his position in the armed forces and in the country and had, as a result, activated his opponents. The American leaders undoubtedly wanted to know how strong Lin's position was. For them this was particularly important on the eve of the President's visit to Beijing.

The political in-fighting in Beijing in 1971 differed markedly from the debate in the Chinese leadership in the mid-1960s, when a group of influential military men urged cooperation with the USSR in order to ensure the conditions for building up a modern, combat-efficient army. The course towards normalising relations with the capitalist West, notably with the

¹ Thomas W. Robinson, *A Politico-Military Biography of Lin Biao. Part I, 1907-1949. A Report Prepared for United States Air Force Project Rand, Santa Monica, California, 1971*, pp. VI-VII, 63, 69, 74-75.

USA, and the setbacks in the application of this doctrine aimed at spreading China's influence among developing nations, the countries of Indochina in particular, objectively undermined Lin Biao's position.

Edward E. Rice¹, a former US diplomat, noted that "the decision to invite President Nixon had been made against the opposition of a group headed by Lin Biao". Rice believed that Mao Zedong had not changed his basic attitude towards the USA; he had only come to regard "the United States as an enemy which had dropped to secondary place, behind the Soviet Union". In this context Rice drew upon a historical analogy. In 1937, explaining the changed relationship between the Communist Party of China and the Kuomintang, Mao observed that the contradiction between China and Japan had become the principal one, and China's internal contradictions had dropped into secondary and subordinate place. But the changed relationship with the Kuomintang, Rice pointed out, did not prevent Mao from pursuing basic aims in internal politics. Similarly, the former diplomat concluded, "achieving a different relationship with the United States might alter the way in which Communist China pursued its external aims, but not those aims themselves".² In the given case it was recognised that in foreign policy tactics might change but not the strategic aims.

The group led by Zhou Enlai undoubtedly pinned considerable hopes on a normalisation of relations with the USA and endeavoured to ensure the success of the Nixon visit, feeling that this would, to a large extent, as was most probably believed in Beijing, justify the expediency of removing adversaries of a sharp turn towards the USA in the Chinese leadership. China's leaders prepared to receive the US President in a situation marked by the emergence of a new balance of strength in Beijing resulting from the defeat of Lin Biao and his supporters and by a certain weakening of the role of the military in the nation's

¹ Edward E. Rice was an American Foreign Service officer for more than 30 years (first coming to China in 1935). He served in the US State Department and was Consul-General in Hong Kong (1964-1967). After his retirement he was a research associate in the Center for Chinese Studies at the University of California, Berkeley.

² Edward E. Rice, *Mao's Way*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1972, pp. 491, 492.

leadership. The proponents of rapprochement with the USA in China sought to create auspicious conditions for the meeting in Beijing from the standpoint of both internal politics (justification of the sharp turn towards the USA) and foreign policy (impact on the attitude of the USA's allies), and to ensure a strong hand at the talks. These objectives explained Beijing's restrained reaction to the resumption of the US bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

The Shanghai Communique

The first-ever visit of a US President to China began on February 21, 1972. At 9 a. m. US President Richard M. Nixon arrived in Shanghai. He was welcomed by Qiao Guanhua, then a Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was seen by American observers to be the key figure in the Foreign Ministry. After taking Chinese pilots on board, the aircraft soon took off and at 11.30 a. m. landed at Beijing's airport. The first official meeting took place. In armchairs placed in a circle the guests and hosts sat face to face. In front of the President were Premier Zhou Enlai and his wife, Deng Yingchao, Marshal Ye Jianying, the acting Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei, his deputy Qiao Guanhua, and other officials.

After lunch it became known that Mao would like to see the President.

According to Kissinger's reminiscences, Mao evaded discussing with the President specific questions of bilateral relations. "Those questions are not questions to be discussed in my place. They should be discussed with the Premier. I discuss the philosophical questions."¹ During the visit Nixon met with Mao Zedong and had talks with Zhou Enlai. Secretary of State Rogers had talks with Ji Pengfei. The American guests visited Guangzhou and Shanghai. A joint communique was signed in Shanghai.

The Nixon-Mao meeting, as the entire process of the activation of the US-Chinese dialogue in the early 1970s, was not

¹ Henry Kissinger, *White House Years*, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1979, p. 1060.

viewed as unusual by many influential political and civic circles around the world, for by that time peaceful coexistence and cooperation between countries with different social systems were seen as natural, reflecting the normal evolution of international relations. It was then that the Nixon administration was conducting an active dialogue on a wide range of questions related to the development of Soviet-US relations, and negotiations were under way on a cessation of the war in Vietnam.

For more than two decades the Soviet Union had urged the USA and other capitalist powers to establish normal diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. The question being asked by Soviet opinion, as well as by public opinion in many other countries, was: Were not steps being made towards a Sino-US rapprochement to the detriment of the interests of third nations, to the detriment of the interests of world peace? The suspicions of public opinion in the Soviet Union and other countries were aroused by, for example, the circumstance that the Sino-US rapprochement began soon after the Ninth Congress of the CPC, when tension surfaced in Soviet-Chinese relations.

In connection with the reports that the US President had been invited to visit Beijing, the newspaper *Pravda* wrote: "The cause of peace and world security can only be served by actions that reinforce the position of socialism and the forces of freedom and national liberation. The long-term interests of the peoples, including the peoples of the PRC and the USA, require decisions that strengthen peace and international security. As regards foreign political combinations directed against other states, they will ultimately and inescapably boomerang against their initiators."¹

As early as ten years after the Nixon visit to Beijing some of the closely-guarded secrets of the first US-Chinese summit were divulged, and these only bore out that there was justification for the suspicions of the early 1970s about the rapidity and timing of the Washington-Beijing rapprochement.

During the preparations for the Shanghai meeting the Americans saw what "philosophical" problems of Sino-US relations interested Mao Zedong. On one of his trips to Beijing Kissinger noted to the Chinese leaders that the relations between the USA

¹ *Pravda*, July 27, 1971.

and China were on a "sound basis". Kissinger asserted that a major argument in favour of this was that neither side asked anything of the other. Mao did not leave this statement of the US President's adviser without attention. "If neither side had anything to ask from the other," he queried, "why would you be coming to Peking? If neither side had anything to ask, then why ... would we want to receive you and the President?" What was Mao's principal "request" and how was it depicted by Kissinger? Mao indicated his displeasure with "American ineffectualness in resisting" the Soviet Union. He compared the US to "swallows in the face of a storm". "This world is not tranquil," the guests replied, matching their hosts' style, "and a storm—the wind and rain—are coming. And at the approach of the wind and rain the swallows are busy..."

Most probably, the talk about "swallows in the face of a storm" reflected one of the significant directions of Mao's "philosophical thinking". Kissinger observed in his memoirs that for the Chinese leaders the Soviet Union was the cardinal problem. The Sino-US summit focussed not on individual questions of bilateral relations but on problems of a "geopolitical nature". At the talks the Americans did not need too much time to ascertain what basically interested their Chinese partners. The objective imperative for promoting state-to-state relations between China and the USA was seen by influential top leaders from among Mao Zedong's intimate associates through the prism of their own, subjectivist vision of the world. There was at the time a consuming interest on the part of Beijing to increased tension in Soviet-US relations. Kissinger conceded that implementation of a scenario of this sort should produce conditions more conducive for the Chinese leadership's foreign political ventures and give Beijing a stronger hand in its diplomatic bargaining with Washington.

An outcome of the attempts to show commonality of strategic aims was that in the Shanghai communique there was not a word about the USA and the PRC having two different social systems or about the PRC being a socialist country. The Nixon administration even actually went along with the political style of its negotiation partners (Nixon's statement about the striving of the USA and the PRC to "create a new world order", and so on). It was no accident that the principle of peaceful coexistence and

the equality of countries with different social systems was supplanted in the Shanghai communique with the obviously egalitarian thesis that "all nations, big or small, should be equal". Moreover, the communique ignored pressing issues such as the struggle against Israeli aggression, the efforts to ban nuclear weapons and achieve disarmament, the need to eradicate the last centres of colonialism, and so on.

The agreement, recorded in the communique, to counter "hegemony" by any country in Asia was evidently seen by the Chinese side as being directed against the Soviet Union (opposition to the efforts "by any other country or group of countries" to establish "hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region" and to the collusion of any major country with another against other countries, or of major countries to divide up the world into spheres of interest). Although in the communique the Chinese side recorded its attitude to "hegemonism", the term itself was first suggested by the American side. Kissinger recalled: Beijing would have liked to see open hostility between Washington and Moscow, linking at the time its calculations to this and thereby reinforcing its position in the negotiations with the USA. Naturally, the Americans engaged in a balancing act: while negotiating in Beijing, they sought to take the realities of the nuclear age into account and in this context endeavoured to neutralise their Shanghai communique partner's displeasure by the deepening of the Soviet-US dialogue. Kissinger informed the Chinese of the contemplated agreements with the Soviet Union, seeking to avoid any implication that a US-Soviet condominium was being set up. "What we could not do," Kissinger wrote, "was to give Peking a veto over our relationship with Moscow."¹

Kissinger's reminiscences might give the impression that the sides worked out their basic stand on the Taiwan issue in the course of the preparations for and during the Nixon visit to Beijing. However, other sources lead to the conclusion that the Shanghai communique was preceded by a much longer process of mutual sounding, by painstaking efforts on the part of the Americans and the Chinese to work out their attitudes, especially on so delicate an issue as Taiwan.

In 1960, when the journal *Look* sent Edgar Snow to China as

¹ Henry Kissinger, op. cit., p. 1076.

its correspondent, the Chinese leaders quite unequivocally stated their posture on Taiwan. Zhou Enlai cited evidence to show to Snow that the USA was to blame for the tension in Sino-American relations. In particular, Zhou Enlai recalled that in the initial postwar years the USA (Truman administration) recognised that Taiwan was China's internal problem and promised not to interfere in China's internal affairs. With the outbreak of the Korean war, Zhou Enlai said, the USA steered towards aggression against China, sending its Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait and placing Taiwan under military control; Chinese volunteers joined in the hostilities several months after the USA had deployed its forces in the Taiwan Strait and American troops had crossed the 38th parallel and were approaching the Yalu River. Snow noted that the Chinese leaders had long been demanding an end to the American military presence on Taiwan as the main condition for an improvement of relations with the USA. "Taiwan," Mao Zedong told him in 1960, "is China's affair. We will insist on this." Zhou Enlai spelled this out to Snow in 1960 and 1965, saying: "Taiwan is China's internal affair" (and must be settled by the Chinese themselves).¹

According to information obtained by the Japanese press, the Taiwan issue was discussed by Zhou Enlai and Henry Kissinger in June 1971. Kissinger, the newspaper *Tokyo Shimbun* reported, insisted that international commitments did not permit the USA to neglect Taiwan, but he said that the USA desired to help the PRC to take its place in the UN Security Council. Zhou Enlai contested this, observing that Chiang Kai-shek was also against this move, declaring that there was one China. He did not overlook Kissinger's desire to hear that China would not liberate Taiwan by force. In response to this promise the USA showed a willingness to pull all American armed forces out of Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait. Zhou Enlai made it clear that first the USA was to withdraw from Taiwan and declared that the Taiwan issue was China's internal affair. If the USA announced its agreement to end its military presence on Taiwan, China, Zhou Enlai said, would declare that it would liberate the island by peaceful means.

¹ Edgar Snow, *The Long Revolution*, Random House, New York, 1972, p. 11.

As if in reply to this Chinese offer of a quest for peaceful unification of Taiwan with the mainland, Washington steadily stepped up its propaganda ploy that "Chinese problems are resolved solely by the Chinese themselves". The American leaders, especially in view of the approaching first-ever visit by a US President to Beijing, sought to prepare the ground for a universal recognition of the Taiwan question's purely "Chinese character". This was undoubtedly a move designed to ease the impact of the deadlock over Taiwan on Washington's manoeuvres in its relations with Beijing and in its Far Eastern policy as a whole.

When preparations for signing the 1972 Shanghai communique were under way the Chinese leaders repeatedly reaffirmed their stand. Zhou Enlai told his American guest John S. Service that the USA could not have two embassies in one country. Service had a conversation with Zhou Enlai on the day the UN announced the PRC's admission to membership. Service asked the Premier if he ever planned to go to New York now that China had been admitted to the United Nations. "Never, never," Zhou responded at once. "As long as a Taiwan ambassador is in Washington, you will never see me in the United States."¹ To Americans visiting the PRC during the preparations for the US President's visit to Beijing, Zhou Enlai usually noted (for instance, in a conversation with two US professors—Arthur W. Galston of Yale University and Ethan R. Signer of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology) that there was a point on which he and Chiang Kai-shek were of one mind—that the "two Chinas" policy was unrealistic. This was Beijing's point of departure for its stand on a key foreign policy aim—the expulsion of the Taiwan representative from the United Nations.

On February 24, 1972, while Nixon was viewing the Great Wall of China, Kissinger and Qiao Guanhua animatedly discussed the Taiwan issue. As the Americans and Chinese expected, this became the central issue in the discussions over the Shanghai communique. When Kissinger made his preparatory visits to China, the sides had agreed that each would state its own stand on this ticklish problem. Beijing declared that the PRC government was the only lawful government of China, that Taiwan was a province of China, and that the future of Taiwan was

¹ *The New York Times*, February 8, 1972.

China's internal affair. Kissinger did not object to the thesis that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait recognised one China and that Taiwan was a province of China. In principle, the USA did not dispute this. For their part, the Chinese agreed not to mention their attitude to the "US-Taiwan security treaty", but nonetheless noted that American armed forces had to be withdrawn from Taiwan.

When the text of the Shanghai communique was scrutinised, the Chinese wanted the US to state that a peaceful solution of the Taiwan question was their "hope". The American side insisted on affirming it as "an American interest". Beijing demanded the total withdrawal of US armed forces from Taiwan, but the Americans were willing to go no further than to describe US withdrawal as an "objective".

It took nearly 20 hours to iron out the difficulties over the text of the communique. On February 24 Qiao asked Kissinger to reaffirm the US intention of a total withdrawal of all its forces. A compromise was expected from the orchestrator of the ping-pong diplomacy. The Americans made an attempt to link the problem of a total withdrawal of armed forces to the easing of tensions in the region (in other words, to Vietnam). This proposal aroused Qiao's interest, but he let it be understood that he was not prepared to accept it. Eighteen hours remained to the end of the talks. The Americans stuck to their position: the war in Southeast Asia was indeed a factor behind the US military presence in the Far East. Progress began to be made when Zhou Enlai joined in the talks between the diplomats. His presence at these talks underscored a major circumstance—the Premier had assumed the responsibility for the needed compromise.

Zhou Enlai was aware, of course, that the Taiwan issue could not be settled during the Nixon visit to China. If too much pressure were put on the USA in this matter it would call in question the main purpose of the talks—the establishment of Sino-US cooperation and even strategic partnership. Kissinger believed that his meeting with Qiao would consummate the debates over the draft communique. Qiao did indeed accept the American wording about recognising Taiwan as part of and not a province of the PRC. Moreover, the Americans succeeded in linking their "ultimate objective"—the "withdrawal of all US forces" to an easing of tensions in the region. As before, both sides passed

over in silence the USA's military commitments to Taiwan.

But difficulties erupted again when it seemed that all the acute discussions had ended. This time the hindrance was the stand of the State Department. Secretary of State Rogers stated his opinion of the draft communique to the President—he felt it was not satisfactory. State Department experts introduced up to 15 amendments. Nixon worried. He knew the problems harassing him—he was apprehensive of criticism from the right, of the reaction from conservatives, despite the fact that he had always belonged to that wing. It seemed to him that the amendments to the draft communique were the trigger that could cause serious complications for his administration. A day before the communique was to be promulgated Kissinger had to return to the negotiating table with Qiao. The latter was at a loss: how could they turn to the document once again when agreement had been received from the President and the text had been approved by the Political Bureau? Nevertheless, the desire to achieve a compromise prevailed.

When a Chinese army band welcomed the US President with an American march, US bombers were intensifying their attacks on Cambodia and Vietnam. Beijing, at the time, gave its backing to the demands being made by the revolutionary forces of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, but it said nothing of the role the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was playing in reaching a settlement in Indochina and did not criticise the plan for the “phased withdrawal” of US armed forces from the region.

The sides were unable to work out a common stand on the problems of Japan and Korea. The USA underscored the role of its Japanese ally as a growing basic factor of stability in the Far East, while Beijing insisted on Japan's neutralisation. The USA made clear its intention to continue maintaining relations with Seoul, while China sided with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the question of Korea's reunification.

In the Shanghai communique the Chinese side reaffirmed its position: “The Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States”, “the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair”, and “all US forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan”. The Chinese government firmly opposed the creation of “one China, one Taiwan”, or “one China, two

governments", "two Chinas", and "independent Taiwan", or formulations proclaiming that "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined".

In the communique the American side did not state which government it recognised, confining itself to the acknowledgement that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintained there was but one China and that Taiwan was a part of China. Actually, both sides reaffirmed that Taiwan should not be the cause of military confrontation: the Americans did not conceal their interest in a peaceful settlement and affirmed that the ultimate objective was the withdrawal of all US forces and military installations from Taiwan. As for the Chinese, they did not make the immediate withdrawal of the Americans from Taiwan the prior condition for promoting relations with the USA. Although the USA reiterated its alliance with Japan and South Korea, it did not confirm in the communique US commitments under its military agreement of 1954 with the Chiang Kai-shek government. In a departure from their previous stand, the Chinese did not demand that the USA break off its relations with the government in Taipei.

The Shanghai communique was in all respects an amorphous document. The wishes recorded in it were not mandatory. Nevertheless, the 40 hours spent by Zhou Enlai in Nixon's company were not unproductive. In principle, the two statesmen charted the way towards the full normalisation of relations, agreed their positions in the confrontation with the Soviet Union, primarily in Asia (the Chinese approved, for all practical purposes, the US military presence in the Asia-Pacific region), and blunted the Taiwan issue. The subsequent establishment of liaison missions in Beijing and Washington paved the way for the establishment of diplomatic relations in the near future. As Nixon himself acknowledged, he achieved one of the paramount aims of his visit to China, namely, the continuation of the "two Chinas" policy. Nevertheless, the Taiwan problem continued to play a significant role in American-Chinese relations (see Chapter Seven).

Upon returning from China, Nixon addressed the American people from Andrews Air Base. He reminded the Senators and Congressmen who came to meet him of his achievements at his talks in Beijing and, at the same time, made it clear that he had

not renounced any commitments given to other countries. The first thing that Henry Kissinger did upon entering his office following his return from China was to telephone leading conservatives, Governor Ronald Reagan of California and Senator Barry Goldwater. Both promised their support on the condition that the commitments to Taiwan were honoured. Reagan joked in Hollywood style—the Nixon visit had been a great television “pilot” and ought to be made into a series.¹ The results of the Nixon visit were approved by both houses of the US Congress. A bipartisan China policy took shape in the USA.

The Position of the Gang of Four

In view of a definite strengthening of the positions held by supporters of Jiang Qing (Chiang Ching)—the promotion, in particular, of Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan, the so-called Gang of Four, to leading posts in the Communist Party of China—Beijing’s American policy was coming under growing criticism from the “radicals” who felt that the rapprochement with Washington had not produced the expected results. This criticism played the role of an important instrument in the political struggle in China itself. The Gang of Four took advantage of being close to Mao Zedong, of having the possibility of using the media controlled by it to “explain” the instructions of the “leader”. Jiang Qing adopted the posture of interpreter of the ideas of the CC Chairman. Addressing officials of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, she said: “Because he [Mao Zedong] is so busy I am, in fulfilment of my duty as a Communist, bringing his verbal instructions to your notice.”² The mechanism of foreign policy’s reverse impact on the in-fighting in China functioned quite efficiently where the promotion of Sino-American relations was concerned.

At the close of 1975 Professor Harry Harding of Stanford University came to the conclusion that while in 1969-1974 Mao favoured Sino-US detente, he now obviously had his doubts about it and this surfaced at his talks with US Secretary of State

¹ Henry Kissinger, op. cit., p. 1093.

² *Zhongniang ribao*, May 28, 1975.

Henry Kissinger. This change in Mao's attitude, Harding wrote, could now become an ill omen for Sino-US relations. Harding and other American analysts had justification for their apprehensions. In order to strengthen its position in the Communist Party of China the Gang of Four tried to blame the "pragmatists" for foreign policy miscalculations. Of course, this did not mean that Jiang opposed Mao. Biographers of Mao's wife note that all basic decisions—for instance, on the Hundred Flowers Campaign, the Great Leap Forward, the organisation of communes, the Cultural Revolution, and so on—were taken by Mao after "serious discussion and consideration with Jiang". More, the leader of the Gang of Four spoke publicly of the first-ever visit to China by a US President as of the "greatest" coup in modern history. During the Nixon visit Mao's wife preferred to hold public attention most of the time. In the mid-1970s the Gang of Four acted in the name of Mao and tried to compensate for the weakness of their position in the party apparatus and the army with propaganda campaigns, with pride of place attached to the so-called struggle for the "purity" of the revolutionary line and the drive against China's "Westernisation".

Sino-US rapprochement led to some growth of trade and economic relations between China and the USA, to purchases of American equipment, and to a study of American expertise (for instance, in agriculture, medicine, and other areas). This circumstance objectively contributed to the creation of conditions conducive for the development of left tendencies in policy, for fostering xenophobic sentiments and hatred for everything foreign ("all that is best is in China"), and for using stereotypes of the mass consciousness to attack the "moderates". The journal *Hongqi* cautioned that "China's total Westernisation was impermissible", and people were exhorted to "keep an eye on all the espionage intrigues" of US imperialism, to prevent "spies in the party from entering into criminal contact with US imperialism", and so on. The "radicals" used historical "arguments". For example, in August 1974 *Hongqi* printed an article headed "It Is Treachery to Revere Confucius, Read Canons, and Worship Things Foreign".¹ The US press drew attention to the publication in Shanghai in 1974 of a pamphlet entitled "The Revolutionary Anti-Imperialist and Anti-Feudal Exploits During the

¹ *Hongqi*, No. 8, 1974.

Yihetuan Uprising Will Always Be a Bright Light in China's Life". The purpose of the parallels drawn with the past by the "radicals" was to prove that the way of rapprochement with imperialist states, notably with the USA, was not the sole and necessary way for China.

The stand of the Gang of Four was stated quite explicitly in the "replies" of the Hongqi Publishing House to questions by readers about the 10th Congress of the Communist Party of China. The "bourgeois elements" in the CPC, it was noted, might enter into a "spy conspiracy" with US imperialism. "Already now some people are trying to restore capitalism, utilising the policy of temporary compromise with US imperialism pursued by our country. For their part, the imperialists are extolling this category of people, boosting their reputation, and making agents of them within our country." In the propaganda media controlled by the Gang of Four (for example, the journal *Hongqi*) the "temporary compromise with US imperialism" was set off against the "conspiracy between Soviet revisionism and the USA".¹

A curious document—a speech by Jiang Qing to senior officials of China's Foreign Ministry in mid-March 1975—circulated in the foreign press in the middle of 1975. Mao's wife focused attention on the contradictions between the PRC and the USA. Many quarters doubted the authenticity of the Jiang Qing speech published in Hong Kong in 1975. However, that this speech was delivered by Jiang is borne out by its content, which dovetails with the propaganda activities of the Gang of Four. The differences between the rival factions did not relate to the choice of foreign policy strategic aims—they were focussed on the formation of tactics and on the assessments of foreign policy experience, in this case the experience of promoting relations with the USA since the signing of the Shanghai communique. Indicative in this respect were the impressions gained by G.M. Choudhury, former general director of the Pakistani Foreign Ministry, who visited the PRC in 1976 at the invitation of the Chinese leadership. The officials whom the former Pakistani diplomat spoke to warned that the USA would have difficulties in its relations with Beijing if the USA tried to use China as a "bargaining chip" in its relations with the USSR. Nixon,

¹ *Zhonghua yuebao*, No. 708, 1974.

Choudhury was told, had clearly seen the "dangers" coming from the Soviet Union. In Beijing's view, with Nixon's departure from office, US foreign policy initiatives seemed to move from the US President to the US Secretary of State Kissinger, and the latter had gone back on past assurances on matters concerning Sino-US relations.¹ Of course, the slowdown of the development of Sino-US relations could hardly be attributed to the attitude of individual US statesmen, although their views and personal decisions were significant. The main reasons for the inhibition of the Sino-US rapprochement in the mid-1970s must be seen in the development of the international situation and in the aggravation of the political in-fighting in China itself.

The "radical" Gang of Four was particularly annoyed by the refusal of industrialised capitalist states, chiefly the USA, to make unilateral compromises to China. Diplomatic relations with the USA were not formalised, the Taiwan issue remained unresolved, and no trade transactions benefiting China were signed with capitalist countries. Another circumstance that the "radicals" evidently took into account was that Sino-US rapprochement was detrimental to China's cooperation with its closest allies, whose policy was founded on the leftist ideology and the concept of "struggle on two fronts". Even those who had supported them for a long time had to dissociate themselves from Beijing's guidelines. Judging by the Albanian press, there was a negative response to Beijing's foreign policy line in Tirana ("one cannot ally oneself with one imperialism against the other"). In fact, the Seventh Congress of the Albanian Party of Labour in November 1976 denounced the "three worlds" doctrine, which put the USA and the Soviet Union in one "world", the developed capitalist countries in another, and the developing nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America in yet another. In the report to the congress it was stated that this division of the world "obscures the class character" of the various political forces and was aimed at causing "ideological discord and undermining the struggle of the progressive forces". The rapid Sino-US rapprochement eroded Beijing's prestige in the developing nations and among left-wing movements in the capitalist countries. Beijing's political actions on the international scene

¹ *Orbis. A Journal of World Affairs*, Vol. 20, No. 3, Fall 1976, pp. 606-07.

distinctly showed the peoples fighting for national and social liberation the true significance of the theoretical postulates of China's top leaders and the untenability of their assessments of the situation in the world (particularly, the "three worlds theory").

In her address to senior officials of the PRC's Foreign Ministry, Jiang Qing declared in response to the displeasure shown by some of Beijing's allies over China's steep turn towards the USA: "We shall never conspire with superpowers for the sake of mercenary interests. We do not deceive friends and do not seek to achieve our aims at their expense." Roxane Witke of Columbia University, an enterprising journalist, managed to get Huang Hua to arrange an interview with Jiang Qing for her. With the exacerbation of the political in-fighting in China, Witke's actions appeared as direct American interference in the PRC's internal affairs. Willy-nilly, this interview with the leader of the Gang of Four signified publicity for the architect of the "cultural revolution".

Witke's book, *Comrade Chiang Ch'ing* (1977), contains references to Jiang's (Chiang's) speech of March 1975, which was circulated among Taipei sources and touched on the PRC's relations with the external world. In this speech Jiang stressed that China had to "follow Chairman Mao's correct line". "Our foreign policy must concentrate on black friends, small friends, poor friends. They will be grateful to us. We may have no white friends, great friends, rich friends; but we are not isolated."¹

Jiang's contradictory stand on the question of relations with foreign countries, notably with the USA, showed clearly in her attitude to intellectual contacts with the West. In the interview with Roxane Witke, Jiang explained, for example, how "cultural exchange" complemented international relations in the "superstructural sphere". Cultural exchanges, she declared, were much riskier than the usual trade material. For, Witke wrote in this connection, "imported 'bourgeois' culture might stimulate [for the Chinese] a dangerous thirst for variety in China's guarded proletarian realm".²

Until the beginning of the 1960s there was a certain measure

¹ Roxane Witke, *Comrade Chiang Ch'ing*, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1977, p. 467.

² Ibid., p. 456.

of freedom in China's cultural intercourse with foreign countries. For all practical purposes, the "cultural revolution" put an end to this intercourse. It erected an insuperable barrier to contact with foreign culture, giving only a limited number of Chinese intellectuals the opportunity to travel abroad.

The examples cited by Witke indicated not only the adherence of the Chinese to the preservation of their own distinctive culture, an adherence that was no less strong than in imperial times, but also the interest of the Chinese elite in the cultural values of the external world, perhaps chiefly of the capitalist countries. Limited access to foreign films was reserved only for the public at large. Works regarded as "unhealthy for the people" were restricted to private showing among leading personalities, who, Jiang Qing among them, considered them for "reference", which meant that they learned from them mainly as "negative examples".¹ "Bourgeois democratic films," Jiang Qing declared, "are to be reserved for private showing. If the people could view them they would criticise them bitterly on political grounds."² Jiang Qing's personal library of foreign films contained almost the entire collection of films starring Greta Garbo, for whom Mao's wife had a special admiration.

The world press gave wide coverage to visits to the PRC by the Italian film producer Michelangelo Antonioni and the Philadelphia Symphony Orchestra. Antonioni was hosted by the heads of China's radio and television networks. At this time the mass media were controlled by Jiang Qing. Antonioni's documentary about China brought the Italian film-maker under violent attack from the Chinese press but was received with understanding in other countries. The Philadelphia Symphony Orchestra on its invitation to China gave four concerts in Beijing and two in Shanghai for leading cadres but not for the masses. Jiang Qing made a special request for Beethoven's Sixth Symphony, the Pastoral. At the close of the tour Jiang presented the conductor, Eugene Ormandy, with a set of valuable books from her private collection. But these "musical evenings" soon fell into oblivion. There followed a campaign of violent criticism of "bourgeois" music, a campaign that was part and parcel of the drive against everything "foreign". Even Roxane Witke, known for her per-

¹ R. Witke, *Comrade Chiang Ch'ing*, p. 440.

² Ibid.

sonal liking for Jiang Qing and her friends, had to note the extremes of the "cultural revolution". "Marx, we know," she wrote, "adored Shakespeare and Balzac, and Lenin loved Pushkin, Chernyshevsky, and Beethoven. But in the spring of 1974 Peking's leaders linked classical music to the rise of capitalism..."¹

The advocates of closer relations with the USA in the Chinese leadership sought to neutralise the attacks of the left-radical opposition. The Americans visiting the PRC in the summer of 1974 noted that Zhou Enlai's illness was physical rather than diplomatic. But even in hospital Zhou used his influence to repulse the attacks of the opposition headed by the Gang of Four. Adversaries of the Gang of Four caustically criticised Beethoven, this being an attack, albeit veiled, against Jiang Qing. When Jiang Qing's supporters initiated a denunciation of Confucius as a "revisionist", who welcomed the advice of foreigners, their rivals linked these assaults on Confucius to criticism of Lin Biao, thereby in fact neutralising the attacks of their opponents. Information seeped into the Western press to the effect that even during Mao's lifetime Jiang Qing was denounced for "contacts" with foreign powers.

It may be presumed that the "radical" section of the PRC leadership could and evidently did speak of the undesirable effect of China's rapprochement with the West, chiefly in the zone of the developing nations. These arguments acquired considerable weight in view of the growing impact of the developing nations on the world situation, especially through such effective means as the oil embargo against the leading capitalist powers, including the USA. The activation of the China policy among the developing nations suited also the proponents of rapprochement with the USA, especially as they wanted to put pressure on the USA, with the reminder that if necessary China could reorient its foreign policy.

What were the signs of a slowdown in the development of the relations between the PRC and the USA? First, the changed quantitative and qualitative character of the contacts on governmental level. At the close of July 1973 it became known that Kissinger had postponed his planned visit to China. It was most

¹ Ibid., p. 459.

likely that the Chinese leadership did not wish to receive the US Secretary of State at a time when preparations were under way for the 10th Congress of the CPC and the political situation in China was growing tense. By Chinese standards, Kissinger got a very cool reception in Beijing in November 1974. There was a rise of anti-US propaganda in the Chinese press and more anti-US statements were made in the United Nations—a development that could be assessed as China's dissatisfaction over the stand adopted by Washington, as not only veiled criticism from the left but also as an attempt to bring some pressure to bear on the USA as a partner in an ongoing dialogue. The talks conducted by Kissinger in November were evidently a disappointment for the Chinese leaders, who were expecting new initiatives from Washington. Nor were changes stimulated in Sino-US relations by the visit to the PRC by US President Gerald Ford in 1975.

Second, there was a sharp decline of the qualitative level of scientific and cultural exchanges. While in the first ten weeks of 1973 the Xinhua News Agency published 30 articles on official meetings of US delegations in China, in the first ten weeks of 1974 the Chinese published only three such articles.¹ Refusing to be put on a lead by Beijing, the Americans showed a definite firmness. Washington cancelled its invitation to a Chinese ensemble, which had a song entitled "We Shall Liberate Taiwan" in its repertoire. In May 1975 the US press quoted Canadian sources as reporting the expulsion of a Chinese diplomat—the third secretary and press attache of the PRC Embassy Guo Jinan—from Canada at the request of the USA. The charge against the diplomat was that he received industrial secrets and military information gathered in the USA and brought it to the Chinese Embassy in Ottawa, from where it was transmitted to China.

Third, there was some slowing down of trade and economic relations. Beijing scrapped a contract, signed with the American company Cook and Industries, on the sale of grain to China in the period from February to September 1975.² In trade the

¹ *The New York Times*, March 22, 1974.

² China cancelled or postponed a number of import transactions—on the purchase of steel and fertiliser in Japan. The number of contracts on the purchase of fully equipped factories in the West dropped from 23 in 1973 to 17 in 1974 and to 12 in 1975.

increasingly inhibiting factors were China's poor export potentiality and a large deficit in its trade with the USA and other capitalist countries.

Beijing's reluctance to solicit long-term credits from the USA was due largely to political reasons. In the first half of the 1970s China made active use solely of short-and middle-term credits from capitalist firms. China's leaders preferred to call these transactions "payment by instalments".

The growth of the external debt bared serious contradictions between the declared policy of "reliance on own resources" and the practice of the PRC's economic relations with countries of the capitalist world, chiefly the USA. With the political struggle in China reaching crisis proportions for the Beijing leadership, the Chinese would hardly have approved American investments, although it would have been quite realistic to expect major concessions in another area, for instance, a modification of the stand relative to credits from the West.

Fourth, the PRC's attitude relative to Taiwan hardened. The Chinese drew special attention to the unresolved state of the Taiwan problem. In talks with foreign visitors Zhou Enlai complained that the USA was evading its commitments under the 1972 Shanghai communique, chiefly its promise ultimately to withdraw all its armed forces from Taiwan. In the three years following the signing of the Shanghai communique the USA reduced the numerical strength of its troops on Taiwan from 8,500 to 5,000, in other words, by only 3,500. Meanwhile, the USA took a number of steps to assure Taipei that it would not be abandoned. Beijing showed its displeasure also over Washington's refusal to reduce the level of diplomatic relations with Taiwan (the appointment of a leading career diplomat Leonard Unger as the new US Ambassador in Taipei), and the opening of new Taiwanese consulates in Portland, Oregon, and in Kansas City.

A meeting of representatives of urban public opinion and representatives of "compatriots" on Taiwan was held in Beijing in February 1974 on the 27th anniversary of an uprising on the island (the uprising of the local population against the Chiang Kai-shek clique put to flight from the mainland by the People's Liberation Army of China). In fact, this meeting was an undisguised demonstration of the Chinese leadership's determination

to establish control over Taiwan. Judging by articles in the Chinese press, elements in Beijing were openly speaking of the possibility of using armed force to liberate Taiwan ("The Taiwan Strait is no longer a barrier to the liberation of Taiwan", "The choice of the means for liberating Taiwan is a matter to be decided by China"). The Gang of Four was insistent and impatient in the question of Taiwan, demanding the earliest and most resolute measures to reunite Taiwan with the mainland by, among other means, armed force. After the Gang of Four was arrested, it was evidently not fortuitous that the periodical press carried articles reporting that the "left-radical" group had intended to seize control (chiefly in the military sphere) of Fujian Province as a springboard for an invasion of Taiwan.¹

In 1977 the foreign press printed a report delivered on August 24, 1976 by Geng Biao, CPC Central Committee member and head of the Foreign Relations Department of the CPC Central Committee. This report repeated seemingly known tenets enunciated in the explanations of the CPC leadership regarding the invitation to Richard Nixon to visit Beijing in 1972. However, the significance of this report was enhanced on account of the exacerbation of the political struggle in Beijing during this period. "When we feel that the time has come," Geng Biao declared, "we shall tell Uncle Sam: Be good enough to pack up and go."²

Leaving aside doubts about the authenticity of the published report, the postulates enumerated by Geng Biao fitted snugly into the conception of the left-radical opposition regarding the necessity of fighting on "two fronts" and the possibility of a "temporary compromise" with the USA in order to strike at the main enemy. The Geng Biao report was rather an explanation that was needed most by the CPC leadership to offset the disaffection provoked by the Gang of Four over the development of Sino-US relations.

With Zhou Enlai's death the "radicals" no longer needed compromises with the successors of Zhou-Deng over the policy towards the USA. As the position of the Gang of Four grew

¹ "Trends in Peiping's Foreign Trade", *Issues & Studies. A Journal of China Studies and International Affairs*, Vol. XII, No. 6, June 1976, (Taipei), pp. 37-78.

² *Wenti yu yanjiu*, January 1976, (Taipei).

stronger following Zhou's death, the Chinese leadership grew increasingly impatient about getting compromises from the USA as quickly as possible. It was evidently not accidental that in an editorial on August 9, 1976 *The New York Times* expressed regret about this: Zhou Enlai had shelved the Taiwan issue in 1971-1972 to open the way for rapprochement with the United States.¹

With the change in the alignment of forces in the Chinese leadership, especially after Deng Xiaoping was removed from power, the Taiwan problem was given prominence again. The US Senate Minority leader Hugh Scott (Republican, Pennsylvania) declared on August 2, after returning from a two-week visit to the PRC in July 1976, that "the radicals [who] have grabbed the party machinery in China insist that the United States set an early timetable for fully normalizing relations with Peking and breaking ties with Taiwan".² The slogan that the "liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair" began to be propagated more vigorously than before in the summer of 1976, and some American analysts believed it implied that China wanted a military solution of the Taiwan problem. In Beijing Senator Scott tried to learn whether the Chinese leadership precluded the "use of force" to liberate Taiwan but did not get a coherent reply.³

Many quarters in the West noted that China had become inclined to think that there was no way for uniting China and

¹ *The New York Times*, August 9, 1976.

Addressing a group of American academics in August 1972, Zhou Enlai surprised his guests with his very restrained and, at the same time, flexible stand on the Taiwan problem. He defined the "liberation" of Taiwan as the continuation of the "liberation of the mainland", noted that the Taiwan problem was a matter of great complexity, and "one should not be too impatient". Muting the slogan of "liberation of Taiwan by force", he said that the island's peaceful liberation might take quite some time (*Taiwan's Future?*, edited by Dr. Yung-Hwan Jo, Arizona State University, Tempe, 1974, pp. 66-67; *Newsweek*, January 8, 1973, p. 14).

² *The Washington Post*, August 3, 1976.

³ "The only answer I can tell you about," Scott told journalists, "is that they said this [the liberation of Taiwan] is internal—an internal affair." "Some Americans," *The Washington Post* analyst added, "have been told at least unofficially that when Peking says in its new, sterner line that Taiwan is 'an internal affair' for China alone to decide, it means that Taiwan must be 'liberated by force'."

Taiwan other than by force. The Chinese thus used the Taiwan issue as a major instrument for bringing pressure to bear on Washington: they intimated that they might back out from the tacit commitment, given during the Nixon visit to Beijing, that they would refrain from using force in the Taiwan Strait.

Fifth, the Chinese reacted more morbidly than before to any activities by Tibetan emigres in the USA. On October 14, 1975, a week before Secretary of State Henry Kissinger arrived in Beijing to work out the final arrangements for a visit by President Gerald Ford to the PRC, the Chinese press printed a statement by the PRC's Foreign Ministry charging the USA with "undisguised interference in the PRC's internal affairs and a flagrant violation of the Shanghai communique". These charges were linked chiefly to the problem of Tibet, but indirectly they concerned Taiwan as well. A Tibet Affairs Office was officially registered in the USA and in 1964 it began operating in New York. This was one of the pretexts. The other was the scheduled tour of the United States in the autumn of 1975 by a Tibetan song and dance troupe, whose members had received entry visas from the State Department. The Department of State rejected the Chinese protest, but on October 8 the China liaison office repeated its demand that all "Tibetan" activities be stopped forthwith on American territory.

The developments following the death of Mao Zedong showed the weakness of the political base of Jiang Qing's entourage. The latter were unable, despite the capital made out of support of the Red Guard (Hongweibing) organisations, to consolidate their positions and acquire a solid base in the organisational structures of the party and the state.

The clashes over foreign policy, including the question of relations with the USA, brought to light the immediate intentions of individual groups and, to a certain extent, the serious contradictions between the objective need for society's modernisation (a need that in view of China's isolation from the socialist countries was pushing it towards links with imperialism) and the extremely sensitive xenophobia that had taken deep root in Chinese society. In the spring of 1976 Deng Xiaoping was accused of seeking "to sell China's natural resources" in order to obtain up-to-date equipment from Japan and the West. But within only a month of Mao Zedong's death the Gang of Four,

which headed the attacks on Deng Xiaoping, was subjected to the same attacks ("deal with the West", "conspiracy with a foreign power", and so on) that were levelled at Zhou Enlai's associate, who was removed from power in 1976.

US political and military agencies closely followed the developments in the PRC. American interest in the power struggle in Beijing was fuelled by the debates over foreign policy in connection with the 1976 presidential elections. In the Democratic Party's election platform, charted by a team led by a well-known American Far Eastern expert, Robert Scalapino, it was stated that the future course of the relations between the USA and China depended largely on two factors: first, the solidity of US commitments and, second, Soviet-Chinese relations. American experts were of the opinion that if the USA displayed weakness and irresolution, if it showed an inability or reluctance to honour its pledges, this would add weight to the arguments of those in China who were urging an improvement of relations with the USSR. Uncertainty about the outcome of the power struggle in the PRC in the spring of 1976 stimulated arguments in US academic and political circles about the choice of the means to prevent any major change in Soviet-Chinese relations. The US press frankly stated its anxiety over the destiny of Sino-US relations in the event the "radicals" won stronger positions in the Chinese leadership.¹

What had to be done to prevent the USA from losing an important lever of its "multipolar" diplomacy? How to preserve at least some results of the White House's new "China" policy? Political leaders, academics, and newspaper analysts sought answers to these and other questions. The American press carried articles suggesting immediate US concessions (up to the breaking off of diplomatic relations with Taipei), offering hypothetical plans for setting up an anti-Soviet Washington-Beijing-Tokyo "triangle", and discussing the organisation of Sino-US military cooperation (sale of military hardware, exchanges of intelligence collected by means of satellites, electronic listening installations, and so forth). There was a particularly lively debate over possible military cooperation between the PRC and

¹ *U.S. News & World Report*, April 19, 1976, Vol. LXXI, No. 16, p. 36.

the USA. Some political leaders, including the Commerce Secretary Elliot L. Richardson and the Governor of California Ronald Reagan, expressed interest, though in varying degree, in the sale of US-made armaments to Beijing. The USA, wrote the newspaper *The Christian Science Monitor*, ought to extend military assistance to China to discourage Chinese-Soviet reconciliation.

However, individual American experts drew attention to some uncertainty at the time of the Chinese stand on the question of military cooperation with the USA.

Influential circles in the USA believed that by showing initiative in modernising the PRC's military capability they would strengthen the position of those Chinese leaders, especially of military men, interested in promoting relations with the USA. The Gerald Ford Republican administration manoeuvred around acute problems linked to US relations with the PRC. Henry Kissinger, despite objections from the Defense Department, recommended rising no obstacles to the sale of the Cyber-172 computer to China. Commenting, *The Washington Post* wrote that the State Department's striving to show support for the new leaders in Beijing would, it was believed, probably help to acquire approval for the sale of a computer to China.¹

Of course, the White House deliberately chose the time for its decision (October 1976) to approve the sale to the PRC of equipment usable for military purposes when the odious Gang of Four was removed from China's political scene. Despite this step by the Ford administration—it could signify the start of Chinese purchases of US equipment designed for military purposes—the debate of this issue in American academic and political circles did not come to an end. Thoughtful political leaders urged keeping in mind Soviet-US relations, the destinies of detente, or at least compliance with the principle of “equidistance” (relative to the USSR and to the PRC). In the theses for the election platform the Democratic Party's group of consultants emphatically recommended that the future president should not, when adopting decisions on Sino-US relations, dismiss the principle of “interaction and equidistance”. They presumed that however much armament was sold to China it would not result

¹ *The Washington Post*, August 3, 1976.

in any tangible strengthening of its defence capability against the USSR. Instead, they declared, this could entirely change the character of the relations with the USSR, and return the USA to the cold war on a larger scale than ever. The consequences of such a step would be exceedingly grave in Asia: it would threaten the military-political balance in the region and affect the interests of many countries. Realistically-thinking political personalities in the USA understood that attempts to foster a complication of Soviet-Chinese relations through ill-considered actions would seriously threaten detente and the national interests of the USA itself.

In the mid-1970s the predominance of positive tendencies in international relations and the assertion of the principles of peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems significantly narrowed the opportunities for the West's foreign policy manoeuvrings around China. As interpreted by Kissinger, the US stand was that the USA and China had a common interest in preventing the Soviet Union from upsetting the global balance of power. However, he noted, the USA had no vested interest in permanent hostility with Moscow unless the latter challenged the international equilibrium. As nuclear superpowers, the USA and the USSR had an obligation to reduce the threat of nuclear confrontation. On account of internal political considerations, Beijing would no doubt have preferred overt hostility between Moscow and Washington. What the USA could not do was to give Beijing a veto over its relationship with Moscow any more than it could give Moscow a veto over its relations with China. The operation of the mechanism of detente voided the calculations that the imperialist powers, the USA in the first place, would be more receptive of a policy of precipitating a "great chaos" in the world.

Gerald Ford Versus Ronald Reagan

The setbacks in implementing the Nixon doctrine, the further consolidation of socialism's positions in Europe and Asia, and Gerald Ford's efforts to make his own mark on foreign affairs and thereby dissociate himself from his ill-starred predecessor led the government in Washington to attempts to redefine

some of the foreign policy guidelines laid down under Nixon. These attempts were clearly reflected in Ford's Pacific doctrine. The proclamation of this doctrine in terms of time and basic content was linked closely to President Ford's visit to the PRC.

In inviting Ford, the Chinese leaders wanted to show that practice had affirmed the expediency of the course towards rapprochement with the USA and the long-term character of their foreign policy objectives, which presupposed closer relations with Washington. However, Beijing regarded the Ford visit more as a tactic designed to neutralise the successes of the Soviet Union's policy in Europe and the international political significance of the Helsinki Conference. Beijing attentively followed the internal situation in the USA on the eve of the 1976 presidential elections and could plainly see that in the focus of the election struggle were the basic problems of detente and Soviet-US relations. In the election battles the American voters were impressed by the energy displayed by Ford's rival for the presidency—the Republican candidate Ronald Reagan.

Reagan's term of office as Governor of California had ended at the beginning of 1975 and he became a radio and newspaper analyst. Nearly 200 radio stations broadcast his daily five-minute commentary and over 200 newspapers carried his syndicated column. He clung to his hope of one day taking over the White House as President. He decided to enter the presidential race for the first time in 1968, but dropped out in favour of Richard Nixon. But now, in 1976, he used against his rival a most potent weapon—his long experience of public relations, which more often than not found expression in his support for the most conservative ideas.

Reagan enunciated the calls of the conservative opposition, which, referring to the revolutionary changes in the world (Angola, Indochina), had vitalised its efforts to erode peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems and increase its pressure on the US administration in order to induce it to reconsider its attitude to detente. In this context, Reagan's posture on the question of detente was well-defined. "We are blind to reality," he said fanning fear on his radio programme, "if we refuse to recognize that detente's usefulness to the Soviets

is only as a cover for their traditional and basic strategy for aggression.”¹

With the right wing of his party bringing strong pressure to bear upon him, Ford had to manoeuvre. He responded to his rival's challenge, but in effect adapted himself to Reagan's propagandist style. The attempts to assert himself in the role of the initiator of a harder line towards the Soviet Union crystallised mainly in the “peace through strength” slogan and renunciation of the detente terminology. With pressure from Reagan and his supporters the Republican Party platform was extended to include “morality” in foreign policy and “abandonment of illusions” about any possible change in the character of the political system in the USSR.

President Ford's speeches began to reflect the hard line of his rivals in his own party. In his efforts to strengthen his position among the conservatives in the Republican Party, Ford went too far in the wake of Reagan, losing sight of the fact that the majority of the American voters wanted a policy in the spirit of the principles of peaceful coexistence. The battle that Reagan and other politicians among the Republicans and the Democrats intended to fight against detente could not at the time lead to victory at the elections. The polls taken at the time showed that the policy of detente and the Helsinki accords had the support of 70 per cent of the American electorate. In this situation Ronald Reagan in the Republican Party and Henry Jackson and George Wallace in the Democratic Party depicted their stand as merely a wish to “introduce amendments” into the detente policy on the allegation that this policy was benefiting only the Soviet Union.

Reagan's hard-core anti-communism influenced Ford's position relative to China.

In the 1970s the debates in the USA over problems related to China were, in terms of their content and bearing on a wide range of issues concerning world and regional Asian policy, a continuation of the serious collisions and sharp arguments of 1968-1970 in the American political and academic communities, in other words, of the period preceding President Nixon's visit to the PRC. The political battles of 1968-1970 were

¹ *The New Republic*, February 28, 1976, p. 23.

fought in a situation marked by the struggle in the USA around acute problems of foreign policy, including the China policy, which involved wider socio-political circles than before. Official Washington encountered a spread of the anti-war movement in the country, a growth of disaffection among its closest allies, who were worried by the haste with which the Americans were implementing a policy of "small steps" towards the PRC, and differences in the ruling camp, particularly in connection with the crisis of US military policy in Southeast Asia.

In the debates of 1968-1970 there were, generally speaking, basically two approaches to problems linked to US-Chinese relations. The first approach (expounded by A. Doak Barnett, A. Whiting, Alexander Eckstein, Morton Halperin, and other leading American Sinologists) took into account the immutable and overriding impact of nationalistic factors on the PRC's foreign policy and envisaged essentially chronic tension in Soviet-Chinese relations and the need for the USA to do all in its power to perpetuate this tension. The second approach (most strikingly reflected in the stand of the conservative majority in the House of Representatives at the time) was based on the premise that the aims and ideological foundations of the USSR and the PRC coincide (ideology of communism—"Communists on either side of the bamboo curtain. China abides by the same philosophy as the Soviet Union relative to the attainment of world supremacy by communism"). The divergences in Soviet-Chinese relations are transient, and this presupposes a possible reconciliation of the sides, especially if there is a weakening of the positions of Mao's supporters in the PRC leadership. While the exponents of the first approach urged a revitalisation of the small steps by the USA towards rapprochement with Beijing, the champions of the second approach wanted a harder line relative to the PRC and an intensification of anti-Chinese activity by the USA along China's periphery.

The first Nixon administration sought—especially in the pre-election period—to manoeuvre between the partisans of different viewpoints on relations with Beijing and on questions of the USA's Asia policy. Washington avoided extreme decisions and tried to improve relations with China's leadership, a policy

that was strikingly seen in the drawing up and signing of the 1972 Shanghai communique.

By the mid-1970s, after the USA had suffered significant setbacks on the world scene and Washington lost the political initiative in deciding the most pressing international problems, considerable strength had been acquired by right-wing forces united in the many-faceted front of adversaries of detente. In this situation the US ruling circles sharply vitalised their quest for what to them would be the most suitable way and means of reinforcing Washington's shaken positions in the world.

The dialectics of capitalism's world strategy are growing increasingly visible in US foreign policy: the more monopoly capitalism's political positions are shaken, the more subtle become the actions taken by socialism's adversaries to split and undermine the anti-imperialist front. In this context, the China factor acquired special importance to the US rulers, and this is what largely determined the sharpness of the debate of issues of the China policy of the mid-1970s.

The arguments in the American political and academic communities over problems related to China at the close of the 1970s were stimulated by Washington's apprehensions in connection with the death of Mao and Zhou and by the election debates in the USA itself.

As in previous cases, the debates in the USA in the latter half of the 1970s mirrored a diversity of views, assessments, and recommendations. But, as distinct from the end of the 1960s, in these years the debates were free of clashes of diametrically opposed opinions approving or rejecting the expediency of cooperating with the Chinese leadership. The vast majority of those involved in these debates believed, judging from all the evidence, that in the interests of the West it would be useful to interact with Beijing in the spirit of the "balance of strength" concept.

The traditions of conservative Republicans continued to influence American politics. The proponents of a harder approach to assessments of Chinese reality coalesced with the stereotypes of the Dulles policy of the 1950s. They abided by foreign policy guidelines that gave priority to military decisions, to a military-political opposition (with the employ-

ment of, among other things, military-political blocs) to the interests of socialism on the international scene. Hence the rejection, at the initial stage of US-Chinese rapprochement, of incentives, of a quest for a compromise over Taiwan. In many ways Reagan's stance on the China problem took into account China's affiliation to the "anti-world" standing in confrontation, according to the notions of the conservatives, with the USA and the "free democracies" as a whole.

Ronald Reagan, Henry Jackson, and George Wallace regarded the relations with Beijing chiefly from the angle of confrontation with the USSR. As the US press noted, Reagan saw the Beijing leadership as the USA's natural ally in the decisive confrontation with the Russians, and he depicted the US-Chinese rapprochement as an alliance motivated by common interests.¹ Beijing sought to exercise a direct influence on the presidential elections in the USA, but it, in fact, favoured Gerald Ford's opponents. However, the main barriers to understanding between Beijing and the right-wing Republicans were linked to the latter's reluctance to make concessions to China on Taiwan. The same circumstance was a hindrance to Washington's China policy.

President Ford Visits the PRC

President Gerald Ford visited the PRC on December 1-5, 1975 at the invitation of the Chinese government. He had talks with top Chinese leaders and met with Mao Zedong.

In agreeing to a summit in Beijing, the Washington government took into consideration, above all, the uncertainty of the political situation in the PRC on account of the possibility that there would be changes in the Chinese leadership. Conservative circles in the USA were very disturbed by the success of the Soviet foreign policy course towards detente in Europe, the efficacy of the Soviet foreign policy initiatives, and the growth of the Soviet Union's prestige in Europe. These circles, approving the US President's visit to China, tried to thwart the possibility of a growth of the Soviet Union's influence

¹ *The New Republic*, February 28, 1976, p. 23.

in Asia in the event the detente process spread to that region and to this end they tried to rely on Beijing. Appreciating the significance of the China factor for the political situation in the USA, the Ford administration sought to neutralise the negative impact of a certain decline, at the time, in Sino-US relations on the 1976 presidential elections.

Despite pressure from the conservative opposition, the American leaders endeavoured to pursue a policy of "equidistance" relative to the USSR and the PRC. Upon returning from his China visit, Ford publicly reasserted that it was his administration's policy to consolidate detente. He said: "We have to recognize there are deep ideological differences between the United States and the Soviet Union. We have to recognize they are a superpower militarily and industrially just as we are. And when you have two superpowers that have such great influence, it is in the best interests of those two countries to work together to ease tensions, to avoid confrontation where possible, to improve relations on a worldwide basis. And for us to abandon this working relationship and to go back to a cold war, in my opinion, would be very unwise for (us) in the United States and the world as a whole."¹

The problem of Taiwan was considered at the talks, but it did not get the same attention it received at previous summits. In the Shanghai communique of 1972 the Taiwan problem was described as an important issue obstructing the normalisation of relations between the USA and the PRC; during the Ford visit to the PRC the significance of this issue in the entire range of Sino-US relations was somewhat diminished. "The Chinese know," *The Washington Post* wrote, "that Mr. Ford is not able to do anything, even if he wants to, to change the American position toward Taiwan while he is facing a challenge from Ronald Reagan in the presidential primaries."²

However, the Chinese tried to push events in a direction that would encourage the Washington administration to take some steps to enervate the US-Taiwanese alliance and shorten the road to the establishment of full diplomatic relations between China and the USA.

¹ The Department of State Bulletin. Vol. LXXIV. No 1909. January 26, 1976, p. 102.

² *The Washington Post*, December 5, 1975.

The Ford administration found itself facing a complex situation: the opposition on the right was demanding a further rapprochement with China on an anti-Soviet basis and was sharply opposed to any concessions concerning Taiwan. In this respect Ford's rival, Ronald Reagan, significantly fettered the initiative of the government. "Unfortunately," wrote former US Under Secretary of State Thomas L. Hughes, "Ronald Reagan never followed his friend Richard Nixon to Peking. Had he done so, he might have picked up the Peking telephone directory, which is said to carry among its emergency listings one that reads: 'Dial 00 for policy'... If Mr. Reagan had dialed 00 he would have heard some compatible excerpts of Mao's thoughts recited over the phone... 'Who are our enemies? Who are our friends? This is a question of the first importance. The basic reason why all previous revolutionary struggles in China achieved so little was their failure to unite with real friends in order to attack real enemies'."

Hughes felt that had Reagan heard this recital it might have induced him to contribute to the US China policy instead of complicating it.¹

At the talks with Ford, the Chinese intimated that they would like Washington to resolve the Taiwan question along the lines of the "Japanese formula" (rupture of diplomatic relations while maintaining economic, scientific, and cultural relations). The Americans reiterated that they were interested in resolving this problem peacefully, at a time most suitable for the USA. In particular, Henry Kissinger declared that time was needed for this process to mature and for the relevant situation to take shape.² On the Taiwan issue the Washington government adopted a wait-and-see attitude, which in large measure took into account the uncertain political situation in the PRC, the upcoming presidential elections in the USA, and the rapid rate at which Taiwan was building up its military and economic potentialities. Officials on Taiwan argued that the American role in bolstering the island's security through a mutual defence treaty made the "Japanese formula" totally inapplicable for the United States.³

¹ *The New Republic*, February 28, 1976, p. 23.

² *The New York Times*, December 7, 1975, p. 24.

³ *Ibid.*

The talks in Beijing also covered the problem of Korea. The Chinese were out to neutralise the negative impact of Sino-US contradictions in the Korean peninsula on the further development of relations between Beijing and Washington. The sides recorded that they had divergences on the problem of Korea.

The exchange of views on international problems and on Sino-US relations showed that the sides were eager to continue the dialogue and maintain Sino-US relations at the existing level. A high assessment was given of the talks, which were described as "substantive", "constructive", "useful", and "frank". It was obvious to the Americans that despite its anti-imperialist rhetoric Beijing regarded its relations with Washington as extremely convenient and necessary in the light of its geopolitical strategy of those years. However, despite the official stamp of approval by Beijing and Washington, the Ford talks, as could have been expected, did not yield any effective, significant results. No joint document was issued, the sides confining themselves to reiterating the 1972 Shanghai communique. Many analysts saw the absence of a joint statement at the completion of the talks as indicating a certain stalemate in Sino-US relations.

CHAPTER SEVEN

US FAR EASTERN COMMITMENTS: TEST OF CREDIBILITY

The "Japanese Formula"

In the US Congress the opposition to the USA's China policy utilised the most acute foreign policy issues to which Washington was particularly sensitive. The initiators of US-Chinese rapprochement were asked whether it was worth promoting relations with China at the expense of the interests of the USA's allies. What values would remain, Nixon's adversaries asked, if Japan awakened one morning to find that the USA had recognised Beijing and had ignored informing Japan about it? Questions of this sort seemed to hit the target—Japan learned of the US President's decision to visit Beijing only ten minutes before this decision was announced to the world.

In Tokyo they had hardly recovered from the economic blows struck at them—the Washington government had taken steps to "save" the dollar and did this at the expense of its allies. Japan responded morbidly to the aggravation of the contradictions in the US-Japanese alliance, especially as Washington was making moves to improve relations with the PRC. The sudden announcement that the US President would visit the PRC exposed the total falsity of the claims that Japanese Prime Minister Sato's consultations with the Washington government on the China policy were "secret and confidential". As early as October 1970 Sato and Nixon had agreed to consult each other on China, and three weeks before the Nixon visit to the PRC was announced the US Ambassador to Japan had sincerely, it seemed, assured Sato that the USA would take no steps towards recognising China without first consulting with Japan.

The fact that there were no prior consultations between Washington and Tokyo about the Nixon visit may have been due to China's intentions to keep the preparations for this visit secret. For its part, the USA wanted secrecy for its preliminary diplomatic negotiations with Beijing in order to ensure "mutual confidence" in its relations with the PRC. Professor Edwin O. Reischauer of Harvard University, the former diplomat George Ball, and other US experts saw Nixon's "initiative", the "pomposity" of his visit to the PRC as hurting the USA's relations with Japan. In Ball's opinion, Japan saw Washington's China action as a "bolt out of the blue"; it demonstrated that while the USA was not hostile towards Japan it was, in any case, indifferent to its interests. The turn in the China policy was made without coordination with Japan, without taking its possible reaction into account. Moreover, the US press also acknowledged that the President's visit to Beijing might have negative consequences in terms of the interests of the Japanese-US alliance. The USA demonstrated that relative to Beijing it could pursue a policy it saw as beneficial without agreeing its steps with Tokyo. The promotion of direct Sino-US contacts virtually nullified the mediation role that Tokyo sought to play in the dialogue between Beijing and Washington.

The mistrust with which they followed in Tokyo the Sino-US summit appeared to be justified. Washington's initial attempts to create the impression that all was well in the US-Japanese alliance (that the Nixon visit to Beijing contained no surprises for Japan) fell short of the desired results. A series of diplomatic contacts followed. The Japanese Ambassador in the USA Nobuhiko Ushiba had meetings with Rogers and Kissinger. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Marshall Green visited Japan. In the State Department they realised that they had to flatter their ally, and at first glance US diplomatic activity yielded some results. The Nixon administration's foreign policy guidelines could not, of course, ignore the enhanced role of Asian states, notably of Japan's economic influence, in international affairs.

The "Vietnamisation" policy became a major manifestation of the Nixon doctrine in Southeast Asia. The architects of this policy looked for a way out of the Vietnam war with the least political losses and material expense. The ruling circles of the

Asian countries allied to the USA, notably Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and Thailand, watched closely for the outcome of the "Vietnamisation" experiment and of Washington's attempts to prod a doomed regime towards "self-salvation".

The victory of the heroic Vietnamese people, who relied on assistance from the forces of socialism and progress, showed the futility of the West's attempts to preserve its positions in Asia by both diplomatic intrigues or military-political operations aimed at buttressing the corrupt Saigon regime. The experience of Indochina compelled the ruling circles of Asian countries that had relied on US military strength to look for new guarantees of their existence, a development that had, of course, to bring about a certain weakening of the USA's positions in Asia. Thailand, the Philippines, and some other of these states saw these guarantees in the normalisation of relations with socialist countries, with the PRC.

But as the Sino-US dialogue was carried on, the problem of Taiwan acquired growing urgency for Japan. A special Japanese emissary went to Taipei in September 1972 and a tense atmosphere reigned at his meetings with Taiwanese leaders. Taiwan's Vice President Yan Jiagan declared flatly that the relations between Tokyo and Taipei were based on the "1952 peace treaty". Taipei warned the Japanese emissary that if the Tokyo government unilaterally annulled this treaty, Taiwan would return to a state of war with Japan.

Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka visited Beijing in September 1972, with the result that diplomatic relations were established between the PRC and Japan. Japan announced that the Japanese-Taiwanese treaty of 1952 was null and void and that diplomatic relations between Tokyo and Taipei were henceforth to be regarded as having been broken off. This was an obvious concession to Beijing by Tokyo. Japanese political leaders tried to depict this diplomatic recognition of Beijing as their foreign policy triumph of world significance. Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira declared in the Diet in October 1972 that with the normalisation of relations with China Japanese diplomacy had begun to function globally, and as Japanese national strength grew Japan would be playing a steadily bigger role in the "world community". The appearance of the "Japanese formula" for the solution

of the Taiwan problem (rupture of diplomatic relations while preserving other links to Taipei) gave Washington an incentive to look for an acceptable way out of the Taiwan impasse.

The peace treaty between Japan and the Taiwan regime was signed at the harsh time of the US aggression in Korea. The story of the signing of this treaty is extremely noteworthy in the light of the great significance that the Japanese ruling circles attached to their relations with the PRC as soon as the latter was proclaimed, and in the light of the US influence on the shaping of Tokyo's foreign policy.

In assessing the restructuring of state-to-state relations in the Far East in the 1970s, in the centre of which were the changes in US-Chinese and Japanese-Chinese relations, one has to turn to the sources of the formation of the US-Japanese alliance, whose influence on Tokyo's China policy had been decisive since the early 1950s. Washington was, at the time, oriented on Chiang Kai-shek and rejected any recommendations—including those offered by Britain—that did not fit into its Far Eastern strategy. American diplomats noted Britain's influence on the attitude of the Japanese. In the long run the British backed down under pressure from Washington in exchange for an American promise to support Britain in its conflict with Iran, where the property of an Anglo-Iranian company had been nationalised in 1951, and in protecting British colonial interests in Egypt. The compromise implied that Japan would renounce control over Taiwan and its agreement that neither the PRC nor Taiwan would be permitted to participate in a peace treaty with Japan. In the Japanese Foreign Ministry they did not conceal their apprehensions that the signing of a treaty with Taiwan would foster anti-Japanese feeling in the PRC. The British advised their Japanese colleagues to follow London's example and recognise the PRC.

On December 11, 1951, Senator John J. Sparkman of Alabama, who arrived in Tokyo together with John Foster Dulles, declared in answer to a question put by correspondents: "If Japan should open relations with the Peiping government, such action would raise a very considerable roadblock in the Senate."¹ There

¹ William J. Sebald with Russell Brines, *With MacArthur in Japan. A Personal History of the Occupation*, The Cresset Press, London, 1967, p. 285.

were considerable repercussions in various circles of Japanese society to this statement, which slightly raised the curtain on one of the key aims of this visit by US politicians to Japan. In meetings with Japanese statesmen Dulles stressed that for the USA the China problem was very important. The American emissaries expected firm assurances that Japanese foreign policy be patterned on that of the USA, in other words, that Japan would help to isolate the PRC from the industrialised capitalist countries and support the regime on Taiwan. Dulles suggested what he considered was a digestible formula for the conclusion of a treaty between Japan and Taiwan—official relations would be established only with territories that were under *de facto* Chiang Kai-shek control.

The world subsequently learned the details of the US-Japanese dialogue on the China problem in the period of the preparations for and signing of the San Francisco treaty. On December 18, 1951 Dulles handed Prime Minister Yoshida a memorandum in which it was emphasised that Japan would sign a treaty with Taiwan on the normalisation of relations in accordance with the principles enunciated in the San Francisco peace treaty. The treaty would cover all territories "controlled" by Taiwan and all territories that might come under its control in the future. In other words, with the USA directing it, Tokyo officially backed the idea of returning Chiang Kai-shek to the mainland. On January 16, 1952 the records relating to this memorandum were published on behalf of the American and Japanese governments. In a letter to Dulles the Japanese government noted that it had no intention of signing a treaty with the PRC. This decision was backed up with two arguments that sounded very convincing at the time to the proponents of a US-Japanese alliance: first, the signing of the Soviet-Chinese Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance in 1950 and, second, Beijing's support for the Japanese Communist Party. Upon abandoning the thought of improving relations with the PRC, Japan steered towards a normalisation of relations with Taipei. The talks between Tokyo and Taipei commenced in February 1952 and proceeded under the constant supervision of William J. Sebald, representative of the US occupation authorities in Japan, who was briefed about the apprehensions in Washington and tried to prevent the Japanese

from displaying excessive initiative.

The government of Shigeru Yoshida sought to sign a treaty with the Taipei regime without calling it the government of China in order to leave a loophole for political manoeuvring with Beijing. Chiang Kai-shek, on the contrary, insisted that in the treaty his side should be depicted as representing the whole of China. The sides indulged in debates that lasted ten days. Japan wanted to confine the operation of the treaty to areas controlled by Nationalist China or all territories that would come under that government's jurisdiction. Taiwan demanded changing the conjunction "or" to "and", and this brought the talks to the brink of a breakdown. Acting on Sebald's advice, Yoshida instructed his representative in Taipei, where the talks were proceeding, to be more tractable in his conversations with the Taipei leaders. Both sides finally accepted the word "or" with the reservation that in the "agreement protocol" "or" could also be interpreted as "and". The treaty was signed on April 28, 1952 and came into force on August 5, 1952.¹

Among the PRC leaders there was a sharply negative response at the time to the talks and the conclusion of the Japanese-Taiwanese treaty. Any peace treaty signed by Japan without the participation of the government of the PRC, Zhou Enlai declared, was "illegal and invalid". In Beijing the "Yoshida letter" was seen as a "ploy of the US imperialists" designed to link the "reactionary government" of Japan to the Kuomintang remnants on Taiwan and thereby threaten the PRC and pave the way for "another war of aggression" in the Far East. The press of the PRC recalled the Chinese people's heavy losses during the Japanese aggression against China. The PRC government was at the time closely following the militarist sentiments in Japan. The signing of the US-Japanese security treaty was evidence of a revitalisation of military and political counteraction against socialism and the PRC as a component of the socialist system by the leading powers of the capitalist world.

Following Nixon's visit to Beijing conservative Republicans alleged that the US government was ignoring the interests of its

¹ William J. Sebald, Russel Brines, *op. cit.*, p. 287.

allies. This chorus of criticism was joined by liberal Democrats. Passions flamed up with the growth of the dimensions of the Watergate scandal. The bugging of the Democratic Party's headquarters by the President's associates led to Nixon's impeachment and to a new tide of criticism of his foreign policy, including the Chinese orientation of this policy. Nixon's adversaries kept drawing attention to his "tactless" diplomacy that allegedly brought about a deterioration of the USA's relations with Japan.

Upon taking over the presidential chair from Nixon, Gerald Ford tried to respond to the basic criticisms from the opposition. With his first steps he tried to show that his policy would be more thoughtful and effective precisely in areas where foreign policy had been most heavily criticised. The programme announced by Ford during his tour of Asian countries, including China, stressed the need to sustain the confidence of its allies in US commitments and proclaimed that to this end the Washington administration intended to reinforce various forms of its military presence in Asia.

In particular, Ford declared that "equal partnership" with Japan had to be promoted. The significance of these guidelines should evidently be considered in the light of the US administration's aim to neutralise the exacerbation of Japanese-US relations as a result of a number of actions carried out by the USA under the Nixon administration. Prior to the Shanghai communique all the contradictions between Japan and China were part, as it were, of the contradictions between China and the Japanese-US alliance. The Japanese were unquestionably apprehensive that this pattern of state-to-state relations would be shaken with serious adverse consequences to Japan. This largely explained the morbid reaction in Japan to Nixon's visit to China, which, in effect, stimulated the establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and Japan. In assessing Ford's visit to Beijing, Kissinger spoke of the "similarity" of the stand of the PRC and the USA towards Japan.

The American analysts Halliday and McCormack note that Japan began to play the role of the "USA's counter-revolutionary ally" in East and Southeast Asia, and that one of Japan's policy objectives in this region had become the isolation of Asian countries from the socialist states. Towards the beginning

of the 1970s Japan had moved into second place among capitalist countries for the volume of "aid" extended to developing nations, becoming the principal source of "aid" for the Taiwan regime, Singapore, Burma, and the Philippines, and the second biggest source of "aid" for South Korea and Malaysia, and the third main source for Thailand and Laos.

Basically, Japanese policy was oriented on Washington. This was widely acknowledged in Japan itself. The interests of the US-Japanese alliance were the priority factor in the formation of Tokyo's foreign policy, of its policy in the Asia-Pacific region. The most explosive element from the standpoint of the development of the political situation in that region was the Carter administration's attempt to encourage Japan to take a more active part in trilateral US-Chinese-Japanese cooperation. Carter's decision to meet with Hua Guo-feng, then Chairman of the CPC Central Committee, on Japanese soil, illustrated his administration's intention to stress the significance of US-Japanese-Chinese relations in the period of particularly high tension in relations with the Soviet Union.¹ This circumstance certainly contributed to the inflaming of anti-Soviet sentiment in Japan. It was probably a deliberate action on the part of some Japanese press media enunciating the official viewpoint to one extent or another to publicise the considerations in favour of a possible "trans-Pacific coalition" consisting of the USA, Japan, and China, although they were careful to emphasise that an anti-Soviet coalition would not serve Tokyo's interests.

Japan played a part in causing the situation in the Asia-Pacific region to deteriorate. One can speak of "parallel" or coinciding lines of the USA, the PRC, and Japan in Southeast Asia aimed at preventing the consolidation of the changes that had taken place in Indochina. Visits by Japanese statesmen to Asian countries showed that Japan was among the first of the capitalist countries to support the Pol Pot regime. The attitude articulated by the Japanese Foreign Minister Ito during his tour of Southeast Asia in 1980 contained elements of the concept of a "united front" against the USSR and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

¹ *International Herald Tribune*, July 11, 1980.

The makers of Japanese foreign policy took into consideration what they saw as positive aspects of the improving relations between China and the USA. These were linked chiefly to Japanese foreign policy priorities, in other words, the interests of the US-Japanese alliance in the first place. In Tokyo they were aware that the modifications in Sino-US relations had led to a change in the Chinese stand relative to the US-Japanese alliance and to problems connected with Japan's arms build-up. They expected that improved Sino-US relations would reduce Beijing's potentialities in Southeast Asia, in other words, that this would help to maintain the status quo in that part of the world.

At the turn of the 1980s there were clear signs that Japan, as the USA was doing, was renouncing the principle of "equidistance" from the USSR and the PRC. The expansion of Sino-Japanese relations was accompanied by a revitalisation of political contacts and a significant extension of the issues being discussed. At official and semi-official meetings representatives of the two countries dealt with military-political problems, particularly those affecting the Asia-Pacific region. For the first time there was a semi-official meeting of senior members of the defence establishments of the two countries. Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira's visit to China in December 1979 and the visit by Hua Guofeng to Japan in May 1980 in fact paved the way for regular summit meetings, this being evidence of the priority given by the leadership of the two countries to the promotion of political relations with each other. The decision to hold annual working meetings at Foreign Ministry level should likewise be regarded in this light.

In early 1982 Yasuhiro Nakasone became Japan's Prime Minister at the age of 64. During a period of two years he made his mark in foreign policy. It seemed that at the time no problem demanded preferential attention from the Japanese: the Japanese economy was on the upgrade and society was in a state of relative political tranquillity. It was forecast that Nakasone would win the next elections. One of the main arguments in his favour was that he had the support of former Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka, who, despite his conviction in 1983 for bribery, remained the leader of a group of 118 deputies of the Liberal Democratic Party (of a total of 392) and

his opinion carried considerable weight when party leaders were elected.

The world press began to link Nakasone to Japan's foreign policy successes in the 1980s. Close observers noted that Japanese leaders preferred to remain silent or simply dozed at previous meetings of heads and prominent representatives of the principal capitalist powers. They only livened up when the time came to repulse importunate attacks of their Western counterparts worried about Japanese economic expansion. Now the situation had changed. At the 1983 conference of the heads of government of leading capitalist powers in Williamsburg the Japanese Prime Minister was brilliantly eloquent and holier than the Pope. In fact, wrote the newspaper *Tokyo Shimbun*, Nakasone outdid Reagan and on many counts directed the debates into the channel of a hard attitude to the East. He tried to consolidate this line in talks with Helmut Kohl, Ronald Reagan, and Hu Yaobang. He vigorously championed a positions of strength policy and outpaced his Western colleagues in his support for the stationing of Euromissiles, depicting the Soviet Union as responsible for all the difficulties on the international scene. It seemed that only recently, in 1971, as Director-General of the Defence Agency, Nakasone had spoken of the need for combining the efforts of the USSR, the USA, China, and Japan in order to maintain peace in Asia and the Pacific. Now, as Prime Minister, he was the first Japanese statesman of that rank to sign a "political statement on security issues" and thereby demonstrate, to judge even from the Japanese press, that he was a hawk of international dimensions.

The Japanese Prime Minister's actions mirrored the new trends in Tokyo's foreign policy. Earlier Japan had given US foreign policy "rear support". Under the umbrella of that policy the Japanese monopolies sought to reinforce their positions in the Asia-Pacific region and in the world at large. In the eyes of Japan's rulers the USA was a reliable guarantor of the capitalist system, and this belief largely determined the Japanese approach to its allied commitments. In the 1970s, the USA's role as dependable guarantor of the capitalist system was somewhat shaken, especially among its allies. A reassessment was taking place both in the USA and Japan of the role that

Washington's main Far Eastern ally should play in the world. Japan undertook a large share of the responsibility for the destinies of the capitalist world. The Blue Book on questions of diplomacy for January 1983 to March 1984 stated: "positive" diplomacy must be conducted in keeping with the circumstance that Japan is a member of the "community of free democratic nations and a state of the Asia-Pacific region".

The desire not to "trail along behind" the USA influenced Japanese diplomacy's China orientation as well. In Tokyo they undoubtedly realised the significance of relations with China in terms of Japanese foreign policy interests. By the early 1980s China had become one of the world's ten economic leaders (in 6th place according to the GNP), in military capability it was behind only the USSR and the USA, and had shown that it wielded political influence in various parts of the world.

Nakasone's advisers were undoubtedly aware that Japan's and China's involvement in world problems—detente, disarmament, nuclear weapons, and so forth—was somewhat easing the tensions between the two countries. These were the directions in which the Japanese leaders aimed to find compensation for the negative impact on relations with China of Japanese-Chinese contradictions in the Asia-Pacific region.

For the USA the revitalisation of Japan's China policy was by no means free of complexities. On the one hand, Tokyo's policy seemed to fit into the pattern of Washington's global policy. But, on the other hand, American political leaders were seriously worried by the prospect of a rapprochement between Japan and China. This anxiety was mirrored by the American press. The USA, it wrote, could hardly compete with Nakasone, who had offered China an impressive loan at 6-7 per cent interest, 1-2 per cent below the usual interest rate in Japan.

In preparing Reagan for his visit to China, his advisers expected the Chinese to ask what economic aid the USA was prepared to extend. The reply they suggested should be: None. The substantiation for this reply was that the US government expected that such aid would be extended by the private sector. The USA had no government agency that could offer international loans at a reduced interest rate.

Thus, Japan gave China loans and trade. The Americans could offer chiefly trade.

The political bonds of the US-Japanese alliance fettered mainly the activities of Japanese businessmen in China. The Americans did not scruple, when necessary, to remind Japan of its allied commitments in order to restrict these activities. When Japanese businessmen started talks on sales to China of high-technology electronic equipment, in Washington they were reminded of the COCOM restrictions. The Pentagon was opposed to the sale to China of the Hitachi M-180 computer system. It asserted that this system could be used to compute the trajectory of an intercontinental ballistic missile and US territory too might be within the range of the latter. The Japanese had reason to question whether their allies were not using political levers to pressure competitors in the Chinese market?

Of course, the Japanese closely watched the Americans circumventing political barriers in their commercial dealings with China. After the US Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger visited China in the autumn of 1983 reports reached Japan of a possible US export of armaments and military equipment to China. In some quarters in the USA there was talk even of a special list being drawn up of goods to be exported to China envisaging a relaxation of COCOM restrictions on the export of high-technology equipment and armaments to that country. The Japanese business world worried that the USA was intending to circumvent the COCOM restrictions which it was assiduously imposing on its allies. Japan and other allied nations put this question to Washington. The reply was that the US government was not planning a special provision to exclude China from the list of countries covered by the COCOM restrictions. Answering questions from newspaper correspondents on April 18, 1984 the US Secretary of State George Shultz bluntly declared that the question of sales of high technology was of major significance and that US policy in this respect was linked to the policy of the USA's European allies and Japan. In the meantime, Japanese businessmen continued their offensive: the loan promised to China by Nakasone would be used to finance two programmes, which the USA found exceedingly disturbing: the building of new automatic telephone exchanges in Beijing, Guangzhou, and Tianjing, and of a hydro-power station close to the frontier of China and Vietnam.

The Americans were bitterly disappointed for by that time they had spent nearly 600,000 dollars exploring the possibilities for building that station.

American experts who thought in global terms rubbed their hand: Japan had undertaken a much bigger concern than previously for the destiny of the capitalist world. Moreover, they hoped that an expansion of Japanese-Chinese trade would in some measure blunt the contradictions in this sphere in the US-Japanese alliance. Leading American analysts close to Reagan's views gave wide publicity to the thesis that despite the difficulties in the relations between them the Soviet Union and China were potential adversaries of the USA. Here the objective was to mobilise the military efforts of the USA and Japan. Gaston J. Sigur, one of Reagan's advisers, believed that the USA would obtain congenial agreements at talks with the USSR and China with the minimum risk to its own security interests. This line presupposed the consolidation of efforts within the US-Japanese alliance.

Taiwan: Adjustment to a New Situation

For his expulsion from the United Nations Organisation Chiang Kai-shek blamed his US patron. He linked all his misfortunes of the time to the US President's decision to visit Beijing. This decision, he said, was basic for an answer to the question: Who should represent China in the UN? The Taiwanese press attacked the US rapprochement with China. After the Nixon visit to Beijing, passions flamed up with renewed force in Taipei. The exchange rate fell in the Taipei stock exchange, and the Taiwan regime feared for its future. The press openly castigated the USA for its promise to Beijing that US troops would ultimately be pulled out of the island and also for the statement that Taiwan was part of China. A cut-back of US armed forces and equipment on Taiwan, it said, had to be decided upon between the Nationalist Chinese and the US government in accordance with their mutual interests and the interests of their security, and President Nixon had no right to make unilateral statements of this kind.

The Taiwan problem neither was nor could be resolved

during Nixon's visit to the PRC, but it was no longer seen as an insuperable obstacle to the promotion of bilateral relations between the USA and China. The wording of the Shanghai communique, inserted by insistence of the Chinese, showed that Beijing's stand on this question had at the time evolutionised much less visibly than that of the USA.

In their statements on the Taiwan problem in the 1970s, US spokesmen drew upon the long experience of the USA's allied relations with the Kuomintang regime. While signing the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taipei in 1954, the USA already then showed some flexibility. The military-political commitments defined in the treaty concerned not only Taiwan but also the Pescadore Islands. The treaty stated that an armed attack in the West Pacific Area directed against the territories of either of the Parties "would be dangerous to its own peace and safety" (Article V). However, the USA's commitments to Taiwan, as to its other Asian allies, made no provision whatever for an automatic involvement of US armed forces in a conflict over Taiwan. In the event of a conflict, the treaty said, each side "would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes".

On December 10, 1954 US Secretary of State Dulles and the Taiwanese Foreign Minister exchanged notes stating the agreement between the two countries that the use of force from territory controlled by Chiang Kai-shek (i.e., from Taiwan and the Pescadores.—V.V.) "will be a matter of joint agreement", except in cases of an emergency character.¹ This reservation was a constant reminder to the Chiang Kai-shek regime of its limitations, in the absence of US assistance, for a landing on the mainland. The USA obtained the right to a more flexible interpretation of its commitments under the 1954 treaty. Further, the provision that the military presence on Taiwan and the Pescadores would not, without mutual consent, be reduced to the extent that would significantly weaken the defence capability of these territories was unquestionably designed to limit the USA's actions if it still

¹ *United States Relations with the People's Republic of China.* Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 92d Congress, 1st Session, June 24, 25, 28, 29 and July 20, 1971, U.S. G.P.O., Washington, 1972, p. 397

felt bound by this treaty.¹ The Shanghai communique did not affect the US-Taiwanese Mutual Defense Treaty. American political leaders continued to abide by their commitments to Taiwan.

In spite of the US-Taiwanese treaty, Beijing and Washington went on formulating their stand on the Taiwan issue in a manner to avoid obstructing the development of bilateral relations. The decision to exchange liaison groups between the PRC and the USA (February 1973) in fact signified recognition of the "two Chinas" principle by the sides: there were diplomats from Taiwan and from the PRC in Washington.

After the exchange of liaison groups, the two sides did not stop their dialogue on the Taiwan problem while negotiating many other controversial issues of an international character. The USA used this problem also for pressuring Beijing into conceding more favourable terms at talks on other matters, particularly on the Indochina crisis. The US declared, for instance, that it would gradually cut back the numerical strength of its armed presence and dismantle its military installations on Taiwan as tension eased in that region. The internal political struggle in China likewise influenced Beijing's stand on Taiwan.

In the framework of the Shanghai communique, the USA had, of course, to abandon some of its guidelines for ensuring the Taiwan regime with support. It had earlier used Taipei for an active military presence in Asia and the Pacific: until the close of the 1960s over 10,000 US troops were stationed on Taiwan, and ships of the US Seventh Fleet were on constant patrol in the Taiwan Strait. The USA began to reconsider this situation, keeping only a symbolic military presence on Taiwan. The main thing lay in something else — the USA did not repudiate its commitments under US-Taiwanese Treaty, which provided Taipei with its sole real military-strategic guarantees.

¹ A special resolution (Formosa Resolution) passed by the US Congress on January 29, 1955 authorised the US President to employ American armed forces "for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack". The debates in Congress over the destiny of this resolution were particularly sharp in view of Washington's "new China policy". In 1971 the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations recommended the annulment of this resolution. *Ibid.*, p. 398.

All of the USA's actions linked to the preparations for and signing of the Shanghai communique showed that Washington was by no means planning to sacrifice Taiwan for transient benefits of dubious value in terms of its global interests. After the UN General Assembly voted to expel Taiwan, Washington publicly demonstrated its solidarity with Taipei. Upon instructions from his government, the US Ambassador Walter P. McCaughy met with Chiang Kai-shek, and in a joint communique with the Taipei Foreign Ministry called this UN decision "neither just nor realistic". Quoting authoritative circles in the USA McCaughy stated that the decision would not undercut US commitments to Taiwan.¹ Henry Kissinger and State Department officials later explained that the language in the communique did not mean that the USA intended to discontinue its obligation "to defend Taiwan and the Pescadores" under the 1954 treaty.² Nixon himself, upon his return from the PRC, spoke openly of his government's intention to honour its pledges to Taiwan.

In the early 1970s the USA in some cases reinforced rather than relaxed its attention to Taiwan. It extended all-sided economic and military assistance to the Chiang Kai-shek regime: 1,500 million dollars in economic aid from 1951 to 1965 and 3,000 million dollars in military aid from 1949 to 1970. In fiscal 1974 total US aid to Taiwan under the programme of military aid dropped somewhat compared with fiscal 1973. But this did not signify that the USA had lost interest in reinforcing its ally's military capability. During this period there was a significant increase in credit supplies of US armaments and military equipment to Taiwan.³

¹ *Free China Review*, Vol. XXI, No. 11, November 1971, p. 11.

² *China and the Question of Taiwan. Documents and Analysis*, edited by Hungdah Chiu, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1973, p. 83

³ The Pentagon and experts linked to military planning on Taiwan stressed that in the programmes for military construction for the latter half of the 1970s priority had to be given to enlarging the Taiwanese air force and navy. The programme for long-term US aid provided for the building of a Northrop Corporation jet aircraft assembly plant at Taizhong. The US credits for this project amounted to 150-200 million dollars for the period up to 1978 inclusively. In the period from 1972 to 1974 the USA sold Chiang Kai-shek 17 warships (15 destroyers and two submarines). Taiwan bought five support and auxiliary vessels.

Hardly had Nixon added up the results of his visit to Beijing than leading American monopolies signed big contracts with Taiwan. Acting through the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the US government gave American investors on Taiwan iron-clad guarantees. The National Distillers and Chemical Corporation of the USA funded an expansion of production at its Gaoxiongshi polyethylene plant (at a cost of 10 million dollars). Big contracts were signed with Taiwanese industrialists by Ford Motors, Westinghouse Electric, and Amico-Chemical Corporation (a Standard Oil subsidiary), Union Carbide, and other monopolies. Leading Canadian and American banks, Chase Manhattan in particular, finance the activities of these corporations. In the 1970s, the regime on Taiwan gave every encouragement to foreign investments on the island (by 1975 they had added up to 1,300 million dollars). One-third of these investments came from the USA, 17 per cent from Japan, and 28 per cent from overseas Chinese.¹ Various industrial equipment (including nuclear reactors) and food products began arriving on the island in larger quantities than formerly. As in previous years, the USA was Taiwan's biggest partner in foreign trade.² As distinct from Sino-US trade, US-Taiwanese trade in the first half of the 1970s remained more stable, larger in volume, and balanced.

In the early 1970s the USA had no intention of lowering the level of its diplomatic representation on Taiwan. In 1974 a new career diplomat, Leonard Unger, was sent to the island, and new Taiwanese consulates were opened in two US states — Oregon and Portland. Altogether, five new Taiwanese consulates were opened in the USA during the three years after the Shanghai communique was signed. In Washington the administration remained deaf to the warnings issued from time to time by China that it would use force to take the island. The US administration evidently counted on the assurances that it got in Beijing at secret talks. Quoting a "senior American official", the American press reported after Kissinger's talks

¹ *Business Week*, December 15, 1975, pp. 40, 44.

² Taiwan's trade with other countries at this time totalled: 2,250,000 dollars with Japan; 1,163,000 dollars with Southeast Asian countries (exports—712 million; imports—451 million dollars); 1,042,000 dollars with European countries (exports—576 million; imports—466 million dollars).

in Beijing in November 1974 that the Chinese were not bringing strong pressure to bear on the Taiwan question and that in this situation the USA saw no necessity for urgent adjustments relative to Taiwan. In the opinion of many American analysts, time became the main condition for solving the Taiwan problem. In the Senate debate shortly before the Nixon visit to the PRC many speakers (John K. Fairbank, A. Doak Barnett, Patsy T. Mink, and others) believed Taiwan could maintain its autonomy. Barnett felt it would either be an independent state recognised by Beijing or it would become part of China on terms acceptable to the Taiwanese, or it would be united with the mainland as an autonomous entity. It was suggested (Patsy T. Mink) that the issue should be turned over for settlement to the UN Trusteeship Council.

The makers of US Far Eastern policy saw Taiwan's strategic value as a link in the "defensive" chain of Pacific islands between the USA and its Asian partners in the Northeast, South, and Southeast Pacific. Moreover, in Washington they took into account the circumstance that a rupture with Taiwan could complicate the USA's relations with its allies in the Asia-Pacific region, destabilise the military-political situation, and undermine the region's balance of strength that was congenial to the USA. On the diplomatic level Taiwan lost ground significantly. As of March 1972 diplomatic relations with Taipei were sustained by 53 countries, including the Vatican. In January 1974 there were only 38 such countries.

Until the death of Chiang Kai-shek the "liberation" of mainland China was seen as Taiwan's priority objective. The pragmatic programme of Chiang Kai-shek and his son, Premier Jiang Jingguo, was aimed at increasing Taiwan's industrial and economic potential, expanding trade, energetically attracting foreign capital, and promoting tourism. In per capita terms, Taiwan's income level was the second highest in Asia after Japan, exceeding the per capita income level of the PRC four times.¹

Chiang Kai-shek intractably rejected the suggestions that the Taiwan problem should be resolved by the Chinese themselves

¹ *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Vol. 83, No. 5, February 4, 1974, pp. 44-46.

and by peaceful means. He declared that the only contacts between Taiwan and the enemy were contacts of blood and the sword.¹ But this was no more than rhetoric. Actually, the regime vitalised its efforts to "Taiwanise" the island, while Beijing, as distinct from the past, abstained from sharply criticising Taipei's actions.

The measures instituted by Premier Jiang Jingguo were designed to consolidate the regime's social base on the island. In 1972 he co-opted into his cabinet another three representatives of the island's indigenous population; this gave its representatives one-third of the ministerial posts. Of the 89 newly-elected deputies in the legislative yuan, following the 1972 elections, 79 "represented" the island's indigenous population. This changed only the external form and not the essence of the regime itself.

The changes in Taiwan's foreign policy tactics became self-evident: gradual abandonment of the practice of immediately breaking off diplomatic relations with countries that recognised Beijing and a striving to preserve existing diplomatic links and even establish new ones; focussing efforts on economic development, attracting as much foreign capital as possible, encouraging tourism, and so on; undisguised hostility for socialism gave way to a differentiated approach to socialist countries.

The establishment of diplomatic relations between Washington and Beijing caused an outburst of indignation on Taiwan and in the USA itself. Taipei poured abuse on President Carter after he spoke on this question on January 1, 1979. He was called "traitor", "venal", and much else by the Taiwanese press. In its note the Taipei regime used language customarily regarded as obscene. In Taipei there was growing doubt whether they could count upon the USA as an ally.

Paradoxically, the marked advance in the relations between China and the USA objectively fostered an acceleration of Taiwan's economic development and enhanced the role of Taiwan's economic potential in capitalist world relations. The rupture of relations with Taiwan by the USA compelled Taiwanese businessmen to display considerable resourceful-

¹ *China Post*, January 1, 1972.

ness, to employ new and more flexible tactics in order to survive. On Taiwan "survival" became a synonym of "prosperity". In 1980 alone the volume of US-Taiwanese trade amounted to 11,400 million dollars, up by 55 per cent over 1977. Taiwan became a major US trade partner. Meanwhile, US trade with China grew from 1,100 million dollars in 1978 to 4,800 million dollars in 1980.

This revitalisation of Taiwan's foreign trade policy following the breaking off of diplomatic relations with the USA led to a growth of Taiwan's commercial links to European capitalist countries. Beginning in 1980 there was a revitalisation of financial transactions handled by leading European banks such as Société Générale, Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, the European-Asian Bank of the FRG, and the Hollandsche Bank Unie, and also by British, French, Greek, and Spanish trade offices.

In 1980 Taiwan's trade with Western Europe totalled 4,900 million dollars, up by 900 million dollars over 1979. However, Japan's share of Taiwan's imports fell from 45 per cent to 27 per cent within a period of ten years. This diminution was due largely to Taipei's resentment of Tokyo's China policy.¹

Washington sought to preserve its entire range of relations with Taiwan. The most glaring changes were, perhaps, seen in the renaming of the former embassy offices into the American Taiwan institute and the Taiwan coordination council for North American affairs.

After the changes that took place in Beijing with Mao Zedong's death, the Chinese leaders continued looking for a way out of the Taiwan impasse. This involved a quest for a "reunification" formula acceptable to the Taipei leaders, but judging by Chinese pronouncements this evidently did not exclude some other option, including the use of military pressure. This is borne out, in particular, by the aggravation of differences between China and the USA over Taiwan on the eve and after the Reagan administration came to power.

At the turn of the 1980s Beijing undertook yet another "peace" offensive on the Taiwan issue.

In an interview given to the Xinhua News Agency on the

¹ *The New York Times*, June 9, 1981.

eve of the 32nd anniversary of the proclamation of the PRC the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress Ye Jianying spelled out his government's stand on "Taiwan's return to the homeland". The Chinese proposals provided for talks between the Communist Party of China and the Kuomintang on the basis of Taiwan being recognised as part of the PRC. Beijing urged Taipei to contacts between Chinese on both sides of the strait, and offered that "after reunification" Taiwan would enjoy autonomy, have its own armed forces, preserve its socio-economic system, and have "representatives of its various circles" take up leadership posts in the country's political institutions, and so on.¹

In starting their "peace offensive" on the problem of "reunification", the Chinese leaders took into account the increasingly more complex position of the senior generation of Kuomintang leaders. The latter found themselves between the hammer and the anvil, so to speak: on the one hand, Beijing's "peace offensive" and nostalgia of the people who had fled from the mainland, and, on the other, pressure from the indigenous Taiwanese, who held fairly strong positions in Taipei and whose representatives were in authoritative posts in the leadership of Taiwan's armed forces. Separatist tendencies on Taiwan and among Taiwanese emigres, allegiance to which began to be shown by influential leaders from among the new generation of local Taiwanese, naturally eroded the foreign policy concepts of the Kuomintang old guard.

Taiwan began to be spoken of as a "two-faced Janus". Nevertheless, Beijing's "peace offensive" got a hostile reception in Taipei, where it was seen as a "continuation of their united front propaganda". In the view of the Taipei government the only way to bring about "unification" was for Beijing to abandon the "communist system".²

The Chinese leaders tried various ways of reaching closer accord with Washington on the Taiwan problem. In June 1980 the Chinese press reported that the PRC had commercial relations with Taiwan via Hong Kong. According to statistics

¹ *The Japan Times*, October 1, 1981.

² *Ibid.*

given by the Xinhua News Agency (which cited Taiwanese and Hong Kong sources), in 1979 Taiwan's exports to the PRC via Hong Kong totalled 21,300,000 dollars, while PRC exports to Taiwan (also via Hong Kong) amounted to 57,800,000 dollars. The Chinese government's decision to lift customs tariffs on goods from Taiwan signalled its desire for an activation of links to the Taipei regime. Trade between the PRC and Taiwan in 1980, according to figures published in the American press, amounted to 200 million dollars.

In the 1980 presidential race in the USA Ronald Reagan spoke in favour of raising the level of Washington's relations with Taipei and criticised the Democrats for ignoring the interests of the USA's allies, of Taiwan in the first place. This stand of the Republican candidate was rebuffed in Beijing with the result that Reagan toned down his statements on matters related to the China policy in order to neutralise the negative reaction of the Chinese and forestall any complication of his position as presidential candidate. After Reagan was elected the Chinese leaders began to depict the new President as a "pragmatist, adaptable and flexible". The American press drew attention to Beijing's description of the US President as "a tough opponent of the Soviet Union".¹

In the view of the Chinese leaders the hardening of the anti-Soviet aspect of the Reagan administration's foreign policy could not compensate for the White House's refusal to make concessions to Beijing on the Taiwan problem.

In Beijing they were particularly disconcerted by the circumstance that the Taipei regime was refusing to negotiate, while influential quarters in the USA regarded Taiwan as a "zone of their predominance", forgetting what was written on this score in the joint Sino-US communique on the establishment of diplomatic relations. Was not, they asked, the USA creating a tense situation there by arming the Taipei regime under such circumstances? Was this not an attempt to counter the efforts "in the struggle against hegemonism and in defence of peace" in the Far East and the Pacific? Was this not a factor undermining the development of US-Chinese strategic relations?²

¹ *The New York Times*, December 4, 1980.

² *Renmin ribao*, May 14, 1981; June 12, 1981.

The White House saw the success of its China policy largely in the progress of the concept of "balanced arms sales" to Beijing and Taipei. One of the aims of the visits to Beijing by Reagan's emissaries — Gerald Ford, Alexander Haig, and Holdridge — was to learn the reaction of the Chinese leaders to a possible sale to Taiwan of new types of armaments, including the latest FX jet fighter aircraft.¹ Just before Haig's visit to Beijing, the Chinese leaders had quite negatively responded to Washington's attempts to conduct a "balanced" policy in the sale of armaments. "Some officials of the American administration," stated a Xinhua commentary, "have of late noted on several occasions that there was a need to assess China's strategic position and role and intimated a desire to promote strategic relations with China in areas presently devoid of links between the two nations. This good intention of the USA was regarded with favour by Chinese public opinion. However, the development of strategic relations between the two countries requires a cessation of the contacts with Taiwan ranging beyond non-governmental relations." The Chinese sharply denounced the plans that were being discussed in the USA for selling the latest types of armaments to Taiwan.

John Chang, head of the Taipei Foreign Ministry's Department for Relations with the USA, publicly spoke of the dual feeling that members of the Taipei regime had for President Reagan. Of course, Reagan showed himself as a friend of Taiwan, but his visit to Beijing, according to Chang, reinforced the relations between the USA and China to the detriment of Taiwan. Chang drew attention to questions of the relations between the USA and the PRC that directly affected Taiwan's interests. These questions were, as before, linked chiefly to the sale to China of civilian technology that could be used for military purposes; and to cooperation in the nuclear sphere. There was, of course, other, sharper criticism. In 1983 James Shen, former Taiwanese Ambassador in Washington, published a book under the title: *The U.S. and Free China. How the U.S. Sold Out Its Ally*.

Feeling physically worn out the President of Taiwan Jiang Jingguo decided to turn power over to senior Kuomintang

¹ *The New York Times*, March 24, 1981.

members who were born on the mainland. Foreign observers noted that the new leaders could open the door for an improvement of relations with Beijing. But any hints that Taipei was willing to begin a dialogue with Beijing irritated the administration in Washington. The Americans compelled the Kuomintang leaders to abandon any intention of turning power over to successors who could find a compromise with Beijing; at the same time, they began flirting with members of the Taipei regime inclined to accept the "two Chinas" concept. The Americans courted "opposition" elements in Taipei in an effort to persuade them to work for the overthrow of Jiang Jingguo and for Taiwan's "self-determination". Beijing did not ignore this activity on the part of the USA, noting that it showed Washington's intention to perpetuate Taiwan's separation from the mainland and turn it into an "unsinkable aircraft-carrier".

A moderation or hardening of the stand on Taiwan by Beijing and Washington was influenced by factors reflecting the political tactics employed by the sides at a given stretch of time. However, there was no hard foundation for an assertion that in the long term Beijing always saw the island's reunification with the mainland as the inevitable outcome of its policies. China's stand on Hong Kong, Macao, and Singapore (three-fourths of whose population are Chinese) encourages some American experts to think in terms of making Taiwan "the Singapore of East Asia".¹

American policy was aimed at preserving the status quo in this part of Asia. The USA stepped up its efforts to use Taiwan as a lever for bringing a socio-economic and political influence to bear on the situation in China. However, Washington was never certain that China would pursue, relative to Taiwan, a policy congenial to American interests and those of the USA's allies. Even optimistic members of the US administration could not compellingly inspire their compatriots with the hope of an early consummation of the long dispute over Taiwan.

¹ *United States—Soviet Union—China: The Great Power Triangle.* Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Future Foreign Policy Research and Development of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 94th Congress, U.S. G.P.O., Washington, 1976, p. 270.

CHAPTER EIGHT

BALANCING IN A TENSE SITUATION

Washington Abandons the Equidistance Policy

In the 1970s Americans awoke to the realisation that dramatic changes had taken place in the alignment of strength on the world scene, including the capitalist world. Leading members of the brain trust in Washington pondered ways of preventing the American share of the capitalist world's output from diminishing and of safeguarding US interests against pressure from West European and Japanese capital. However, the shrinking of the USA's share of the capitalist world's output did not erode, at least for the 1980s, its position as the main guarantor of the capitalist system. The Democratic Carter administration that came to power in 1977 continued the line of its predecessors in feverishly looking for foreign political levers that could help Washington most effectively carry out its role of leader of the forces opposed to socialism. Western strategists believed that the Chinese factor was becoming the lever that could neutralise socialism's impact in different areas of world development, particularly in view of the confrontation between the two social systems.

James Carter, as many Democratic presidents before him, was highly sensitive to attacks from the right. With criticism levelled at him practically from the moment he entered the White House, Carter's popularity rating kept falling catastrophically in 1977-1978. The opposition attributed the decline of the USA's influence in various regions of the world to the new president. The administration sought, to win prestige through foreign policy manoeuvres in, among others, the Chinese direction. Carter's advisers tried to weave the human rights question into the fabric of US foreign policy, hoping

to use this question to bring pressure to bear on the Soviet Union. While recognising that detente between the USA and the USSR was the "key element of world peace", Carter challenged the Soviet Union to recognise that the USA was playing a messianic role in the modern world and accept American views or encounter confrontation in various areas of foreign policy. In aiming their arrows at the Soviet Union, the president's men ignored the voices from the right — some of which at times grew quite loud — demanding measures against "human rights violations" in China as well. The administration kept an eye on the diverse viewpoints on the China problem being offered in academic and political circles in the USA and sought to take them into consideration, albeit with extreme caution, in its practical activities.

In the spring of 1978 the author of these lines visited the USA and learned at first hand of the views of American academics studying Washington's Asia-Pacific policies, its China policy in particular. The "minimalists" were nurturing the idea of a phased military withdrawal from the Asia-Pacific region. They linked the need for a withdrawal of armed forces, while preserving strategic commitments to Japan, to the growth of Asian nationalism, with which, they felt, Washington had to be on good terms.

The proponents of another concept, while accepting the thesis that the USA had to cut back its military commitments, thought in terms of a consolidation of strategic partnership consisting of the USA, Japan, and China. They saw this partnership as based on economic, political, and even military "mutual understanding". In turn, "mutual understanding" would, it was felt, lead to a further deepening of US-Chinese relations (with the partner getting, among other things, "military aid"), the prodding of Japan into assuming more effective military obligations, the containment of any expansion of Japan's relations with the USSR, and the encouragement of relations with the PRC, including close economic cooperation. Exponents of this concept urged the USA, Japan, and China to draw as many small Asian states as possible into a "united front" strategy.

Those favouring yet another version of the Far Eastern policy held that at the negotiating table the USA could not

ignore the factor of strength (including its military presence in the region). As distinct from the idea advanced by the "minimalists", their concept of "balancing" emphasised the need for maintaining an armed presence in the region. In support of this argument they referred to China's positive attitude to the American military presence in the Asia-Pacific region. This presence, they contended, was needed to maintain the existing "balance of strength" and thereby keep the situation stable. It was important, they said, to avoid "excessive" US involvement in conflict situations and limit US military commitments there. In keeping with this school of thought, the possibility of a de facto alliance between the PRC and the USA directed against the USSR was disputed. The "united front" concept, it was said, might evoke a sharply negative Soviet reaction, impede the conclusion of a Soviet-US agreement on nuclear weapons control and could make disarmament altogether impossible, which would in fact signify a return to the cold war.

Among the adversaries of an unlimited improvement of relations with China there were conservative and liberal academics and political leaders. While the conservative wing in academic circles (for instance, William R. Kintner — whose book *A Matter of Two Chinas* is characteristic in this respect — and Harold C. Hinton) justified their reserve relative to a Sino-US rapprochement with the contention that such rapprochement would mean assistance to a possible future adversary of the USA, liberal politologists (Allen S. Whiting and others) were opposed to anti-Sovietism as a basis for rapprochement. The advocates of drawing China into an anti-socialist front strategy (such as Donald S. Zagoria, Michael Pillsbury, Robert Oxnam, and Michel Oksenberg) were supported by senior aides of the Carter administration. The chorus of opposition to a "united front" strategy was vociferously joined by Congressman Lester Wolff and by George F. Kennan, Robert A. Scalapino, and other influential political and academic personalities.

While denying preference to any of the above viewpoints, the Carter administration tried to pursue a balanced policy that would contain elements of diverse conceptual attitudes. By 1978 the administration had been drawn to the idea of a

“balanced” China policy (enunciated by A. Doak Barnett, Jerome A. Cohen, and others). The idea of “balanced non-interference” in Soviet-Chinese relations on security issues was associated with the US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. However, the predominant influence on the Carter administration's Asia-Pacific policy was exercised by supporters of the foreign policy advocated by Zbigniew Brzezinski, insisting on the elaboration and use of various “levers of pressure” on the Soviet Union (a growing military-strategic potential, close coordination among countries of the capitalist world, and active utilisation of the China factor within, among other things, the “united front” concept). Fulfilment of the USA's strategic plans in this region was to be ensured also by “maximum mobility”, including an ability for a rapid deployment in that region of large contingents of US troops.

The principal objective of Brzezinski's visit to Beijing in May 1978 was, as Brzezinski himself conceded, to underscore the long-term, strategic nature of the USA's relations with China. Unlike the talks during Vance's visit to the PRC in 1977, Brzezinski's talks in Beijing focussed mainly not on bilateral relations but on recording that the USA and the PRC had “common interests” in the world and on working out a joint foreign policy platform. After this visit the administration in Washington approved the sale to China of West European high-tech equipment that could be used for both military and civilian purposes.

The sides made a special effort to produce an acceptable formula for establishing diplomatic relations. The US proposals boiled down to the following:

1. The Japanese formula (an Ambassador in Beijing, and a liaison group on Taiwan).

2. Replacement of the “mutual security” treaty with a unilateral declaration by Washington of its support for the regime in Taipei.

3. Retention by the USA or private American firms of the right to sell armaments to Taiwan after the island became a province of the PRC.

4. Conversion of Taiwan into a sort of Hong Kong.

5. A public statement by Beijing that it would not use force against Taiwan.

In the joint communique, issued in Beijing and Washington on December 16, 1978, the PRC and the USA announced the establishment of diplomatic relations. Washington recognised the government of the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China but reserved the right to have cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the "people of Taiwan".

The USA's treaty with Taiwan contained a provision stating that the official alliance between Washington and Taipei could be annulled one year after notification of this was made by one of the signatories. Such notice was given by the USA on December 23, 1978. In the joint communique they recorded different attitudes to the Taiwan problem. The American government recognised China's stand (that there is only one China, and that Taiwan is a part of China), but did not say anything to indicate that this was also the US stand. At news conferences held after the communique was signed, Carter and Hua Guofeng also noted that differences remained on the Taiwan problem (the US would continue to maintain relations with the "people of Taiwan" while the Chinese declared that the "people of Taiwan were their compatriots"; the USA would sell defensive armaments to Taiwan even after the US-Taiwan "security" treaty was annulled, while the PRC was categorically opposed to this).

The US-Chinese communique on the establishment of diplomatic relations caught political observers in different countries by surprise. Many of them expected this to take place after the USA signed SALT-II¹ with the USSR. This had been indicated by the logic of the Nixon-Kissinger diplomacy, which provided for an "equidistance" in the manoeuvring between China and the Soviet Union. However, in stepping up its efforts to improve relations with the PRC, the Carter administration acted in unison with its generals. The military-industrial complex lobby lauded Carter for adopting and putting into effect a new military programme that provided for, among other things, the development and deployment of new types of nuclear-missile weapons — the highly accurate, mobile M-X intercontinental missile, strategic air-based cruise

¹ The Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty was signed in Vienna in June 1979.—*Ed.*

missiles, new Trident nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, land-based cruise missiles and medium-range Pershing IIs designated for deployment in Western Europe, and so on. The Carter administration's statements in support of SALT-II were thus nullified not only by official statements about the USA's intention to continue modernising its military potential but also by practical steps to build up armaments.

Naturally, an offshoot of the approach of presidential elections was a hardening of the administration's policy towards the Soviet Union. The administration steered a course that aggravated the situation in various parts of the world, notably in the Middle and the Far East and in the Persian Gulf. There was a marked slowing down of the disarmament process, chiefly in its main sector — the Soviet-US talks on limiting strategic armaments. After cutting the SALT process short, the USA proceeded to undermine the military-strategic parity in the USSR-USA-China "triangle". Leslie Gelb and Richard Ullman, US authorities on politico-strategic problems, noted, evidently not without reason, that SALT-II was condemned to defeat in the US Senate long before the events in Afghanistan.

The Carter administration's foreign policy course clearly signalled its intention to break with the "equidistance" line. This course encountered strong resistance from the pro-Taipei forces, whom Carter, like his predecessors, was unable to appease. Senator Barry Goldwater and 24 other members of the conservative wing in the Senate filed a suit with Federal Judge Oliver Gasch, stating that President Carter had denied them their right as Senators to influence the administration's decisions, especially over the annulment of the treaty with Taiwan. The blazing passions over the decision to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC soon died down. The opposition got substantial proof that the Washington administration would not leave Taiwan to the whims of fate.

The USA took into account Taiwan's ability at the time to repulse an external military threat and also the fact that the Americans had the possibility, even after the treaty with Taiwan was cancelled, to sell it armaments for the maintenance of the Kuomintang regime on the island. Hardly had the ink dried on the document formalising the establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and the USA than US information

agencies, quoting Pentagon officials, reported that the Washington administration had adopted a long-term (1979-1983) programme of armaments sales to Taiwan. These sales, amounting to 625 million dollars, were to include F-5E jet fighter aircraft, Sidewinder, Hawk, and Maverick missiles, tanks, artillery, aircraft bombs, torpedoes, and some other types of military hardware. China's readiness to agree to the sale of American armaments to Taiwan upon the expiry of the US-Taiwan mutual defence treaty, it was stressed in the American press, was the most significant concession made by Beijing.

China counted on providing its Armed Forces with the entire spectrum of strength and means for the conduct of modern warfare without becoming dependent on the West in military and industrial terms chiefly by restructuring its economy and eliminating the weaknesses hampering its development. While concentrating on promoting agriculture and small-scale industry, China took steps to modernise and enlarge its heavy industry as the basis for creating its own systems of armaments. The content of a talk between Nomura Kiichi Saeki, president of a Japanese research centre, and Wu Xiuquan, Chief of the Chinese General Staff, in October 1980 was made available to Japanese analysts. China was declared as being in a position to modernise its Armed Forces only after it had modernised its non-military spheres — industry, agriculture, science, and technology. This was where national and international corporations could, regardless of the stand of their governments, extend tangible assistance to China.

Sales of high-tech industrial plant to China depended on the international situation and on the overall orientation of Washington's foreign policy. Upon coming to power the Reagan administration's stand on military cooperation with China was cautious. Reagan was aware, and made no secret of it, that one fine day the armaments that the USA sold to China might be used against the USA itself. However, in Washington they saw the promotion of military links primarily as a strong foreign policy bargaining chip.

Visible changes, notably in bilateral links, took place with the establishment of US-Chinese diplomatic relations on January 1, 1979: the prospect opened for visits by Chinese

leaders to the USA and for organising air and sea communication between the two countries, and more conducive conditions were created for promoting US-Chinese trade, economic, scientific, technological, cultural, and other contacts. Moreover, it became more likely that China would use the expansion of US-Chinese contacts to build up its scientific and technological potential, the lack of which was (and is) the main bottleneck on the road to the formation of a modern military-industrial capacity.

In embarking upon the risk-laden renunciation of its "balanced" policy towards the USSR and China, the USA proceeded from the premise that a militarily powerful China would be a factor benefiting the American geopolitical strategy and that the sale of military hardware and licences for the manufacture of American armaments in China would not tilt the world balance of strength to the detriment of the USA.

While believing that there were common "American-Chinese strategic interests" in the confrontation with the USSR and showing an interest in strengthening China's military potential, US political and academic circles were inclined to regard cooperation with China rather as a means of bringing political pressure to bear upon the Soviet Union. Advocates of this attitude saw military links with China as a substantial lever for reducing the likelihood of an improvement of Soviet-Chinese relations.

Following the defeat of the Gang of Four there was a mitigation of the Chinese stand on the question of accepting Western offers of technology that could be used for military purposes. China agreed to government-to-government level negotiations with the USA on scientific and technological issues. The USA sold China computer technology (the Cyber-172 computer) widely recognised by experts as applicable for military purposes. Washington insisted on harsh terms. With inspection of the use of the Cyber-172 computer as the pretext, the Americans would have virtual access to China's computer centres.

Far from objecting, the Americans approved sales of armaments and technology to China by their NATO allies, France and Britain. Brzezinski intimated that the USA would encourage its European allies to sell weaponry to Beijing, true, with the

reservation that this would be defensive weaponry. Michael Pillsbury, a Reagan team member known as a protagonist of broader Western military contacts with China, published an article headed "A Japanese Card" in which he advocated such contacts, including the exchange of visits, invitation of Chinese military personnel to observe joint American-Japanese military exercises as well as limited participation of Chinese ships in such exercises.¹

Influential quarters in the USA counted on the initiatives to establish military cooperation becoming a means of reinforcing the position of Chinese leaders, particularly of military personalities, who had shown an interest in an expansion of relations with the USA. The Ford administration, which sanctioned the sale of the Cyber-172 computer to China, encountered opposition from adversaries of this deal who contended that this type of computer could be used for further programmes of nuclear armament. "A State Department desire to show a symbol of receptivity to the new leaders in Peking," *The Washington Post* wrote, "... is reportedly likely to help produce approval of the computer sale."² Some modifications of the computers designated in the USA for sale to China were banned by the Carter administration for export to the USSR in July 1978.

The decision of the White House to sell the PRC technology that could be used for purely military purposes was aimed at securing more confidential relations with China's new leadership. It was, perhaps, not accidental that this decision coincided in time (October 1976) with the removal of the Gang of Four from the political scene.

The White House gave more attention to military contacts with China following visits to that country by the US Defense Secretary Harold Brown in January 1980 and the Under Secretary of Defense William J. Perry in September of the same year. It announced its intention of permitting American companies to sell military-transport aircraft, anti-aircraft radar systems, trucks, transport helicopters, communications equipment, computers, and other items to China. American firms

¹ *Foreign Policy*, No. 33, Winter 1978-1979, pp. 25, 26.

² *The Washington Post*, October 21, 1976.

were given permission to build factories in China for the manufacture of US-designed helicopters and computers. In the autumn of 1980 400 licences for the export to China of various military-oriented equipment and technology were approved. The impression was created that the sides were actively promoting military cooperation. However, there proved to be formidable obstacles to such cooperation, caused by objective factors, chiefly China's economic, scientific, and technological backwardness and the clash of US and Chinese interests in bilateral relations. Progress was fettered by the Taiwan problem and also the doubts among influential circles in the USA about the durability of the edge obtained by Washington in the distribution of forces in the USSR-USA-China "triangle".

In China's programme for modernising its industry account was taken of the possibility of cooperating with international military-industrial monopolies, including those linked to American business. Much publicity was given in the 1970s to a deal with the British Rolls Royce Corporation. Under this deal the Chinese purchased not only a large number of Spei jet aircraft engines but also the licence for manufacturing them in China. Stanley Hooker, technical director of Rolls Royce, was elected honorary professor of Beijing University. The British Rolls Royce acted in close cooperation with the American Pratt & Whitney Company — manufacturer of Boeing-707 engines — which had earlier sold 40 of these engines to China.

Equipment manufactured by Daedalus Enterprises, including infrared and television devices, permits identifying seemingly very insignificant deviations in the geological structure for the forecasting of earthquakes. But the same devices are fully applicable for military purposes — to detect underground facilities from high-flying aircraft. The Washington government's motivation for selling this equipment to China was that the Chinese radio-electronic industry had no facilities for adapting it for military uses. It seemed that by giving Beijing access to "grey zone" technology and equipment (i.e., equipment of dual designation — for civilian and military uses), the USA was aiming to build up a wide-ranging system of multifarious contacts giving it a certain measure of control over China's scientific and technological potential.

The USA's rulers were eager to see China as a long-term counter-balance to Soviet influence, but they could not ignore the possibility that with the growth of its military and economic potential China could be a tangible threat to the West's regional and global foreign policy and commercial interests. On October 16, 1980 China exploded another of its nuclear devices in the atmosphere. This explosion gave rise to serious apprehensions in the USA, because ecologists believed it could cause considerable damage on American territory. The press prepared people for the worst — it was expected that in the USA radiation would reach a higher level than after the Chinese nuclear test in 1978. The 1980 explosion was ten times as powerful as the test in 1978. There was alarm world-wide. In Washington they linked this test to the changes in the general strategic situation. They now felt that the Soviet Union was not the only serious threat to the USA. The new Chinese missiles, which could reach the USA, introduced substantial corrections into strategic thinking.

Lester L. Wolff, Chairman of the Congressional Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, noted that the USA favoured a strong and modernising China in the next ten years but could it not happen that a strong China might find it had interests that differed from those seen by the USA today?

Reagan's China Policy

Ronald Reagan's election to the presidency signified that a stronger influence was being exercised on American policy by the powerful US West coast financial and industrial groups. The USA's "Californisation" brought significant structural changes to the American economy. In addition to ships and trains, California began to produce computers, wide-fuselage aircraft, fighter planes, intercontinental missiles, new types of bomber aircraft, neutron weapons, and the entire space arsenal for the twenty-first century. It specialised increasingly in the manufacture of strategic instruments of war. By 1983 the California factories of the military-industrial complex had been awarded up to 23 per cent of the Pentagon contracts. By that year there were in the state some 8,550 of the Pentagon's

major contractors. These included Lockheed, Hewlett-Packard, Rockwell, and Northrop. This was where the Bank of America flourished — during the Second World War this Bank acquired the strength to compete on an equal footing with the biggest New York banks. The philosophy of the Californian businessman and politician absorbed mythical notions about the first settlers on the Pacific coast (“Only the strong settled here, there was no place for the weak”). The proponents of this philosophy had an aversion for the philanthropic idea of helping the weak. They were, above all, worshippers of the cult of personal benefit and cultivated among their compatriots an unbridled passion for wealth (“Self-assertion instead of compassion”).

The strengthening of the positions held by California-based transnational corporations of all kinds, banks, and insurance companies led to the predominance of the ideology of unlimited free enterprise. The most rabid proponents of this ideology entered the White House together with Reagan.

Ronald Reagan assimilated his predecessors’ spirit of messianism, a rather distinctive characteristic of American statesmen. As early as at the beginning of his political career, when he was at the centre of the trade union intrigues and political scandals of the “witch-hunt” years in the corridors of Hollywood, he adopted the pose of a disinterested advocate of Christian morals and the banner-bearer of patriotism. If God had put a sick humanity in the hands of America, he reasoned, the cure for the uncertain ego with the aid of political therapy of the ultra-right school could also be a cure for the whole of mankind. But was Reagan, as Governor of California, able to halt the growth of crime, alcoholism, and drug-addiction in his home state? Had he given a better lot to people of ethnic minorities inhabiting the Pacific coast? The temptation to play the role of a spiritual mentor to humanity was not abandoned by Reagan when he became President. The education of Americans in a spirit of hatred for socialist countries (“empire of evil”) became a central objective of his administration.

Naturally, the consolidation of the position of ultra-right Republicans influenced the formation of Washington’s China policy, which it regarded as a major area of its international activities. The Reagan entourage’s sense of messianic pre-

destination stimulated the administration's efforts to prevent China from developing cooperation — an unhappy prospect for the right — with socialist countries. The Reagan administration drew upon the experience of the bipartisan policy that got its start with the Nixon visit to Beijing in 1972. However, Reagan's China policy was also influenced by the tenacity of traditional Republican prejudices about the opposite social system, prejudices that persevered particularly among conservative politicians partial to the Taiwan regime.

Carter's attempts to put the "doctrine of anti-detente" into effect raised the tension level world-wide, including the Asia and Pacific region. The situation in this region was growing particularly disturbing: the higher level of military-political activity was felt keenly in precisely this region, the arms race among the Asian states had approached a new, dangerous degree, and flashpoints of crisis were being sustained and fanned. The Reagan administration reaffirmed the continuity of its handling and implementation of the USA's Asia policy. There was a vitalisation of the USA's military and political contacts with its Asian allies; Washington increased its pressure on Japan to get it to make a larger contribution to the West's military-strategic efforts; and there was no diminution of the links between Washington and Beijing despite the fact that there was a pessimistic slant in Reagan's pre-election assessments of Sino-US relations.

The Reagan administration increased the proportion of elements of force in US policy in the Asia and Pacific region. This was no accidental whim on the part of the new President. In the 1960s Reagan had with enviable steadfastness supported the right-wing extremist Barry Goldwater who urged using nuclear weapons against Vietnam, in the latter's nomination for the presidency. Although Reagan did not begin his term of office as President with the advocacy of the use of the atomic bomb against the "empire of evil", there was a perceptible growth of the role of the factor of military strength in his policies. His administration began to establish closer military and political cooperation with friendly nations: the USA completed negotiations and signed a new agreement with the Philippines on the status of US military bases; military aid was increased significantly, to Thailand in the first place; more

military-technical contacts were established with Southeast Asian states oriented towards the capitalist world; the US Seventh Fleet became more active; the level of the US military presence likewise increased sharply.

The contours of Reagan's basic foreign policy guidelines were clearly marked out in the protracted political battles long before he entered the White House. He charged his ill-starred predecessor James Carter with the temptation to withdraw from "global responsibility". "To many," he wrote, "the Carter administration's declared intention to withdraw troops from South Korea appears to be evidence that U.S. policy-makers are giving in to that temptation."¹

In what way could the USA preserve its "global responsibility" and make a dramatic gain in the confrontation with the Soviet Union? Even before Reagan became President he believed that a sure way to this objective was to place the accent on a decisive build-up of armaments, on attaining military superiority over the Soviet Union. In accordance with the new President's basic military and political guidelines the USA had to have the capability to use force more effectively wherever this was required by its global interests.

Reagan's China policy harmonised with his pattern of US "global responsibility", which was linked largely to fidelity to allied commitments. Although in Reagan's conservative worldview the experience of building the new society in China was identified with "communism", he gave his backing to Nixon's new China policy while remaining quite firm in supporting the Taiwan regime. He declared that the Carter administration's bent upon evading commitments to Taiwan exemplified its "temptation" to withdraw from "global responsibility".

Reagan's consultants and advisers placed confrontation with the Soviet Union at the top of the list of foreign policy priorities. Advocates of coalitions of various kinds, who strongly influenced the Carter administration, saw the USA's foreign policy priorities in the following order: relations in the triangle: the USA—Western Europe—Japan, US relations with developing countries, and relations with the Soviet Union.

¹ *Orbis. A Journal of World Affairs*, Vol. 21, No. 3, Fall 1977, p. 518.

Reagan's election to the presidency strengthened the hand of the advocates of top priority for the confrontation with the so-called "Soviet threat" and for the mobilisation of American resources to meet this "threat". Sharp criticism of the USA's allies grew more distinct among the US ruling circles. To some extent, this reflected the exacerbation of the contradictions between the leading capitalist powers. Popularity was acquired by the "new continentalism" doctrine, whose proponents urged a bigger US effort in the Western Hemisphere (the formation, in particular, of a "North American Common Market") in the face of what they saw as an external threat.

In a letter to Premier Zhao Ziyang to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the Shanghai communique, Reagan noted what he felt were beneficial results of the ten-year development of American-Chinese relations. "Our bilateral ties," he wrote, "now encompass trade, banking, maritime affairs, civil aviation, agriculture, educational and scientific exchange, technology transfer, and many other fields. Well over one hundred thousand Americans and Chinese now flow back and forth between the two countries each year." He declared that it was his hope to build "an even stronger bilateral and strategic framework" for US-Chinese relations.

In the course of the ten years following the signing of the Shanghai communique the two countries had indeed covered considerable ground, compared with the past, towards mutual rapprochement.

A major act designed to allay Beijing's apprehensions about the destiny of its relations with the USA in connection with Reagan's election to the White House was the visit to China at the close of March 1981 by Gerald Ford as Reagan's special emissary. The fact that Ford was chosen as the US President's special emissary caused no particular surprise either in Beijing or in Washington. Reagan's rival for the Republican nomination in the 1976 presidential race, Ford was well-known to the Chinese leaders, whom he had met at various levels. The appropriate background for Ford's negotiations in Beijing had been prepared by the Chinese Ambassador in the USA, who in his talks with Americans focussed attention on "global strategic issues".¹ Ford went to China, as he himself said,

¹ *The Times of India*, March 30, 1981.

to reassure its leaders that President Reagan wanted to continue improving Chinese-American relations. He conveyed an oral message from Reagan to Deng Xiaoping and a letter to Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang.¹

Following the 12th Congress of the CPC US Vice President George Bush and the Secretary of State George P. Shultz met with the PRC's Foreign Minister Huang Hua (November 1982), while the Chinese Finance Minister Wang Bingqian met with Bush, Shultz, and the US Secretary of the Treasury Donald Regan (December 1982). These meetings were followed by a series of visits by US government officials to prepare for Reagan's visit to China.

After diplomatic relations were established between the PRC and the USA, the two countries signed a series of agreements that largely determined the volume of trade between them for the closing years of the 1970s and the early 1980s. In January 1980 the US Congress ratified a three-year Sino-US trade agreement under which the sides accorded to each other the status of most-favoured nation in trade. This resulted in a significant lowering of US tariffs on imports from China (on the average from 24 to 5.5 per cent). The operation of this trade agreement ended in December 1982. The USA and China made progress in other areas of trade and economic relations (for instance, they signed agreements on scientific and technical cooperation, and on cooperation in high energy physics; letters were exchanged on cooperation in education, agriculture, and space exploration). Much of the US equipment purchased by China was dual-purpose (computers, transport facilities, and other items whose export to other socialist countries was limited).

China's economic and military development following the death of Mao was seen as extremely favourable to the USA by Henry S. Reuss, Chairman of the US Congressional Joint Economic Committee. This was also the view of John P. Hardt, Deputy Director of the US Congressional Research Service Staff and chief expert on the economy of socialist countries. American experts noted, in particular, that the difficulties the PRC was experiencing were creating opportunities for making it economically more dependent on the USA and that it was in the latter's interest to sign a broad-ranging long-term economic agree-

¹ *The New York Times*, March 24, 1981.

ment with the PRC on extensive cooperation in developing China's steel industry, transport, power industry, and agriculture. Such an agreement, it was noted, "could assure the United States an equal or privileged position in the China market for years to come". American analysts believed that the steps taken by Reagan in relations with China would allow the Washington administration to respond flexibly to major policy changes in Beijing.¹

Aggravating its relations with the Soviet Union, the Reagan administration had to take Beijing's attitude into consideration for the Chinese were making attempts to depict the Soviet initiatives to safeguard peace and curb the arms race as designed to "erode the position" of the West and undermine NATO "unity".

At that time China's approach to disarmament was only beginning to crystallize. Naturally enough, the negative effects of the "cultural revolution" were still felt in this area of foreign relations. The comprehensive disarmament programme that the PRC submitted to the Disarmament Committee in 1979 applied to only the USSR and the USA. It left aside any and all specific commitments of other powers, the PRC included, concerning limitation of arms, notably nuclear arms. But factors working in favour of a realistic approach to war and peace had already begun to gradually gather force in China.

After visiting China in May-June 1982, Howard H. Baker, a leading member of the Republican wing in the US Senate, noted in his report that the Chinese went out of their way to show that they and the Americans had a "common and parallel interest" by maintaining bilateral relations at the appropriate level and strengthening them. Baker noted that they referred to Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and Vietnam. The conservatives doubted that there was any likelihood of a change in the Chinese attitude to the USSR even if there was a downgrading of the level of US-Chinese relations.

As was expected, the charting of the Reagan administration's China policy was influenced by the US Vice President George Bush. His name was closely associated with the USA's new

¹ *China Under the Four Modernizations. Part 1, Selected Papers Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, August 13, 1982, U.S. G.P.O., Washington, 1982, p. 17.*

China policy. The most noteworthy landmark of his career as the US representative in the United Nations Organisation at the very outset of the 1970s was his implementation of Nixon's China policy. This was precisely when Taiwan was expelled from the UN. Soon afterwards Bush headed the US liaison mission in Beijing. Ford recalled Bush from China in 1975 and appointed him as head of the CIA, which post he held until January 1977, when the Ford administration's term of office expired.

Bush next appeared in Houston, Texas, as a member of the board of several Texas banking and industrial corporations, and also a member of a trilateral commission. His unflagging interest in oil, including Chinese oil, dates back to the early 1950s when he became one of the founders of the Zapata Petroleum Corporation. He soon headed the Zapata Offshore Company, which specialised in seabed boring for oil. As president of the company and chairman of its board, he expanded the business energetically. His company gradually evolved into a transnational corporation with multimillion assets and operations in various parts of the world.

Bush's political career was from the beginning linked to the petroleum business. He made his first important political steps in 1959 from his headquarters in Houston, which American businessmen call the "petroleum capital of the world".

George Bush did much to promote understanding between US petroleum business and China. He visited China in the autumn of 1977, offering the services of American oil companies mainly to survey for oil. His personal interest in links to China naturally influenced his activities in politics.

With Reagan's election to the presidency the situation became more favourable for a vitalisation of radical conservatives, who began to air publicly their doubts about there being conducive prospects for the development of relations with China. American newspapers printed material designed to show that the Soviet and Chinese leaders had identical strategic aims. The American public was acquainted with a "memorandum on a new plan for world revolution", supposedly written by Mao Zedong and allegedly taken to Moscow in 1953 by Zhou Enlai. "Some people in the USA," *Renmin ribao* noted, "are trying to portray China in the image of the Soviet

Union." In this commentary, *Renmin ribao* declared that the Americans had no reasons for suspecting the Chinese of having views drawing the PRC close to the Soviet Union.

Criticism of Reagan took into account influential voices in the US academic community opposing the use of Taiwan as "small change" in the relations with China. The fact that all the elements of the US policy in East Asia were closely interrelated was shown by Gaston J. Sigur, Director of the Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies and Professor of International Affairs at George Washington University. For instance, he was categorically opposed to a rupture of relations with Taiwan, arguing that this "would tend to destabilize the area and seriously disturb U.S. relations with our allies and adversaries alike". In their assessments of the Taiwan problem spokesmen of this school of American socio-political thinking, which was extremely close to the views of Ronald Reagan, proceeded from what they saw as their basic theoretical premise, namely, that the Soviet Union and China were, despite the tension in the relations between them, "potential adversaries" of the USA. The Soviet Union and China, Sigur contended, would interpret a weakening of relations between the USA and Taiwan as evidence of a weakening of US political and military influence in the Asia and Pacific region.¹

Spokesmen of academic circles, supporting Reagan's concept in the main, regarded balancing between the USSR and China as the most rational policy for the United States while maintaining a strong US military presence in the region. They believed that in its Asian policy the USA should, first, pursue the aim of preserving the status quo and, second, back this up with military strength and alliances. This, Sigur insisted, would allow "both the United States and Japan to negotiate with the U.S.S.R. and the People's Republic of China from a maximum position of strength. We can seek advantageous agreements with the major Communist States with the least amount of danger to our security interests."²

¹ *United States—Soviet Union—China: The Great Power Triangle*, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Future Foreign Policy Research and Development of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 94th Congress, pp. 260, 261.

² *Ibid.*, p. 262.

The Reagan policy was based on the premise that the PRC had a larger interest than the USA in promoting US-Chinese relations. Reagan administration aides based their calculation, as also party associates did at the time the Shanghai communique was drawn up, on the belief that further concessions could be obtained primarily on the Taiwan problem. The Reagan administration endeavoured to word its China policy so as, on the one hand, to maintain strategic relations with China and, on the other, to carry out the promises given by Reagan during his election campaign to abide by the US-Taiwan Relations Act.

In the summer of 1981 US-Chinese relations were subjected to, perhaps, their first serious test since diplomatic relations were established. A sharp dispute erupted over the sale of new types of weapons to Taiwan.

A joint Sino-US communique, drawn up after long argument, was published on August 17, 1982. It stated that the USA would seek to gradually reduce its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final halt. Arms sales to Taiwan, the USA promised, would not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USA and China in 1979. This communique was only a symbolic document called upon to note that Washington would pursue a "one China" policy.

The Chinese protested chiefly the Reagan administration's decision to sell new types of fighter-aircraft to Taiwan. In Beijing it was intimated unequivocally that if this decision were implemented the "level of diplomatic relations would fall".

In Washington they looked for a way out of this deadlock. Finally, a new decision was taken—that Taiwan's defence requirements called for continued production of the F-5E aircraft jointly with the USA and that the sale of spare parts for military hardware would not be cut off.

Neither Reagan's message to Beijing with assurances of his adherence to the "one China" policy (April 1982), nor the visits to China by senior American officials moved the Chinese. They refused to accept anything less than a cessation of arms sales to Taiwan. Following a visit to China in May-June 1982,

the Republican majority leader in the Senate Howard Baker admitted that in the opinion of the Chinese the "hindrances" in US-Chinese relations were a violation of China's sovereignty and, obviously, a repudiation of the fact that "there is one China and that Taiwan is an inalienable part of it". The Chinese maintained that the American assurances that Washington was steadfastly pursuing a "one China" policy were no more than declarations, and that these were at odds with actions. In Beijing the Americans were told that they had to repeal the US-Taiwan Relations Act or, as a first step, modify it. Senator Baker tried to pacify his interlocutors with the assurance that this act was being applied strictly in keeping with the 1972 Shanghai communique. But the Chinese would not budge, saying that "a gloom hangs over our relations as long as the act is in operation". Baker asserted that the act was working quite effectively in the context of settling unofficial relations with Taiwan and he did not see any sense in getting Congress to modify it.

In spite of everything the Chinese made major concessions. This was also acknowledged in Beijing—China agreed to regard the American arms sales to Taiwan as a left-over from the past.

Nevertheless, the Chinese repeatedly invoked the communique of August 17, 1982, demanding US compliance with its terms. In mid-March 1983 the PRC Foreign Ministry declared that American arms sales to Taiwan were greatly in excess of the level stipulated in the communique. The US administration confined itself to reasserting its stand—it would continue selling arms to Taiwan and the price would take inflation into account, against which Beijing objected.

In the actual business of implementing his China policy Reagan demonstrates his conservatism. On occasion he reaffirms his administration's intention to comply with the US-Taiwan Relations Act (passed by the US Congress in 1979), which, according to him, prescribes helping Taiwan to maintain its military strength. This is also the spirit in which the Reagan administration sees the US stand relative to the US-Chinese joint communique of August 17, 1982. Reagan's fellow conservatives are expecting a more visible tilt by the President towards Taiwan. Barry Goldwater is clinging to his former

position, demanding a consolidation of the USA's relations with Taiwan and continued American arms sales to the island.

When the passions generated by the euphoria over the signing of the Shanghai communique subsided, the time came for sober assessments of past experience.

Analysts noted how modestly the anniversary of the Shanghai meeting was marked. In a letter to Reagan Premier Zhao Ziyang reminded the Americans in rather dry language that US-Chinese relations would continue to develop if both governments complied with the principles jointly spelled out by them in the Shanghai communique. This was a transparent hint—in Beijing they had long been saying that the Washington administration was looking for ways of evading the commitments, particularly on the Taiwan problem, it had undertaken in Shanghai and in connection with the establishment of diplomatic relations. It had grown increasingly obvious that the structure of the US-Chinese relations had by no means removed the contradictions between the two countries.

Confronted by modifications in the PRC's foreign policy and by the changes in the international situation as a whole, Reagan administration aides began to try and work out their own approach to problems of the China policy. Speaking on March 5, 1983 Secretary of State George Shultz summarised his 12-day tour of Far Eastern and Southeast Asian nations. Judging by what he said, Washington was reassessing China's role in international affairs. Shultz departed from the Kissinger line, which at the time the Shanghai communique was signed accentuated the significance of the strategic triangle (USA-USSR-China) to American policy. Shultz ignored the course urged by his predecessor in the Carter administration Zbigniew Brzezinski. The latter wanted China to be drawn into a serious strategic dialogue about the state of Sino-Soviet-US relations.

Alexander Haig, the first Secretary of State in the Reagan administration, was reputedly an advocate of a strategic partnership within the framework of US-Japanese-Chinese relations. By sending Haig to China in June 1981, the USA demonstrated that it was in favour of a "strategic partnership with China". Shultz, who replaced Haig as Secretary of State, took a different tack—when he spoke of China he avoided the word "strategic" and sought to depict the PRC as being

no more than a regional power. On April 15, 1983, during a visit to Singapore, the US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Paul Wolfowitz said that the USA was not belittling China's global role, but felt that there evidently had been a tendency to see China more as a global rather than a regional power. In other words, by regarding China as a regional power the Reagan administration is endeavouring to so pattern its China policy as to give its junior partner in the US-Chinese dialogue the function of a military and political counter-balance to the Soviet Union in the Far East, of diverting to itself a section of the Soviet Armed Forces. Ray Cline, former Deputy Director of the CIA and a leading associate of the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington (incidentally, with views close to those of conservative Republicans), was blunter than official government spokesmen. He warned against counting on China, saying that this "strategic mistake" could disturb significant links with an element of the "geostrategic chain" of friendly countries along the line from Japan and South Korea through Taiwan and the Philippines to Australia and New Zealand. Thinking along these lines totally rejected the concept of interaction between the USA and China in a "united front", a concept that indeed did not enjoy, as it used to under Carter, any particular popularity among the senior aides of the Reagan administration.

Implementation of the above-mentioned programme was impeded by objective contradictions between China and the capitalist West. Even the American press, in assessing the role of "muscle and thinking" in shaping US foreign policy, noted that the line towards an anti-Soviet "alliance" would tie US policy to Chinese interests, and that this went far beyond the bounds of sense or necessity. In China and in Western capitalist countries there are influential forces that see the parallelism of current foreign policy courses as transient and coming into conflict with the long-term objectives of the nations involved.

Beijing's place and role in the modern system of international relations, in solving cardinal international problems are in the end determined not by current changes on the international scene, however dramatic they may be, but by

the operation of long-term tendencies in the development of the domestic situation in China and on the international scene. The influence exercised by China's foreign policy on world politics, on the struggle for detente, is limited by the country's actual potentialities, particularly in its economic and military-political spheres.

Factors such as the backwardness of the Chinese economy and the correspondingly low profile of China's participation in the international division of labour check the realisation of China's potentialities (its huge army of cheap labour and its raw material and energy resources) in the development of international economic relations. The plan for modernising the Chinese economy with American financial assistance proved to be not as attractive as it was first thought to be. The Chinese leaders are trying to limit the undesirable effects of the incursion of foreign capital into China. Beijing has adopted a fairly cautious approach to attracting foreign capital, instituting steps to limit foreign investment by means of taxation and territorial restrictions (free trade zones). In Beijing they were apprehensive lest any further deepening of relations with the West would make China increasingly more dependent (financially, technologically) on the leading powers of the capitalist world, which, in turn, would diminish China's opportunities to pursue an independent line in the world. Since 1979-1980 the Chinese leaders have turned down large heavy industry deals with the West, in the talks on which considerable progress had been made in the latter half of the 1970s.

The difficulties encountered in promoting US-Chinese trade and economic relations are due to a number of closely interrelated factors. First, the absence of the needed currency reserves and the fact that the export base is quite undeveloped. The need to ensure political stability is linked to measures aimed at raising the population's living standard, and this diverts a substantial proportion of export resources (apart from raw materials, China's exports are mainly foodstuffs, textiles, and light industry manufactured goods). It seemed that the practice of exchanging Chinese raw materials and fuel resources for up-to-date equipment and technologies was stimulating an expansion of trade and economic relations between China and the USA. In the early and mid-1970s,

for instance, China's petroleum output rose at an annual rate of 20 per cent. But China did not become a major oil exporter, for at the brink of the 1980s its output stabilised at a level of about 100 million tons—and this against the background of growing domestic oil consumption. Textiles are one of the most important items of China's export (high quality, relatively low cost). However, the growth of Chinese textile exports to the American market sparked anxiety in the powerful American protectionist lobby.

Second, the West found that in China's economy the conditions were unfavourable for using modern equipment and technologies. Serious shortcomings in economic management, the lack of the needed trained personnel, the pressure from unskilled labour, and so on, became major factors limiting the use of Western equipment and technologies. At the Wuhan steel mill, for instance, the Chinese, as they themselves acknowledged, were unable to operate 500 million dollars worth of imported sophisticated equipment.¹

Third, massive imports of foreign consumer goods restrict consumer demand and this inhibits the development of China's own consumer goods industries.

In its trade and economic relations with the USA China obviously encountered basically the same difficulties as are encountered in similar relations between capitalist and developing nations.

American experts see serious potential contradictions in the development of US-Chinese relations. They make no secret of their apprehensions that "China's nationalism" might lead it into a kind of "competitive chauvinism".² Indicative in this respect is the talk about the twenty-first century being the "century of the Chinese". This, said Zhao Haosheng, a Chinese-American scholar, is the view of many people, who note China's huge population and mental potential. If it concentrates all its energy on the four modernisations, Zhao Haosheng noted, it is bound to succeed. The successful implementation of the four modernisations would mark the beginning of the Chinese age.³

¹ *The China Business Review*, Vol. 8, No. 2, March-April 1981, pp. 21-24.

² John K. Fairbank, *Chinabound. A Fifty-Year Memoir*, Harper & Row Publishers, New York, 1982, p. 457.

³ *Zhongguo qinnianbao*, June 9, 1979.

China's invasion by foreign capital and the accompanying influence of Western lifestyles and morals, which come into conflict with Chinese traditionalist stereotypes of thinking, encounter relapses into left-radicalism, and the political unrest that this might generate would in some ways be reminiscent of the anti-Western protests during the "cultural revolution". The Open Door policy has objectively brought with it phenomena such as imitating everything foreign, a fad for foreign goods and hence the burgeoning of smuggling. With the benefits of "reforms come political dissidence, youth rebellion, crime, labor strikes, official corruption, defections, and slavish pursuit of Western lifestyles".¹ In a society that, as the Chinese leaders themselves acknowledge, experienced a "crisis of confidence" when the Gang of Four was vanquished, phenomena such as these were a serious social threat to the foundations of the state. The rise of the level of anti-American propaganda in Beijing was the reaction to these phenomena. The American press, of course, did not accidentally draw attention to talks given for young people by prominent scholars, in which they spoke of the United States of America. In replying to the question of how the USA achieved its economic successes, they in many cases identified the real sources of the growth of the USA's wealth, i.e., the exploitation of immigrant workers, of ethnic minorities, particularly Blacks and Chinese, and the exploitation of weaker countries.

The contradictory character of the impact of the Open Door policy on Chinese society is admitted by the Chinese leaders themselves. Hu Yaobang, General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, exhorted his fellow countrymen to adopt a "dual attitude to everything foreign"—"to take only what is good for people and reject what is corrupt and backward". The line pursued by China's leaders is aimed at assimilating and developing Western scientific breakthroughs, advanced equipment and technology, and rational management methods in keeping with the specifics and situation in China.

The nation's economic backwardness and traditional stereotypes in Beijing's foreign policy came into collision with all-sided cooperation with imperialist powers, including the USA.

¹ *The Washington Post*, April 26, 1984.

CHAPTER NINE

LEFTIST LIBERALISM AND RIGHT-WING ANTI-COMMUNISM

To a very large extent the struggle over Mao's ideological legacy reflected the struggle of the various forces over the means of implementing foreign policy, including the relations between China and the USA.

Leftist Traditions in US Sinology

Back in the 1930s and 1940s the Americans who visited Yanan looked for and found in the areas controlled by the CPC illustrations of the viability of the ideas of the American revolution, of the Jeffersonian exhortations calling for liberty, equality, and fraternity. Some American observers saw in the CPC's victories a panacea for the sufferings and poverty of the Chinese people. Americans got a vision of China of the wartime and postwar years from the many books and articles written by Edgar Snow, Anna Louise Strong, Owen Lattimore, Philip J. Jaffe (pen-name—Philips), T.A. Bisson, and others, who gave a more or less positive portrayal of the CPC.

Religious upbringing and a growth of petty-bourgeois criticism of imperialism strongly influenced American left-wing radicals of the 1920s-1930s. The "social credo of the Church", drawn up by Methodist theologians in 1908, was an attempt to accommodate the principles and ideals of the social Evangelism of the early twentieth century to the practical work of the American Protestant Church in the heyday of the anti-monopoly, labour, socialist movement. Many young

people from religious families in the USA adopted as their own the utopian demand, included in the "credo", for an end to the contradictions generated by private property (social inequality reduced to the extreme) without the abolition of the source of these contradictions. They spoke eloquently about the sanctity of human rights and compliance with justice in social relations in accordance with the "Christian conscience".

A religious upbringing left a deep imprint on Anna Louise Strong, whose life was linked indivisibly to the Chinese revolution. She came from a patrician family headed by a prominent cleric proudly calling himself a "one-hundred-per-cent American". Adherence to the ideals of American petty-bourgeois democrats, who rebelled against the suppression of the rights of the small businessman by the capitalist giants, an inclination to protest in defence of academic freedoms, and personal participation in philanthropic activity among the destitute determined Anna Louise Strong's choice of ideological and political allegiances.

Her formative years as a public personality saw turbulent political passions reach what seemed to be their highest pitch. William M. Brown, Bishop of Arkansas, who in 1920 published a book entitled *Communism and Christianity*, joined the Communist Party of the USA in 1925 and became a devoted champion of the working class. This was a time when in the USA many religious ideologues were saying that Christianity and socialism had a common aim, although, more often than not, the "socialism" they had in mind did not range beyond the framework of narrow petty-bourgeois notions. Their main concepts for building a new, ideal society, envisaged harmony between workers and employers, a harmony that was to be achieved through a cooperative movement "for democratic control in industry" under capitalism.

Like many other young people of those years, Anna Louise Strong became active in the working-class movement under the influence of the struggle that was unfolding in the USA against unemployment, poverty, exploitation of female and child labour, unjust wages, and other wrongs. She made her mark among people infected by the petty-bourgeois ideas of the leftists, among thinking intellectuals. She sympathised with

the revolutionary struggle of other peoples, but even at the height of her creative work she hardly rose above the conscientious objectivity of a bourgeois journalist.

The ideological guidelines of the left-radical school in American Sinology took shape over a period of many years and appeared when militant American liberalism met with the utopian and egalitarian ideas propounded by many leaders of the CPC not only as the anti-feudal, anti-imperialist revolution in China made headway but also after the PRC was proclaimed.

The ideas of the Taiping movement (notably, the slogan: "Let all people be poor, but let them be equal") sank deep roots in the mind of the peasant held in the vise of want and dreaming of an idyllic society of people welded together by a spirit of self-sacrifice in the name of the earliest possible establishment of social justice on the planet. Marxists assessed phenomena of this kind in the light of the actual historical situation. In characterising the risings of the German peasants in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, Frederick Engels wrote: "Already here, with the first precursor of the movement, we find the asceticism typical of all medieval uprisings tinged with religion and, in modern times, of the early stages of every proletarian movement. This ascetic austerity of morals, this demand to forsake all joys of life and all entertainments, opposes the ruling classes with the principle of Spartan equality, on the one hand, and is, on the other, a necessary stage of transition without which the lowest stratum of society can never set itself in motion. In order to develop its revolutionary energy, to become conscious of its own hostile attitude towards all other elements of society, to concentrate itself as a class, it must begin by stripping itself of everything that could reconcile it with the existing social system; it must renounce the few pleasures that make its wretched existence in the least tolerable for the moment, and of which even the severest oppression could not deprive it."¹ Under some historical conditions the "plebeian-proletarian asceticism" that Engels wrote about was of progressive significance. Enlarging upon

¹ Frederick Engels, "The Peasant War in Germany", in Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 10, 1978, pp. 428-29.

this theme, Engels noted that "this plebeian-proletarian asceticism gradually sheds its revolutionary nature when the development of modern productive forces infinitely multiplies the luxuries, thus rendering Spartan equality superfluous".¹

The Chinese peasant's egalitarian ideals, which acquired a certain progressive significance during the struggle against feudalism, were what served as the foundation of the essentially anti-scientific concepts of egalitarian, primitive communism. Such is the dialectics of revolution. "That which Russia has recently embarked upon" (the building of socialism.— V.V.), Sun Yatsen said, "is in fact not pure communism. Nor is Marxism true communism. True communism is the communism of Proudhon, the communism of Bakunin." The contradictory character, the inconsistency of Sun Yatsen's worldview sprang mainly from the social conditions in which his philosophical and socio-economic views took shape.

The quests of the sixteenth-century Utopian Socialist Thomas More, mirrored in his *Utopia*, gave an impetus to the further development of socialist thought. The fathers of utopian socialism built up their concepts of the future society on the basis of the ideological material at their disposal. Together with elements of the Catholic doctrine (charity, generosity, magnanimity, solicitude for one's brethren in Christ), early Christianity's ideals of "universal equality and fraternity" strongly influenced the evolution of the basically highly moral ideas of building a society which was just but far removed from real life. The American academic Russell Ames writes that the significance of Thomas More's legacy is chiefly that he was the precursor of Diderot, Jefferson, and Sun Yatsen.² Sun Yatsen had a purpose for drawing upon Confucian notions of a society directly embodying the age-old hope of the Chinese that the principles of social justice, of "great harmony" (*datong*), would triumph in his country. It was this outstanding Chinese philosopher who pointed out the link of his social ideas with the *datong* principles. This is what largely determined the utopian nature of Sun Yatsen's ideas for restructuring society.

¹ Ibid., p. 429.

² Russell Ames, *Citizen Thomas More and His Utopia*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1949, p. 6.

In the mind of the twentieth-century American intellectual brought up on examples from the history of his own country the ideas of "Sinicised socialism" were associated, more often than not, with the practice of sectarian communes, in which intellectual life was governed by religious canons, with the experience of the Utopian Socialist Robert Owen in the USA, with the slogans of the Fourierist movement that acquired a broad dimension on the American continent in the mid-nineteenth century. In this context the American publications offering an assessment of the activities of the CPC contain analogies with the populist movement in American history, the mass actions of the small farmers against the big capitalists.

The Americans contributed to the development of utopian socialism. The French enlighteners, who were keenly aware of the sordid times of domination by feudal reaction, hoped to see revolution consummated by the building of a realm of reason and everlasting justice on the debris of feudal-absolutist monarchies. The Americans who believed it was possible to build a society of universal economic and political equality in the USA were bitterly disappointed when they came face to face with stern reality—the concentration of capital ruthlessly suppressed the principles of free competition (for the small fry the prospect of being swallowed by the sharks was becoming ever more real) and the rights of the individual, that were advocated most zealously by the bourgeoisie during the epoch of initial accumulation of capital. In the course of the nineteenth century Henry Tucker, Edward Ballamy, and many other spokesmen of the left wing of American socio-political thought were active in disseminating the idea of building a society on the principles of cooperation, mutual assistance, and even national property. This was a sort of response by progressive American intellectuals brought up in the spirit of romanticism to the vises of the bourgeoisie that was reinforcing its position. Ideas of this kind, often tinged by religion, attracted Americans protesting against big capital.

It was only the Marxists, recognising that new relations of production would inevitably form as a result of the growth of the productive forces and that under certain historical conditions socialist utopian ideas were progressive, who showed

that the notions about capitalism being a "reasonable social system" were totally illusory. Characterising this society, Engels wrote: "Cash payment became more and more ... the sole nexus between man and man [in capitalist society—V.V.]. The number of crimes increased from year to year. Formerly, the feudal vices had openly stalked about in broad daylight; though not eradicated, they were now at any rate thrust into the background. In their stead, the bourgeois vices, hitherto practised in secret, began to blossom all the more luxuriantly. Trade became to a greater and greater extent cheating. The 'fraternity' of the revolutionary motto was realised in the chicanery and rivalries of the battle of competition. Oppression by force was replaced by corruption; the sword, as the first social lever, by gold."¹

Why did the American publications, chiefly of the 1930s-1940s, giving assessments of the activities of the CPC, contain references to the populist movement in American history, a movement in which the authors of these publications saw a kind of analogue of the activities of the Chinese revolutionaries? The ideologues of populism drew their followers and sympathisers among small and middle proprietors of town and countryside and among members of the working class. The populists were motivated by the idea of building a strong, centralised power—a government that could, on the basis of "just legislation", ensure society's welfare and guarantee "freedom" of ownership, above all against encroachment by the powerful capitalist associations.

American liberals, particularly left-wing radicals, leaned on the populist worldview, linking to it an ideal of building society that was fantastic for their day and under the socio-political conditions prevailing in their country—the building of a conflict-free society based on the principles of justice and generosity. They usually defined populism as a movement based on the following principle: virtue is sustained by the ordinary people and traditions taken shape in their midst are its embodiment. The populist movement ended in collapse (in the USA the populist party ceased to exist towards the

¹ Frederick Engels, "Socialism: Utopian and Scientific", in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works* in three volumes, Vol. Three, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 118.

beginning of the twentieth century). However, the notions that it cultivated about a humane and just society, in which goods are distributed sensibly and man is perfected morally, were not erased from the memory of generations. On the contrary, they resurfaced with renewed vigour, getting an additional stimulus in critical times of the sharpest socio-political upheavals in the USA and other countries.

When the first government-to-government contacts were established between the USA and the People's Republic of China in the early 1970s, Edward Friedman urged working out a new approach to China: "A formal, idealized, and incorrect understanding of how the American system works leads us time and again to ascribe ideological blinders to opponents because we are blind to the institutional and ideological irrationalities of our own system... Failing to recognize this reality, Americans see the responses of others as provocations. The result can be another major war with China."¹ Thus, Friedman saw the reluctance of Americans to understand the irrationalities of their own institutional and ideological system as one of the principal reasons for the setbacks of the USA's China policy.

Naturally, the views of the left-radical wing in American Sinology were adopted by the political circles and organisations in the USA that urged a reconsideration of their country's China policy. Political personalities, notably of the Democratic Party, have often drawn upon the ideas of academic dissidents, whose views so closely adjoined Mao's notions about building the new China. Even after Mao's death American academics continued, essentially speaking, to laud the theory and practice of "Chinese populism". "Chinese Populism and the Legacy of Mao Tse-tung",² a work by James R. Townsend (professor of Political Science and East Asian Studies at the University of Washington, Seattle), is typical in this respect. Glorification of the behaviour norms, culture, and lifestyle of the elite—the scholars, so typical of China, is counterposed, Townsend writes, with the "populist" ethic, which extols the morals of

¹ *America's Asia. Dissenting Essays on Asian-American Relations*, edited by Edward Friedman & Mark Selden, Pantheon Books, New York, 1971, p. 209.

² *Asian Survey. A Monthly Review of Contemporary Asian Affairs*, Vol. XVII, No. 11, November 1977, pp. 1003-15.

the workers and peasants, claims superiority for labour by hand over labour by brain, and so on. Townsend attributes to Mao Zedong invaluable services in spreading populist ideas in China (his main theoretical contribution being the "mass line").¹

American Apologists of the "Chinese" Road of Revolution

American friends of China, especially those who visited Beijing at the initial stage of the normalisation of Sino-US relations, extolled the "Chinese" road of revolution, paid tribute to the keen "prevision" of Mao, who saw the peasants as the main force behind revolutionary changes, and attributed all the successes of the Chinese Communists exclusively to the "genius" of Mao as a revolutionary strategist. Chester Ronning, a Canadian diplomat, wrote of Mao's "unorthodox" revolutionary approach. Seymour Topping extolled Mao's decision to break, as he put it, with the Leninist concept that the revolution had to be headed by the urban proletariat with the peasants playing the role of allies. An undisguised apology of the special "Chinese" road of revolution is seen clearly in Ruth Sidel's book, in which the Chinese revolution is depicted as an unusual kind of socialist revolution and everything accomplished by it is attributed to the exceptional merits of the leadership.

American politology and propaganda went out of their way to justify and often make much of the leftist vision of the peasantry's role as the main force of revolution, of the "peasant party's" role as leader. "Mao Tse-tung's influence and activities in his home province of Hunan," Chester Ronning asserts for instance, "had blossomed into an organisation of some two million peasants." After 1927, he says, the Chinese Communists eventually realised where the real problems lay—in "China's villages". Although the CPC Central Committee, he notes, continued to keep in touch with the Comintern, its ties were gradually cut off when Zhou Enlai finally

¹ Ibid., p. 1006.

joined Mao. "Mao Tse-tung became the real leader."

American Sinologists, notably of the liberal-critical school, took pains to spread the notion that the Chinese revolution developed separately from and independently of the world revolutionary process. Anti-communist conservatives, who stepped into positions of immense power in the USA in the 1940s-1950s, wanted people to believe that what was taking place in China was the "handiwork of Moscow". The liberal wing of US Sinology, on the contrary, lauded China's road of development as being independent of the socialist revolution in Russia.

Some American left-radical Sinologists acclaimed Sun Yatsen's utopian hopes of "forestalling" capitalism. These hopes were criticised by Lenin. Edward Friedman's book is indicative in this respect. It is an attempt to show that Sun Yatsen's most important act was his decision not to wait for the sun's warmth to bring spring nearer and for the conditions for revolution to ripen. The keynote is that from the outset of the Chinese revolution Sun Yatsen's party did not accept Lenin's scientific views on revolution. It is known that Sun Yatsen favoured egalitarian, primitive communism, examples of which he found in China's history, over the social system that was being established in Soviet Russia. Friedman's book is quite patently an attempt to accentuate aspects of Sun Yatsen's worldview that were criticised by Marxists-Leninists. This approach to assessments of egalitarian communism could help to justify the theoretical speculations over the concept of a "special" communism, to show that the appearance of Mao's thoughts was a natural historical development. Nonetheless, in an article published when the "cultural revolution" was petering out Friedman acknowledges the declarative character of the egalitarian ideas of Mao's supporters. Friedman writes that the egalitarian and revolutionary ideas advocated by the Chinese leaders were unfeasible. The declarations of a number of the CPC's theoreticians, especially during the "cultural revolution", calling for "universal equality" were, in fact, totally at variance with their actions.

Some American Sinologists arbitrarily interpret Lenin's views, and when they depict the role and significance of revolutionary organisations they ignore entirely the character

of the given revolution. It is not at all accidental that in the foreword to Friedman's book Benjamin I. Schwartz accentuates the thesis that Sun Yatsen's idea of a vanguard party of professional revolutionaries became the fundamental and inalienable component of the "Maoist revolution". Sun Yatsen's idea, "unencumbered", as Schwartz put it, by preconceptions concerning the necessary role of the industrial proletariat may have been more suggestive of future actualities than the Marxist-Leninist conception.¹ Enlarging upon this, Friedman devoted a whole chapter to the peasant rising led by Bai Lang, a native of Henan Province. Breaking out soon after the Xinhai revolution, its slogan was "Down with the rich, help the poor!" Since this peasant movement was directed against landowner oppression and the Yuan Shikai feudal-bureaucratic dictatorship, this social orientation closely linked it to the general revolutionary movement of the Chinese people and in large measure determined the progressive features of this movement.

When referring to the history of the Bai Lang rising, the American authors pursued the objective of casting doubt on the Marxist view of the role and place of the peasantry in the Chinese revolution. The rural areas, Schwartz writes, which ultimately provided the mass base for revolution, were not simply the realm of the "man with the hoe".² Ignored here are the character of the revolution, the role of its allies, the predominant forces of the revolutionary movement. In this sense are not their words indicative when they assert that Lenin "identifies reaction with an allegedly culturally backward countryside"?³

In *A Critique of the Gotha Programme*, Karl Marx categorically rejected the view that in relation to the working class all the other classes are only a reactionary force. Rebuffing the leadership of the German Social-Democrats, he quoted the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, which stated that the middle strata become revolutionary to the extent they are faced with having to join the ranks of the proletariat. Marxists,

¹ Edward Friedman, *Backward Toward Revolution. The Chinese Revolutionary Party*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1977, p. X.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid., p. 224

being at the sources of the organised communist and working-class movement, had in mind the anti-feudal potentials of the peasantry. These potentials came to the fore in the national liberation movements. Lenin enlarged upon this approach to the revolutionary role of the peasants. Marxists-Leninists demonstrated the viability of the idea that the democratic and proletarian revolutions complement each other, proved that there had to be an alliance of the working class and the peasantry at the bourgeois-democratic and socialist stages of the revolutionary process, in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism, defined and continue to define the forms of this alliance under the specific conditions of revolutionary processes of a global and regional nature. They have always justifiably regarded the peasants, especially the poorest section of the peasants, as a major ally of the proletariat in the socialist revolution. In the anti-feudal, anti-imperialist revolution in China the peasant, to quote Lenin, was the "chief representative, or the chief social bulwark, of this Asian bourgeoisie that is still capable of supporting a historically progressive cause."¹

In writing of Sun Yatsen's worldview, work, and day, Friedman endeavours to avoid the primitivism that is so typical of his predecessors in the world of bourgeois science. He does not portray the Chinese revolutionary as a staunch advocate of the ideals of bourgeois democracy, as a meek pupil of foreign missionaries, or an assiduous accomplice of some imperialist power or other. He sees his aim in something else. Obviously, he is set on making people believe that the Chinese revolution was offbeat, that the theory and practice of the leaders of that revolution were in conflict with scientific communism.

The postulate, in high favour in Western historiography, that the revolutionary movement in China was a movement isolated from the Great October Revolution is congenial to those who would question the soundness of Lenin's observation about the international significance of the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia. Many features of the revolution

¹ V.I. Lenin, "Democracy and Narodism in China", *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, 1973, p. 165.

in Russia (dictatorship of the proletariat, the alliance between the working class and the peasantry, the leading and guiding role of the Communist Party in the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat and in the building of socialism) are, Lenin wrote, "not local, or peculiarly national, or Russian alone, but international."¹ Friedman entirely ignores the Great October Socialist Revolution (even the index to his book has no reference to it) which changed China's standing internationally and accelerated its social and political renewal. Friedman argues that a new revolutionary generation began to form in China under the impact of Japan's harsh policy, particularly the Japanese invasion of Shandong Province in 1914, and the humiliating for China terms of the Versailles Treaty, with the October Revolution playing no role at all.² Sun Yatsen, to whom Friedman devotes a larger part of his book, wrote warmly to Lenin, following the establishment of Soviet power: "The Kuomintang expresses its profound esteem for the hard and stirring struggle by members of your country's revolutionary party and is reinforced in its hope that the revolutionary parties of China and Russia will join forces and carry on a joint struggle."³

The news of the Soviet government's first Leninist foreign policy decrees permeated with the spirit of fraternity and friendship with the peoples of oppressed countries, fostered the growth of the Chinese people's anti-imperialist struggle and a visible upsurge of patriotic feeling in China, that led to the rise of the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal movement known as the May Fourth movement of 1919. The humiliation poured on China by the terms of the Versailles Treaty—these are mentioned in the book—may be regarded as the spark that ignited the May Fourth movement (the student demonstration in protest of these terms) rather than a key factor leading, if one is to believe Friedman, to the formation of a new, young revolutionary generation.⁴

¹ V.I. Lenin, " 'Left-Wing' Communism—an Infantile Disorder", *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, 1977, p. 21.

² Edward Friedman, *op. cit.*, p. 210.

³ Cited from M.S. Kapitsa, *Soviet-Chinese Relations*, Moscow, 1958, p. 22 (In Russian).

⁴ Edward Friedman, *op. cit.*, p. 210.

The May Fourth movement was largely anti-imperialist and anti-American. However, the main cause of the unrest was the radicalisation of feeling in Chinese society, especially among patriotic intellectuals and young people, precipitated by the growth of national consciousness and the spread in China of the ideals of the Great October Socialist Revolution. Marxism and the triumph of the revolution in Russia captured the imagination and hearts of a large section of the Chinese intelligentsia and youth. Marxist literature began to attract a steadily growing audience and more partisans, providing the inspiration for opposition to imperialism. It was not accidental that among the leaders of the May Fourth movement there were those who were to found the Communist Party of China.

The May Fourth movement was a turning-point in the development of the Chinese revolution, the first response of the Chinese people to the Great October Revolution. Its hallmarks were anti-imperialism and the participation of the working class. This movement confronted the Chinese revolutionaries with the question of allies against imperialism. The attitude to the then young Soviet republic and to the experience of the Bolsheviks was becoming the criterion of the sober-mindedness of the Chinese revolutionaries, a line visibly demarcating the social forces.

In November 1923 Sun Yatsen announced the reorganisation of the Kuomintang and, with this, demonstrated his firm determination to rely on the masses and to study and draw upon the heroic experience of revolutionary Russia. Sun Yatsen, wrote S.L. Tikhvinsky (Soviet researcher of his works), "saw that imperialism was the principal enemy of all strata and groups of the Chinese people, and he called upon the nation to unite and fight this enemy in close and unbreakable alliance with the Soviet Union, the world's first state that broke the chain of imperialist exploitation".¹ It is common knowledge that at the request of the Sun Yatsen government the Soviet Union helped massively to form the armed forces of revolutionary China.

¹ Sun Yatsen, *Selected Works*, Introduction by S.L. Tikhvinsky, Moscow, 1969, p. 33 (Russian translation).

The revolutionary democrat Sun Yatsen stressed the epochal significance of the Great October Revolution. In a message to the Soviet leadership he wrote: "You are heading a union of free republics. This union of free republics is the true legacy that the immortal Lenin left to the world of oppressed peoples. Drawing upon this legacy the peoples languishing under the tyranny of imperialism will win their freedom, their liberation from the system that has always fed on slavery, wars, and self-interest."¹

Despite being inconsistent, Sun Yatsen's social stand reflected the rise in China of new forces that were progressive in their day. Marxist-Leninists have always thought highly of his work. Lenin described him as a revolutionary democrat endowed with nobility and heroism.²

The distinctive features of the Chinese revolution, no matter how significant they were, did not obstruct the spread in China of the ideals of the Great October Revolution. The finest people in the revolutionary-democratic movement in China unfailingly addressed the legacy of the socialist revolution in Russia, and one can hardly consider as credible the claim that the revolutionary process in China was isolated from the October Revolution. The interaction of the revolutions in Russia and China was marked by contradiction and multiformity. The breaching of the imperialist world system in its weakest link — in Russia—heralded the downfall of colonialism in its classical forms. Although the USA was not a classical colonial power, it sided with European and Japanese colonialists time and again against the national liberation movement, including the liberation movement of the Chinese people. The collapse of the colonial system, China's liberation from the yoke of Japanese militarism, and the failure of foreign capital to enslave that country after the Second World War were by no means the result of any "miscalculation" on the part of individual US statesmen, which, as is often alleged in non-Marxist American historiography, led to the "loss" of China by the USA. This was the outcome of the natural development of the world revolutionary process.

¹ Sun Yatsen, *Selected Works*, Vol. 2, Beijing, 1956, p. 922 (in Chinese).

² V.I. Lenin, "Democracy and Narodism in China", *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, p. 165.

The US Left-Radicals of the 1970s

In Beijing considerable interest was shown in the activities of American students of Asia known for their left-radical views. The "new Lefts" united around the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars formed in 1968. Members of this committee visited Beijing in 1972. It is not surprising that some American academics acknowledge that formerly the political battles in the USA over China problems were fought mainly between the "conservatives" and the "liberals". In the 1970s both these groups came under heavy attack from the left-radical wing of academics and students, who wanted the Asian scholars to take a more militant stand on foreign policy issues (criticism of the USA's China policy, of the US aggression in Vietnam, and so on).

The contradictory views articulated by academics belonging to or agreeing with the CCAS reflected the wide spectrum of social forces involved in protests in the USA. In protesting against the aggression in Vietnam and against the US-Japanese military-political alliance, the left-radical academics idealised, and in fact offered an apologia of the "Chinese form of socialism" of the period of the "cultural revolution" and thereby objectively if not deliberately contributed to spreading the anti-humane ideology of great-power chauvinism that was hostile to peace.

The views of the CCAS members were formed in the complex and extremely contradictory atmosphere of the political struggle in the USA at the close of the 1960s. Passions were running high in the country. Economic difficulties were compounded by the bitter consequences of the war in Vietnam. Scholars from the CCAS critically assessed the USA's Asian, chiefly China, policy. From the outset they focussed mainly on China problems. In their evaluations of China and Mao's thought its members were variously motivated: some lauded egalitarianism, seeing it as a form of social protest against the injustices in their own society, others sought to vindicate Mao's social experiments and make a case in favour of early and far-reaching changes in Sino-US relations, and still others adopted a frankly romantic approach to Mao's personality and revolutionary past. CCAS member Richard M. Pfeffer

wrote, for instance, that the "Maoist form of socialism has been effective" ("in furthering China's modernisation", a message "likely to be increasingly communicated to the people in other developing societies, and perhaps even to the American people").¹

In 1972 a CCAS delegation toured rural areas in China. One group studied the administrative apparatus, and the other went to one of the communes. The delegates worked in the fields together with the peasants, and took their recreation with and talked to them. It seems that being informed of the CCAS representatives' views, the Chinese authorities suggested that they study the Yanan experience. In the case of some CCAS members, their romantic perception and propagation of egalitarian ideas were a sort of social protest, while the lack of any possibility of going deep into the actual motivations of the Chinese leaders led them into accepting and recording—in their works—various myths about the character and development of the Chinese revolution.

Many American scholars gravitating to the "new Left" were quite rapturous about the "cultural revolution". Talks and seminars with representatives of revolutionary committees and teachers and students of institutions of higher learning were arranged for a delegation from Pennsylvania State University in February 1974. The delegation also visited some rural areas. A member of the delegation Jan S. Prybyla, Professor of Economics, published two reports about this trip to the PRC. His assessment of the course pursued by the Chinese leaders was, on the whole, favourable ("a gigantic exercise in the levelling of thought, attitudes, aspirations, manners, expression and dress"). While noting the decline in, for instance, education, he felt that "given China's present level of development and the course charted for the economy by the current leadership, the educational revolution makes sense". Prybyla's impressions were tinged with romance, which was a hallmark of CCAS spokesmen. China, he wrote, had "lots to offer as a counter-

¹ Richard Pfeffer, "Understanding China", *Eastern Horizon*, Vol. XI, No. 4, 1972, (Hong Kong), p. 50.

balance to the trinkets-and-tinsel life that has been built in other parts of the world".¹

The academics belonging to the CCAS propagated a romantic perception of the CPC's experience, highlighting China's contribution to giving effect to "genuinely socialist ideas". They saw barracks communism as almost the only way to build an "anti-bureaucratic", "anti-elitist" society. This is exemplified by a collection of essays under the general heading *America's Asia* published in the USA.²

American Pragmatism and Revolutionary Traditions

At the height of the internal struggle in China over the Mao ideological legacy at the close of the 1970s the philosopher Feng Youlan³ came under heavy attack. He was charged with attempting to use his researches to vindicate the "fascist dictatorship" of the Gang of Four. His critics found in his studies of neo-Confucianism what they described as erroneous postulates that were, according to the Chinese press, evoked by the philosophy of pragmatism. As seen by critics, these postulates were, first, that "truth is absolute and everlasting", independent of the human consciousness, and "uncognisable by us" and, second, that "the content of truth as commonly understood is dependent upon us", and this determines the relativity and changeability of truth ("truth consists of tenets that are consonant with our requirements and useful to us").⁴ As a result of these charges Feng Youlan was depicted as a student of the "subjective-idealistic philosophy of pragmatism", which he adopted, in particular, in the USA from the American adherent of pragmatism John Dewey.

The debate among Chinese social scientists at the close of the 1970s on the subject of "practice—the criterion of truth"

¹ Jan S. Prybyla, "Notes on Chinese Higher Education: 1974", *The China Quarterly. An International Journal for the Study of China*, No. 62, June 1975, p. 294; idem, "China's Political Economy: A Traveller's Report", *Current History*, Vol. 67, No. 397, September 1974, (Philadelphia), p. 111.

² *America's Asia...*, op. cit.

³ Wang Yongjiang, Chen Qiwei, "Zai ping Liang Xiao mou chuwen" ("Once Again About an Adviser Named Liang Xiao"), *Zhexue*, No. 3, 1978, (Beijing).

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 23-24.

triggered criticism of the "pragmatic theory of truth", with John Dewey and Hu Shi named among the proponents of this theory.

The theoretical concepts of the American idealist philosopher John Dewey (1859-1952) acquired some currency among Chinese liberals during the revolutionary upturn in the early years of the twentieth century. John Dewey was a proponent of the philosophy of American pragmatism. In opposition to Karl Marx's monistic theory Dewey offered a "pluralistic theory", according to which social developments were seen as the interaction of the components of human nature, on the one hand, and cultural conditions, on the other. Dewey's philosophical views rejected the possibility of consciously transforming society and asserted absolute scepticism relative to historical cognition.

In an atmosphere of acute social tension in China, of the ideological and political clashes precipitated by the October Revolution in Russia, the pragmatic ideas enunciated by Dewey won a following in China.

Dewey's name became known in China largely through the work of Hu Shi or Hu Shizhi (1891-1962), who was one of his pupils. The latter won a reputation in and outside China with his works on philosophy, sociology, history, literary criticism, pedagogics, and linguistics. After receiving the degree of Ph.D. at Columbia University Hu Shi returned to China, where he showed that he was a worthy pupil of Dewey. He was impressed by the relativistic approach to assessing the historical past, by the approach that reduced the science of history to a simple description of historical events.

Pragmatism became a tested means in the arsenal of the staunchest champions of the interests of monopoly capital. Naturally enough, soon after the October Revolution in Russia the philosophy of American pragmatism was translated into practical actions by the opponents of the Marxist-Leninist worldview in China. It was not for nothing that the Independent Political Action League headed by John Dewey was in the vanguard of the anti-Soviet forces. Dewey's negation of the objectivity of cause-effect links led away from the need to study the laws governing historical development and pushed his followers in China onto the road of voluntarism, of spreading

illusions and vain hopes among the Chinese working people.

The popularisation of John Dewey's ideas in China was no accident. After the socialist revolution in Russia American political leaders redoubled their efforts to mobilise ideological and political means of countering social upheavals. American liberalism enhanced the ideology of reformism, whose mission was seen as saving the capitalist world system which had received its first serious blow. The activities of John Dewey's followers, who were preaching harmony between classes, blended with President Woodrow Wilson's efforts to create a world liberal-capitalist order. Wilson was not prepared to see capitalism's setbacks. He gathered around himself like-minded people who urged the powerful representatives of capital to sacrifice their personal interests for the common cause of preserving the socio-economic system they cherished. Wilson spoke of his hope of building a new world order, whose foundation was to be laid on the ruins left behind by the First World War. Wilson's messianic projects were aimed at "enlightening" the Old World with the end objective of establishing American dominance in the world. The American bourgeoisie, which had grown strong by now, was prepared to inscribe Wilson's Fourteen Points on the banners of the new crusaders who intended to march against the ideals generated by the Great October Revolution. American liberals regarded Wilsonianism as a panacea for revolutionary changes in the world. "Lenin's desire to transform the [first world] war into a world revolution", that would, one of these liberals—N. Gordon Levin—wrote, generate chaos, came into conflict after 1917 with the Wilsonian approach to world problems. Wilsonianism and Leninism, he asserted, are "two opposed methods of moving the world from an imperialist past to a progressive future".¹

During the turbulent political events of 1919, when the USA sought an antidote to the ideals of the October Revolution, John Dewey arrived in China, where he read lectures propagating his philosophical and socio-political views. His efforts in China did not, at the time, yield the expected results. Some American academics admitted that, in fact, nothing came of the

¹ N. Gordon Levin, *Woodrow Wilson and World Politics*, op. cit., pp. 6-7.

attempts of the liberals to counter the May Fourth movement with ideas borrowed from Dewey. The latter dropped the principle of individualism in the sense it was understood by his predecessors—spokesmen of classical liberalism. He tried to shoulder a burden that was unmovable—to reconcile the traditional ideas of American individualism to the precepts of bourgeois reformism. Planned collectivism under public control was the American philosopher's appeal for social reforms that would remove the contradictions between the individual and society. Dewey's pragmatism began to acquire growing topicality in US socio-political life in the closing years of the nineteenth and the early twentieth century when monopoly and later state-monopoly tendencies became increasingly distinguishable in capitalism's development. The philosophical studies produced by Dewey were tailored to persuade American and foreign academics of the possibility of adapting capitalist society's sociopolitical institutions to the requirements of reality.

Naturally, Dewey's philosophical views left their imprint on China's ideological life, just as there were repercussions of the vitalisation, after the May Fourth movement, of the debate on the values of bourgeois democracy and humanism, on bourgeois ideas of the epoch of imperialism. However, advanced as a counter-balance to scientific socialism the concepts of the American pragmatists about universal harmony between classes, the possibility of perfecting society with the aid of liberal reforms, and so on, were not accepted by most of the revolutionary youth of China. In this stormy time the October Revolution powerfully stimulated the spread of Marxism in China, and leading Chinese revolutionaries staunchly parried the attacks on Marxism by its adversaries, including adherents of the school of American pragmatism—Hu Shi and his supporters.

The decline of liberalism in China, in the wake of the May Fourth movement, inevitably led to the conclusion that in the Chinese revolution the forces siding with the October Revolution and showing profound understanding for its ideals were growing stronger. Indeed, thoughtful young revolutionaries saw as unacceptable the world's division, as suggested by the liberals, into "constitutional" and "unconstitutional" states; they were increasingly attracted by arguments urging struggle against

oppression and against foreign domination. Sun Yatsen's stand as a revolutionary-democrat came into conflict with American liberal theories, with the pragmatism of John Dewey who preached social harmony. Although it was inconsistent, the social orientation of Sun Yatsen's stand mirrored the growth of new, progressive forces in China.

The political struggle in China inevitably generated bitter debates over the heritage of American pragmatism and its influence on Chinese political reality. The Chinese press began to print articles drawing attention to the ideological kinship of the Gang of Four and American pragmatism. In the Foreword to *A Concise History of Chinese Philosophy* Ren Jiyu, who edited this book, asks the question: "Marxism or pragmatism?"¹ In answering it he depicts the Gang of Four as fervent proponents of pragmatism and adversaries of Marxism. Evidence in support of this is shown in the slogans of the "cultural revolution": "The ancient in the service of contemporaneity" (although words to this effect have been current for 2,000 years). According to Ren Jiyu, this means "the ancient in the service of self-interests". He quotes Hu Shi who maintained that what is useful is true. "Properly speaking," Ren Jiyu writes, again quoting Hu Shi, "truths have been created by people, they have been created for people so that people could use them. And since they are extremely useful, they are given an attractive name—truths." In criticising the "methodology" of Hu Shi ("assume boldly, prove cautiously"), Ren Jiyu stresses that it is wrong first to assume that a subjective need has arisen to assert some premise and then to begin seeking evidence in order to evince a "proof". He castigates the Gang of Four for using history, in keeping with the "methodology of pragmatism", for allegorical attacks on Prime Minister Zhou Enlai, for seeking out "Confucians" in history, for comparing historical personalities with the Chinese Premier, medieval judges with the Minister for Public Security, and so on.

However, this sort of criticism of the Gang's pragmatism can hardly be considered scientifically substantiated. First, because

¹ Ren Jiyu, "A Critique of Allegorical Historiography, Restoration of the True Make-Up of the History of Philosophy", *Zhexue yanjiu*, No. 3, 1978, (Beijing), pp. 28-37.

Zhou's supporters had themselves used examples from history. Second, and this is perhaps the most important point, their political philosophy reflected what was, essentially speaking, a purely pragmatic approach to issues of domestic and foreign policies. Lastly, Chinese propaganda of the period of the trial of the Gang of Four often used examples from history (as it did in the day of Mao), naming ancient emperors and hinting at mistakes made by the latter (while implying Mao) and similarly employing allegories to attack Mao Zedong's supporters.

Beginning with the close of the nineteenth century, when in the face of aggression by capitalist powers Chinese bourgeois nationalism demonstrated that it was prepared to use all means, including vulgar-sociological theories, to achieve the cherished goal of rejuvenating a great China, social-Darwinism won a growing body of support among the Chinese intellectual elite. Chinese reformers undertook what for those days seemed to be an inconceivable task: they tried to pull down the pillars of the capitulationist policy of the Manchu emperor and the group of feudals and compradores advising him. They felt that one of the most effective ways of countering the "foreign devils" was to unite the population of China on the basis of its racial oneness. This belief was reinforced by the theory, borrowed from the West, that the struggle of nations and races for their existence is a natural-historical phenomenon.

The idea of racial oneness began to play a major role in the arsenal of bourgeois nationalists urging China's capitalist development but hoping to rid their country of foreign domination. Newspapers began to print the appeals of the nationalist-reformers to Manchus and Hans to unite in order to turn China into the most powerful state in the world. The protagonists of the social-Darwinist concept of racial struggle went further, preaching pan-Asian oneness in opposition to the "white race". The infectious influence of racism spread to members of the revolutionary wing of the opposition. This disease in its most virulent form was inherited by the reactionary wing of the Kuomintang.

The idea of racial oneness, so widely proclaimed by the nationalist-reformers, was adopted by the Chiang Kai-shek clique. In a book entitled *China's Destiny*, Chiang Kai-shek

wrote that Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, and Tibetans were people of one race with the legendary emperor Huangdi (Huang Ti) as their progenitor. During the civil war in China the Kuomintang sought in racism the means of countering the Soviet Union and the national liberation movement. Logically enough, Chiang Kai-shek's racial ideas were warmly embraced in Japan by the "co-prosperity sphere" proponents. Japanese evaluations of Chiang Kai-shek's book noted that the Kuomintang's chief theoretician repeated the Japanese theory of a "Greater East Asia" and that Chiang Kai-shek's ideas coincided with the pan-Asia concept. The bellicose Japanese press smugly pointed out that Chiang Kai-shek was "after all, an East Asian by nature", that his book was steeped in the "East Asian spirit".

The ideas of racial oneness, which inflamed Chinese bourgeois nationalism in the period of aggression by capitalist states, began to play a militant role in the inter-imperialist struggle in Asia. Little wonder that in the racist concepts of the Chinese nationalists Japanese militarism saw not a venom dangerous to itself but a key instrument that could incite anti-Western feeling in the colonial domains of the leading European capitalist powers and erect an ideological barrier to American expansion.

In his writings Hu Shi, as a follower of Dewey, used social-Darwinism as a counter-balance to the Marxist understanding of society, an understanding that regarded concrete conditions of material life as the cardinal factor of social development. According to Hu Shi, the determining element in the dialectics of social development was "social intuition" rather than the concrete conditions of society's material life. The purpose of ideas of this sort was to cultivate egoism and violence (attainment of personal success, of the end goal, regardless of the means used).

In one form or another social-Darwinist ideas were reflected in socio-political thought in China at the start of the 1980s, when the Chinese mass media began to campaign for free competition. Leading publications controlled by the CPC printed articles that to all appearances might have come from the seemingly forgotten pens of outspoken Chinese vulgarisers of Darwin's theory of evolution, of Chinese proponents of the

school of social-Darwinism. Can free competition and socialism be reconciled? If so, how? The answers in the Chinese press were not distinguished for subtlety. The phenomenon of competition is implicit in the living world generally and "is to be observed everywhere", the Chinese theoreticians wrote. "In a forest trees that manage to push their crowns to the sunlight grow faster and become taller than other trees. At a chicken farm there appear stronger chicks that push the others away from the feeding-rack." However, one can hardly agree that the philosophy of American pragmatism and the social-Darwinist concepts, found in the political doctrines of the Chinese nationalists of the past, are compatible with Chinese traditions, with the intellectual values of the Chinese people.

The custodians of Dewey's ideological heritage in China saw before their eyes the image of the country that raised the banner of "predestination", which could be seen as the product of the work done in the early years of the twentieth century by presidents William H. Taft and Woodrow Wilson, who fired political messianist-reformers with the inspiration to "save the world" in the interests of the USA. President Wilson spoke of his hope of building a new order, the foundation for which was to be laid in another world war, while the American philosopher John Dewey tried to inspire his followers with the confidence that the postulates of Jeffersonian democracy were everlasting and invincible. As a diligent pupil and admirer of John Dewey, Hu Shi looked upon the USA as though it were the symbol of unsurpassed morals, an inexhaustible source of inspiration.

How was the backwardness of his own country to be explained? In his reply to this question Hu Shi referred to the burdensome spiritual legacy of feudal society, the Confucian traditions, and the stereotypes of thought that were fashioned in the course of centuries. Arguments of the same sort have been offered by many leading members of the academic elite in the USA itself, who likewise proceeded from the derivative assessments of the vices of their society. William J. Fulbright spoke of the special Southern way of thinking, long-standing traditions, the psychological heritage of the distant past, and so on, in an effort to explain the tragedy of racist America. Neither the American heirs of

Dewey, nor the Chinese followers of his pupil Hu Shi considered that society's vices could be uprooted by conscious social revolutionary transformations. Hu Shi saw poverty, disease, ignorance, and corruption as the principal enemies of Chinese society.

American society, alas, gave no example of a rapid and painless deliverance from the social ulcers, from the innumerable vices that have their source in capitalism. The economic crisis of the early 1930s dispersed the touted illusions about the American way of life; the dogmas cemented by the ideological heritage of the days of Warren Harding, Calvin Coolidge, and Herbert Hoover fell apart before people's very eyes. Finding itself in the epicentre of the crisis that hit the capitalist world, the USA parted with its unquestioning belief in the "non-susceptibility" of the American way of life to the ulcers implicit in contradiction-torn European capitalism or in socio-economically backward countries of the colonial outskirts.

However, brought up on the classical canons of American pragmatism, Hu Shi did not lose his faith in the values of American democracy. But what was the prime cause of corruption, violence, and racism in that "fortress of freedom and justice", as the USA was depicted by the protagonists of Pax Americana? The American liberals ascribed these phenomena to the "weakness and vulnerability of the human psyche". Society progressed, they said, with the gradual transformation of the "human soul".

Many centuries before the American revolution, the ancient predecessors of the Chinese philosophers of the twentieth century tried to answer the question: What is to be called the "perfection" of the human being? In this context, the Soviet scientist, Academician N.I. Konrad, cited the ancient treatise *Daxue* (*Great Science*): Man gets to know "things", i.e., the entire external world; in this process he creates knowledge; knowledge makes his thought identical with truth; the truth of thought predicates "correctness of heart", i.e., of emotions; through all this is man's personality perfected; when man's personality, when he himself is perfect, then there is order in the family, and when there is order in the family the state is properly administered; when the state is properly administered

there is peace in the Under-Heaven.¹ Konrad draws attention to the fact that throughout his history man has been relentlessly pursued by the thought that the individual has to be perfected, that society's wellbeing depends on the level of the individual's perfection. In this context, the Chinese exponents of the philosophy of American pragmatism drew also upon the legacy left by Chinese thinkers of ancient times. Hu Shi believed that by perfecting the individual Chinese society would be able to vanquish its "principal enemies"—poverty, disease, ignorance, corruption, disorder.

Crisis of Confidence in the "American Experience"

In the course of the many years since the Second World War the American people have time and again been able to see that appeals for a transformation of the "human soul" do not stay the hand of assassins: they shot and killed the fighter for civil rights Martin Luther King, and statesmen and political leaders, for instance, the Kennedy brothers. American liberalism tried to ascribe the assassination of President John F. Kennedy solely to the extraordinary tenacity of typically American traditions, the Puritan way of thinking, the legendary heritage of the period of the migration of American settlers. While the adherents of American pragmatism in China attributed all of their country's calamities to the tenacity of the intellectual heritage of feudal times, the American liberals saw the prime source of their society's tragedy, the uncontrollable spread of violence as one of its most striking manifestations, in the "romantic cult" of the period of colonisation. In 1963, when an assassin's bullet struck down John F. Kennedy, Senator Fulbright told his fellow countrymen that atonement for this murder could be an intensification in American society of the movement against violence and extremism. When John Kennedy was fired at and outraged American liberals called for "atonement" for his murder, John Hinckley was timidly learning to walk in a well-to-do American family. Hardly anybody could suspect

¹ N.I. Konrad, *West and East*, Moscow, 1972, p. 473 (in Russian).

that the Republican President Ronald Reagan would be almost at death's door only because Hinckley would want this some 20 years later. Killers are not born, they are brought up by society. The death of President Kennedy unleashed a rising tide of anger among the American people against violence and extremism and induced the government to make fainthearted attempts to bring down the crime rate. However, the deep-lying social causes remained.

The American philosopher Barrows Dunham analysed, as he put it himself, "a much more cautious" approach to the possibility of changing human nature regardless of whether or not the social problems confronting society are solved. He generalised the most sharply defined theses of twentieth-century American liberals. Do we wish to extend the right of suffrage to the millions denied that right? The advocates of segregation answer this question in the negative. These millions should first get an education. Do we want to remove the many discriminations against Jews and Blacks? The answer is that this cannot be done without first reshaping people's views. Are we seeking a fundamental upgrading of society's nature? The same answer is offered, namely, that this is unattainable without first changing human nature. "It may appear," Dunham writes, "that the views in this last category assume the possibility of changing human nature. That appearance, however, is illusory, for the change which is assumed is completely divorced from the social milieu in which alone change can occur. It therefore becomes an abstract conception, floating agreeably in the minds of its possessors."¹

Progressive Chinese intellectuals showed understanding for Hu Shi's criticism of traditional and essentially reactionary social notions that were hindering China's intellectual and social renewal. But they could not accept him, a nihilist who was dismissing the cultural heritage of a great people, the values that fostered patriotism and undauntedly defied the expansionist aims of the imperialist powers. Members of the enlightened Chinese elite were sooner prepared to follow He Lin, a spokesman of Chinese socio-political thinking of

¹ Barrows Dunham, *Man Against Myth*, Little, Brown and Co., Boston, 1974, p. 34.

the 1930s-1940s, who advanced the idea of a synthesis of Chinese and Western cultures. He Lin postulated that it was possible to create a new Chinese culture exclusively by preserving and developing the nation's cultural values in which the main role was played by Confucianism. The synthesis that He Lin had in mind was not a mechanical borrowing of the world's cultural achievements but an interpretation of Western cultural values in a manner permitting their "Sini-cisation".

He Lin's ideas became popular at a time of the Great Depression when Americans, having previously believed that their social system was infallible and unique, felt themselves cheated out of their finest hopes. The Democratic Party's presidential candidate Franklin Delano Roosevelt declared he would save the "American miracle" by reforms. His New Deal, hailed by proponents of stricter state regulation of the capitalist economy, was seen by many people in the world as the greatest triumph of the etatist conception that envisages an extension of the state's management not only of the economy but also of society's affairs. Roosevelt's efforts to foster state regulation impressed the advocates of a "Confucianist type of democracy". He Lin felt that Roosevelt's New Deal was a concrete embodiment of the Confucianist type of democracy (he called Roosevelt "a great political leader of the Confucianist pattern"). The raptures of Hu Shi, He Lin, and other Chinese philosophers over what they believed were unsurpassed values of American democracy nourished the illusions that the USA had a messianic predestination.

Reagan is not the first nor will he be the last President of the USA to extol the spirit of free enterprise and laud the free market mechanism as a panacea for all the social problems in the world community. During his visit to Beijing the US President did not remind the Chinese that other notions about "American democracy" were also current in the USA. Long before Reagan became President, leading members of the "political realism" school had themselves dispersed the illusions that the experience of American democracy was universal. As early as in the 1960s Hans J. Morgenthau, for instance, drew his fellow countrymen's attention to the contradiction that having stood for freedom and fought fascism in the

Second World War, the USA was in recent years appearing to the outside world "to be indifferent to the cause of freedom". What could America offer to the world? Morgenthau asked. Equality in freedom, a happy life for all under a government governing with the consent of the governed?¹ No, these achievements of American history had been discredited in the eyes of other nations. Writing of the causes, Morgenthau abided by the traditions of "political realism"—it was all the fault of miscalculations in US foreign policy, the quest for military alliances and aspiration to maintain the political status quo throughout the world. It was not the social system itself but only miscalculations, Morgenthau asserts, that brought about the collapse of "the traditional image of the United States as the last best hope of freedom". The picture of a powerful and wealthy nation seeking to increase its power and wealth with the help and at the expense of other nations destroyed the belief that the American experience was peerless.²

The Chinese leaders set out to achieve what was evidently unachievable: to obtain from the West the technology needed for China's modernisation and prevent Chinese society from coming under foreign ideological influence. "In the social sciences," said Huang Kecheng, permanent secretary of the Central Discipline Inspection Commission, "we should under no circumstances imitate capitalism... Had we made fewer mistakes the situation would have been even better. We should not embellish all things Western. American newspapers report that in 1979 the operations of the mafia in the USA involved 150 billion dollars and yielded a net profit of 50 billion dollars, which is second only to the profits of the oil industry. Where did the mafia's profits come from? From drug-trafficking, gambling, and other dirty business. If in our country we begin to imitate this, to what will it lead us? Is this what they call civilisation and happiness?"³ Similar exhortations were to be

¹ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Truth and Power. Essays of a Decade, 1960-70*, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1970, pp. 316, 317.

² *Ibid.*, p. 317.

³ *Renmin ribao*, April 11, 1981.

heard at various conferences. It was urged that learning from the West should not be turned into "veneration of things foreign", that young people should be safeguarded against the pernicious influence of Western culture, which in the early 1980s began to be felt tangibly, especially on the country's Pacific coast.

The Americans endeavoured to use the new climate of the relations between China and the USA following Mao's death to push their ideological influence into China, but in many cases forgot how painfully Chinese nationalism accepts Western ideological values. American correspondents who worked in China in the 1940s and then settled there after US-Chinese relations were normalised noted that the Chinese had no interest in American culture.

The new Open Door policy gave the Chinese the opportunity to view shoddy American films and television programmes, and this enabled them to form an opinion about the values of American society. In the early 1980s Chinese newspapers began publishing more articles on the problem of combating "cultural pollution". The eradication of this "pollution" became an element of the basic task of putting the party in order, set by the 1983 plenary meeting of the CPC Central Committee. "Cultural pollution", the Chinese press wrote, has two aspects: the first is in culture—the appearance of substandard works, and the second is the appearance of works "that come into conflict with approved guidelines".

If it is to maintain the spirit of socialist ideals, China cannot in fact accept the "consumer society" philosophy vigorously preached in the West. What can "mass culture" give China? At the outset of the present decade this question acquired special urgency among enlightened Chinese. What sentiments would consumerism generate? Would it orient people towards the all-sided development of the individual, towards assimilation of the cultural wealth built up by humankind? Is it within capitalism's power to ensure equal rights to education, jobs, and dwellings, equal old-age social security, the individual's participation in public life, and other benefits?

A policy of encouraging egoism, self-interest, and profit at the expense of other people, in other words, everything that fosters capital's mad pursuit of profits, cannot coexist

peacefully with the tendency to safeguard the Chinese people's finest revolutionary traditions, the rich heritage of China's ancient culture.

Quest in the USA to Justify the "Cultural Revolution"

The time came when the Chinese leaders themselves called the regime established by the initiators of the "cultural revolution" a dictatorship "of an utterly rotten and most gruesome fascism with an admixture of feudalism". "In 1957," Ye Jianying said, "when an attack by a handful of bourgeois right-wingers had to be repulsed, a mistake was made in that the magnitude of this struggle was amplified"¹ with the result that millions of people found themselves in prison or in "labour camps".

A hostile howl in the West was the response to the declaration of the Chinese leaders that the PRC would be a socialist democracy. The Western press called the Chinese leadership tyrannical; anti-communist propagandists vied with each other in their arguments about the dangers of a "communist dictatorship" to the Chinese people, and the American press frequently featured caricatures of Mao Zedong personifying a cult of brute force and unbridled arbitrary rule. At that time only a few Western political leaders urged circumspection and Mao's acceptance. Anti-communist criticism of the building of the foundations of a socialist democracy in China focussed on features of socialist administration entirely alien to the social system in imperialist states. Could they in the West composedly accept the declarations that in new China democratic centralism would be the underlying principle and method of administering the socialist society and state? They could not accept these declarations composedly because this principle envisages real conditions for building a democratic society and implies leadership of socialist construction by the working class headed by a Marxist-Leninist party and utilisation of the state by different strata of society as an instrument of socialist construction in the interests of the entire nation. Could the ideologues of the

¹ *Hongqi*, No. 5, 1978, (Beijing), pp. 29-37.

“free world” look with equanimity upon China becoming an antipode of the capitalist state? This would enable the working people to exercise authority, reinforce the socialist forms of economic management, and rapidly, in terms of historical time, build a developed socialist social system. The assessments of the anti-communists about state construction in the PRC changed with the changes in the political course of the Beijing leadership.

It is a fact that in the early 1970s the Chinese press was silent for a long time about the shameful hongweibing past, while Western academics and newspaper analysts continued their efforts to vindicate the use of force, the senseless violence of the “cultural revolution” period, and the doings of its initiators. Speaking of the assessments of the “cultural revolution” as a whole by Western non-Marxist historiography, note must be made, above all, of the steep switch from criticism and condemnation (1966-1969) to recognition of the “objective necessity” for these events in China, to eulogistic comment about the “lofty” intentions of the stage-managers of political “disturbances”, and, lastly, to glorification of Mao as a champion of justice against “bureaucratisation” and “revisionism”. The assault on the rights of the working people, the shocking flaunting of the individual’s elementary rights in the PRC did not evoke, as it once did, a sharply negative reaction from bourgeois propaganda. This was due to one and the same reason—the turn in the policy towards China. A special USIA study prepared for the US President in connection with his then impending visit to Beijing in 1972 characterised the “cultural revolution” in the following terms: This was a great movement to purge the party, halt the spread of revisionism, inspire young people, and return the country to the road of revolution. The “cultural revolution” permitted bourgeois science and propaganda to be indulgent towards the orchestrators of arbitrary rule and violence in China. Anti-communist propaganda, which had earlier undisguisedly denounced the suppression of “freedom of the individual” in China and backed up its denunciations with references to the values of bourgeois democracy, now spoke a different language, displaying a “new approach” to China.

Many Western propagandists were unquestionably aware that

the organised suppression of the individual in China would not be condoned by bourgeois liberalism preoccupied as it was with promoting the ideals of bourgeois democracy in the world. Criticism of Chiang Kai-shek's totalitarian regime by some American Sinologists in the 1940s found understanding and support among liberal Americans. For instance, the wartime American diplomats and liberal journalists who in the 1940s depicted Mao's followers almost as adherents of the ideals of American democracy, sternly indicted Chiang Kai-shek, charging him with being bent upon building a militarist state; they wrote that the Chongqing dictator, who regarded himself as the heir of the ancient Chinese emperor Qin Shihuang, was flouting elementary human rights in his own country.

When the American publicist Edgar Snow wrote of the "cultural revolution" he paid tribute to the exponents of the USA's China policy, who saw the attitude of the makers of this "revolution" as a major prop for their foreign policy manoeuvring. At a time when China had been turned into a "huge barracks" in which violence reigned, Edgar Snow took a different tack—he wrote accolades to the sowers of terror for their efforts to reshape the party and the state. One of Mao's objectives, Snow noted, was to simplify the administrative structure and abolish duplication. The Chinese press subsequently reported what this simplification of the administrative structure cost the Chinese people—100 million people were repressed and persecuted; a huge number of persons, regardless of their social, party, and professional affiliation, of their religious convictions, were subjected to unheard-of harassment and humiliations.

Edgar Snow had once asked: What happened to the senior party and government officials who lost their jobs as a result of the "cultural revolution"? "They were sent," he reported quoting Zhou Enlai, "to rural centres known as 'May 7 schools'. After they had been tempered by labour, some would be appointed to new posts ... they would be sent (or had already been sent) to reinforce the leadership in various population centres."¹ Snow depicted this policy as a determination to be "self-reliant" on a nation-wide and local scale in the produc-

¹ *Epoca*, Vol. LXXXII, No. 1064-65, February 28, 1971, (Milan), p. 23.

tion of foodstuffs and in industrialisation. It was then that Snow reported that in China they were drawing up a new Constitution enshrining the "new forms", created by the people during the "cultural revolution", for carrying out a socialist revolution: the right of freedom of opinion, the right of freedom of appealing to the masses, of holding wide discussions, and writing wall newspapers. This sort of information in Snow's writings gave people the impression that positive processes were developing in China, that the Gang of Four had the interests of the Chinese people at heart and was creating the conditions to permit democracy to flourish in the country. Had Snow given a true picture of the situation in China, he would have been called not a "friend of the Chinese people", as Chinese propaganda referred to him at the time, but an enemy of the Chinese nation.

After Mao's death voices glorifying the personality cult of the "cultural revolution" years could still be heard in the USA. One of the Carter administration's advisers on Chinese affairs, Michel Oksenberg, was known for his inclination to extol Mao and his political credo. The Chinese leaders defined the regime set up during the "cultural revolution" years as feudal-fascist, but Oksenberg insisted that Mao's goal was related to a "search for national security, prosperity, and socialism". The Chinese leaders spoke of a hundred million people persecuted and tormented, but the Carter administration's former adviser wrote that the "cultural revolution" left a "more unified, wealthier, stronger, and more equitable society".¹

In extolling the orchestrators of the "cultural revolution", the ideologues of anti-communism pursued various but closely interrelated aims. One of these was to discredit Marxism-Leninism and the practice of socialist construction.

American Sinologists welcomed, as could be expected, the post-Mao steps taken by the Chinese leadership to facilitate foreign investment and introduce elements of "market socialism". More, they blamed scientific socialism for China's economic difficulties. They stressed (as though offering Beijing advice) that the only way to modernise China most effectively was

¹ Michel Oksenberg, "Mao's Policy Commitments, 1921-1976", *Problems of Communism*, Vol. XXV, No. 6, November-December 1976, p. 22.

to renounce "Marxist socialism".

During Mao's lifetime the USA cherished the nationalism of the Chinese leaders to prevent any changes for the better in Soviet-Chinese relations. It was believed that laudation of the "Chinese way" would serve the West as a significant ideological and political means of countering the Soviet Union and the theory on society's socialist restructuring. After Mao's death, when the tragic consequences of the dictatorship of the "cultural revolution" years came to light, leading Sinologists in the USA tried to turn a blind eye to the adventurism of the "revolution's" initiators, in particular that of the Gang of Four, and focus attention on the advantages that would allegedly come not with socialist but with unhindered capitalist development.

In the USA they found much consolation in the fact that for most Chinese analysts criticism of the role and influence of the survivals of feudalism began to acquire more topicality than criticism of the foundations of capitalism. A debate commenced in the Chinese press on the essence of the socio-political system and the character of socio-political relations in the PRC. According to a new concept that had appeared in the work of Chinese theoreticians, the transition from capitalism to communism is not a single process but one consisting of several stages. In keeping with this concept the PRC was defined as a "socialist state of the dictatorship of the proletariat", in which socialist society had not yet been built and the country had not reached in its development the stage of developed socialism. Most of the proponents of this concept saw survivals of capitalism and feudalism exercising a significant influence at the stage of "undeveloped socialism" in China. In works published in China after Mao's death it is noted that in ideology feudal traditions are more widespread than those of capitalism. Hence the advocacy of a more vigorous drive against survivals of feudalism in China.

Cooperation with the national bourgeoisie and international capital, the creation of conditions conducive for private enterprise with the use, albeit limited, of wage labour, and other innovations in economic policy inevitably evoked resistance in various spheres of Chinese society. The purpose of the "drive against feudal survivals" was precisely to neutralise such

resistance. Protagonists of innovations asserted that Lin Biao was responsible for the appearance of "feudal tendencies", but the opposition to the new line, on the contrary, contended that here it was a case of the appearance of "capitalist" tendencies. This was noted, in particular, in an article by Chong Zhenting in *Lishi yanjiu*, stating that Lin Biao and the Gang of Four tried to "restore capitalism in China".¹

The Marxists-Leninists have always spoken against the attempts to present the military-bureaucratic regime in China of the "cultural revolution" years as a boon for the Chinese people. True democracy is possible only with the establishment of socialist relations of production, and being a stage of society's development these relations are the most crucial prerequisite of democracy. It is not the fault but the misfortune of the Chinese people that they had to experience all the hardships poured down upon them by the "cultural revolution", which the ideologues of anti-communism acclaimed as the greatest boon they ever had.

¹ *Lishi yanjiu*, No. 7, 1978, (Beijing).

CONCLUSION

For centuries on end China's greatest minds looked for a way to build a society of justice and wellbeing. This search was reflected by the birth of utopias, one of which was spelled out in works of the democrat Sun Yatsen. Many eminent representatives of Chinese socio-political thought regarded socialism as the panacea for the suffering, hunger, and poverty of the Chinese people, but there were not many among them who studied the experience of the working class of Russia and had a clear vision of the essence and way of China's socialist transformation. The USA found socialist ideals winning a following in China immediately after the October Revolution in Russia and countered this with the Wilsonian antidote to revolution. The ideology of American pragmatism, which the theoreticians of the "American age" tried so hard to impose upon China soon after the October Revolution, did not find fertile socio-political soil for itself in China.

The "personal gain" motivation, the pursuit of accumulation and profit was recognised by Western socio-political thinking as the mainspring and pivot of the philosophy of capitalist enterprise so zealously preached by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, Alfred Marshall, and other proponents and champions of capitalism. Benjamin Shujung Cheng, Associate Professor of Economics at Southern University, Hong Kong, justifiably asks how far the values of Confucian culture are compatible with the philosophy of capitalist accumulation, the institution of gain, the spirit of acquisition. Cheng offers the view that the Confucian ideal placed ethics and virtue above econom-

ic gain.¹ The value orientations in Confucian China influenced the behaviour of the powerful bureaucracy held in the grip of customs and traditions, and to some extent fettered the development of commercial activity stimulated mainly by bare calculation and profit. These traditions influenced also the leaders of the revolutionary movements in twentieth-century China.

More than 60 years after the commencement of the essentially anti-imperialist movement of May 4, 1919, which erupted in China soon after the Great October Revolution, there was a revival in the USA of the hope of promoting "free enterprise" in China and bringing Chinese society into the capitalist world system. "According to post-Darwinian philosophers," Sun Yatsen wrote, "the chief motive force of humanity's evolution is mutual assistance rather than struggle as is to be observed in the animal world. The inclination to be bellicose is a residue of the animal instinct in the human being and the quicker it is uprooted the better."² Aware of the danger of any manifestations of the "animal instinct" in either domestic or foreign policy, Sun Yatsen urged moral perfection of the nation, mutual understanding and cooperation among different peoples.

The experience of US-Chinese relations of the 1970s showed influential circles in the USA the untenability of the former calculations that the dialogue with China could be a means of global manipulation. It became clear that the West had been much too sanguine about its economic and political links to China. In Washington they found that while the Chinese leaders displayed solidarity with the West on major international issues they were motivated not by American but, in the first place, by China's interests.

In evaluating China's actual stance in the present alignment of strength on the international scene one has, of course, to take into account its geopolitical position, the size of its territory and population, and the fact that its Armed Forces are large and have nuclear weapons. In terms of quantity the PRC has

¹ Benjamin Shujung Cheng, "Confucianism and the Backwardness of China's Economy: A Study of Human Self-Interest and Profit-Seeking Motive in Relation to Economic Development", *Asian Profile*, Vol. 7, No. 6, December 1979, (Hong Kong), pp. 507-15.

² Sun Yatsen, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1964, p. 317 (Russian translation).

the third largest arsenal of nuclear weapon vehicles after the USSR and the USA, but in qualitative terms in the 1980s this arsenal has fallen perceptibly behind that of the USSR, the USA, France, and Britain. Nevertheless for the USA and for NATO as a whole China's military-strategic role is important to the extent it is able to erode the Soviet Union's military-political position. It is precisely this latter circumstance that determines to a considerable extent the PRC's political role in the world as a factor that can either help to maintain or downgrade international security.

The notions and concepts about national security that have taken shape in the USA and China are antipodal.

Realistically-thinking members of the ruling circles in the USA are mindful of the price the American people and the whole world would have to pay for miscalculations on the part of political leaders who bank on nuclear superiority. As long ago as in the 1950s, during the sharp political debates in the USA over the then ongoing military confrontation with China, a leading American liberal Fulbright warned against ill-considered actions. "Our objective," he said, "is to minimize the loss of American lives and the expenditure of treasure. The loss of life going on today is so sad and terrible, it is proper to consider that a mistake might result in ten times greater loss in the near future."

The history of the political struggles in the USA after the Second World War knows of cases of seemingly diehard conservatives opening their eyes. It was not easy, for example, for General Douglas MacArthur, weighted down as he was by his long experience of military battles and by the glory of being the idol of the American ultras, to admit that disputes could not be settled by military force. The general, who had urged bombing China and had not ruled out the possibility of using nuclear weapons in the Korean war, realised, albeit towards the end of his life, how dangerous it was to play with fire in world politics.

"Within the span of my own life," he said, "I have witnessed much of this evolution. At the turn of the century, when I joined the Army, the target was one enemy casualty at the end of a rifle, a pistol, a bayonet, a sword. Then came the machine-gun designed to kill by the dozen. After that, the heavy artillery

raining death upon the hundreds. Then the aerial bomb to strike by the thousands—followed by the atom explosion to reach the hundreds of thousands... But this very triumph of scientific annihilation—this very success of invention—has destroyed the possibility of war being a medium for the practical settlement of international differences.”

The rapid spread of nuclear armaments and their numerical and qualitative growth objectively should introduce substantial changes in each nuclear power's conceptions of national security. In the nuclear age no country can ensure its own security if it undermines general security or gives no thought to preserving world peace.

Recognition of the danger of nuclear proliferation which was taking the world to the brink of a global nuclear war motivated the conclusion of the important Soviet-US agreements on disarmament in the 1960s and 1970s. These agreements helped to diminish the threat of nuclear war and ease the dangerous influence of nuclear tests on the environment.

Nevertheless, as soon as it was installed in the White House the Reagan administration signalled that it was prepared to bury in oblivion the positive experience of the Soviet-US dialogue on disarmament problems. Its drive to change the military-strategic situation in the world in its favour was often motivated in Washington by the security interests of the USA and its allies. But the whipping up of the arms race has not in any way furthered the security interests of the USA, its allies, or the world community as a whole. The arms race has placed a heavy burden on nations, diverting manpower and material resources from economic development and becoming a serious obstacle to the efforts to put an end to backwardness and surmount difficulties in social development.

In 1978 China's attitude to problems of disarmament began to undergo some change. Chinese spokesmen made it clear that they wanted to sit down at the disarmament negotiating table (China has been represented on the UN Disarmament Commission since the close of 1979 and on the Geneva Disarmament Committee since 1980) and showed a certain measure of flexibility at discussions of pressing problems of war and peace. Just as the Soviet Union, China has stated its non-first use of nuclear weapons and has supported the idea of nuclear-free

zones in various regions of the world. However, by the early 1980s Beijing did not subscribe to key international treaties and agreements in this area of world politics (the 1963 Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear and Other Mass Destruction Weapons on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, to name a few). It is quite obvious that the prestige of international agreements limiting the arms race would have grown had they had the PRC's signature.

With the twentieth century coming to a close the security of the peoples of our planet is uncompromisingly dependent on the extent to which the nuclear-missile powers, chiefly the USSR and the USA, but also the PRC, are involved in the disarmament process, on the extent to which they are able to work out a common stand on the problem of preventing a nuclear war. The West's conservative philosophy and sociology, aimed at nuclear suicide, are being counterposed by a reasonable quest for a way out of the nuclear deadlock.

The American missionaries, who spoke with pride of having "opened China" at the close of the nineteenth century, relied on the military and economic strength of American capital, which was spreading its influence in the world. But this strength did not save the Americans from defeat on the mainland. China elected to follow its own road of development. Realistically thinking political leaders and academics in the USA are urging their fellow countrymen to abandon the attempts to use military force in the nuclear age to impose upon other nations their political values and way of thinking, to reject unequivocally the calls of the new self-styled prophets for self-destruction. John K. Fairbank, a veteran academic with the experience of half a century of study, exhorted his fellow countrymen to think seriously of how to stop preparing soldiers to use their deathly weapons and begin studying China in earnest.¹ One may or may not agree with his view about the interaction of two civilisations—the Chinese and the American—but it is indisputable that in the harsh reality of the nuclear age there is no more important task than to consolidate

¹ John K. Fairbank, *Chinabound...*, p. 458.

international security. The fulfilment of this task will be facilitated not by an arms race but by a search for ways to mutual understanding.

The Soviet Union's fundamental stand on questions related to Soviet-Chinese relations has been stated in the resolutions of congresses of the CPSU. In these as in many other party and governmental documents the Soviet people's hope is expressed that the estrangement in the relations between the USSR and China will be superseded by confidence, mutual understanding, non-interference in each other's affairs, and mutually beneficial cooperation. In the Soviet Union it has been noted with gratification that at the outset of the 1980s there have been changes for the better in the bilateral relations between the USSR and the PRC. In particular, the situation on the Soviet-Chinese frontier has grown calmer, a new approach has been adopted towards the question of navigation along frontier sections of rivers, and an understanding has been reached that across-border trade would be resumed. After a long interval there has been a resumption of Soviet-Chinese consultations on problems of state-to-state relations. The CPSU leadership and the Soviet government have time and again declared that the USSR is prepared for a political dialogue with China on basic issues of world development, notably on questions related to strengthening peace and international security; they have pointed out that an improvement of Soviet-Chinese relations could contribute to reinforcing peace in Asia and the rest of the world. The Soviet Union is prepared to do and is doing everything in its power to improve these relations. This objective can be attained only through the efforts of both the interested sides.

The 27th Congress of the CPSU has reaffirmed the wish of the Soviet Communists, of all Soviet people, to have better relations with the People's Republic of China, our great neighbour. "The Chinese Communists," says the CC CPSU Political Report to the Congress, "called the victory of the USSR and the forces of progress in the Second World War a prologue to the triumph of the people's revolution in China. In turn, the formation of People's China helped to reinforce socialism's positions in the world and frustrate many of imperialism's designs and actions in the difficult postwar years. In thinking

of the future, it may be said that the potentialities for cooperation between the USSR and China are enormous. They are great because such cooperation is in line with the interests of both countries; because what is dearest to our peoples—socialism and peace—is indivisible.”¹

Underlying Soviet policy in the Asia and Pacific region is the striving to enshrine in law the principle renouncing the use of force in international relations, halt the escalation of the arms race, ensure enduring peace and security, and turn Asia into a continent of confidence and cooperation, which would be an inestimable contribution to the efforts to prevent a nuclear world war.

¹ Mikhail Gorbachev, *Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Party Congress*, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1986, p. 82.

In this book V. B. Vorontsov, D. Sc. (Hist.), offers a history-oriented analysis of the policies pursued by the USA and China in the Pacific, the contradictions between them, and their tactics relative to third nations in the period from the 1960s to the early 1980s. The reader is led up to the conclusions to be drawn from the historical lessons learned by the governments of the USA and China in the process of their attempts to form a military-political alliance.